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Introduction
This thesis consists of four independent chapters which are linked in several aspects:
All chapters contribute to the theory of public economics. From a theoretical point of
view, all chapters are based on the assumption that agents are privately informed about
their preferences, and all chapters use mechanism design theory. Yet their applications
vary and cover topics such as public good provision, externality regulation and income
taxation. The rst three chapters form an entity as they use the independent private
values model. Chapter 4 uses robust mechanism design.
Chapter 1 studies the independent private values model in mechanism design, applied
to the problem of bilateral trade and public good provision. It provides conditions un-
der which a model with a large but discrete number of types behaves qualitatively in the
same way as a model with a continuum of types. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the problem
of externality regulation. I consider rms that can reduce externalities, which is bene-
cial to consumers. Firms have private information about their costs, and consumers
have private information about their preferences. Chapter 2 investigates optimal price
instruments (e.g. taxes) and quantity instruments (e.g. tradable permits). These two in-
struments are frequently used to regulate externalities such as CO2-emissions, acid rain
and water pollution. Both instruments are contrasted with the optimal unconstrained
mechanism to regulate externalities. Chapter 3 addresses the question how externali-
ties should be regulated when distributional concerns and eciency are considered. If
stronger weight is put on consumers in the regulator’s welfare function, lower emis-
sion reduction takes place than when the regulator is interested in jointly maximizing
consumer surplus and rm prots. Chapter 4 varies in that it allows preferences to be
dierent from selsh. It is a contribution to the theory of robust mechanism design,
taking into account ndings of experimental research. More precisely, it describes how
mechanisms can be designed that are not only robust with respect to variations in beliefs
but as well to deviations from standard preferences.
Chapter 1 The rst chapter is based on a joint project with Felix Bierbrauer and Laura
Kohlleppel. It studies the independent private values model, a workhorse model of mech-
anism design. Consumers are privately informed about their preferences, and rms are
privately informed about their costs. This framework covers many applications such as
bilateral trade, auctions, public good provision or partnership dissolution. Typically, the
1
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independent private values model is based on the assumption that consumers and rms
have a continuum of types. It works with the assumption of an atomless distribution.
We introduce an alternative specication and assume that agents have a discrete number
of types.
For this model specication, we derive necessary and sucient conditions for the pos-
sibility to implement a social choice function. For our characterization of implementable
outcomes, we introduce a measure of how dicult it is to implement a given social
choice function. We use this measure to provide comparative static results. We ask, for
instance, whether an increased number of types or an increased number of agents make
it more dicult to implement ecient outcomes. In particular, we discuss the discrete
type analogues to the impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) for the
bilateral trade problem, and by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) for the public good pro-
vision problem. We nd that the Mailath and Postlewaite result extends to any model
with a discrete set of types. By contrast, for the Myerson and Satterthwaite result, we
nd parameter constellation such that ecient bilateral trade is possible if the number
of types for the buyer and the seller is small. A nal contribution of this chapter is that
it provides conditions under which a model with a large but discrete number of types
behaves approximately in the same way as the model with a continuum of types.
Chapter 2 In the second chapter, I apply the independent private values model de-
veloped in Chapter 1 to analyze externality regulation when the regulatory agency has
dierent instruments at hand to achieve socially optimal results. More precisely, I intro-
duce a problem of emission reduction into the independent private values model: There
are rms that can reduce emissions, and they are privately informed about their costs
to achieve the reduction. The emission reduction benets consumers that have private
information about how much they value emission reduction. Following the literature
on externality regulation under uncertainty, I assume that the regulating agency has a
price instrument (e.g. a tax) or a quantity instrument (e.g. tradable permits) at hand to
regulate emissions in order to maximize social surplus.1
The characterization of optimal price and quantity instruments for externality reg-
ulation is treated as a problem of mechanism design. For this purpose, I assume that
the mechanism designer introduces price and quantity mechanisms before private in-
formation is revealed. I compare these two mechanism with an optimal unconstrained
mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that avoids any a priori assumption on the set of admissi-
ble policies. In this context, I show that the unconstrained mechanism leads to ex post
surplus maximization, where overall surplus consists of consumer surplus and rm sur-
plus. The price and quantity mechanisms, by contrast, fail to achieve ex post eciency.
The Coase theorem would hence suggest that an optimally designed mechanism is able
to improve upon both price and quantity instruments (Coase, 1960). I show that this
1This line of research starts with the seminal paper of Weitzman (1974).
2
Introduction
logic does not apply here. There is always one type that is better o under the already
installed mechanism (i.e., price or quantity mechanisms) than under the optimal uncon-
strained mechanism.
Chapter 3 The third chapter is based on the same environment as Chapter 2. There are
rms that can reduce emissions, which is benecial to consumers. All agents privately
observe the realization of their characteristics. The regulating agency can use price and
quantity mechanisms to reduce emissions. The dierence to Chapter 2 lies in the surplus
function of the regulating agency. In Chapter 3, I assume that the regulator is interested
in maximizing consumer surplus as opposed to total surplus that consists of consumer
surplus and rms’ prots. This allows me to investigate how the optimal level of emis-
sion reduction is aected by distributional considerations. When the regulating agency
maximizes consumer surplus, less emission reduction takes place than when the regu-
lating agency maximizes total surplus. This is surprising because consumers, who are
harmed by emissions, prefer less emission reduction than the total surplus maximizing
amount.
This observation is independent of the regulator’s choice of mechanism. The optimal
unconstrained mechanism, as well as optimal price and quantity mechanisms lead to
less emission reduction under consumer surplus maximization. However, the mecha-
nisms dier with respect to eciency and surplus distribution under the two objectives.
Comparative static properties of the solution to optimal externality regulation under
the three mechanisms are provided. The parameters for which comparative statics are
consumers’ preference parameter and rms’ cost parameter.
Chapter 4 The fourth chapter of the thesis is a modied version of a joint paper with
Felix Bierbrauer, Axel Ockenfels and Andreas Pollak (Bierbrauer et al., 2015). It is mo-
tivated by observations from behavioral economics. In laboratory experiments, agents
deviate from selsh behavior. These deviations can be explained by social preferences
as inequality aversion, altruism or intentionality. In standard mechanism design the-
ory, this is not taken into account. Thus, mechanisms that are robust in the sense that
they do not rely on a common prior distribution of material payos, might not be ro-
bust to variations in preferences, in particular, that individuals are motivated by social
preferences.
In this chapter, it is shown how social preferences can be taken into account in robust
mechanism design. Two classics in mechanism design are studied: Trade between two
parties with private information on their valuations, and redistribution among agents
with private information on their productive abilities – to show that some, but not all,
standard mechanism design solutions fail with social preferences. We characterize opti-
mal mechanisms for the bilateral trade problem and the problem of redistributive income
taxation under selsh preferences and provide laboratory evidence that a non-negligible
3
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share of individuals deviates from the behavior that would be predicted on basis of self-
ish preferences. We show that this can be explained by models of social preferences.
We introduce the notion of social-preference-robust mechanisms, which allows to con-
trol behavior not only for selsh but also for social preferences of dierent nature and
intensity, and characterize the optimal mechanism in this class. We present laboratory
evidence that these mechanisms successfully control behavior.
Finally, we compare the performance of the optimal mechanism for selsh agents and
the social-preference robust mechanism with the help of laboratory experiments. We
nd that behavior can indeed be better controlled with social-preference-robust mech-
anisms. However, the ability to control behavior is not the same as the ability to reach
a given objective. In our analysis of the bilateral trade problem, a mechanism is de-
signed with the objective of prot-maximization. In our experimental data, prots are
higher with the mechanism that is designed for individuals with selsh preferences.
Contrary, for the analysis of welfare-maximizing income taxation the social-preference-
robust mechanism leads to higher welfare.
4
1
On the independent private values model
– A unied approach
1.1 Introduction
The independent private values model is an important workhorse model for the the-
ory of mechanism design. In this model, economic agents are privately informed about
their characteristics, typically preferences or costs, and, moreover, the characteristics
of dierent agents are modeled as the realizations of independent random variables. In
addition, an individual’s payo does not depend on the types of other individuals. This
framework has been applied to study a wide range of allocation problems. These include
the allocation of indivisible private goods (auctions), the provision of pure or excludable
public goods, the regulation of externalities, the problem of partnership dissolution, or
redistributive income taxation.
The seminal papers in this literature are based on the assumption that, for each agent,
there is a continuum of possible types and that the corresponding probability distribution
has no mass points and a monotone hazard rate. Moreover, the typical approach is to
use the envelope theorem for a characterization of incentive compatible social choice
functions. In this paper, we develop an alternative characterization of implementable
social choice functions that is based on the assumption that the set of possible types is
discrete. More specically, our analysis proceeds as follows:
We rst provide necessary and sucient conditions for the implementability of a so-
cial choice function. For our characterization, we introduce the notion of a minimal
5
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subsidy. It is dened as the dierence between the maximal payment that one can ex-
tract from individuals in the presence of incentive and participation constraints, and the
payment that would be required in order to ensure budget balance. That is to say, the
minimal subsidy is the amount of money an external party would have to provide so as
to make a given social choice function compatible with the requirements of incentive
compatibility, voluntary participation, and budget balance. However, we do not assume
that such an external party is actually available. Consequently, a social choice function
can be implemented if and only if the minimal subsidy is negative. We then apply our
characterization to clarify conditions under which the famous impossibility results by
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) extend to a model
with a discrete set of types. Second, we provide a comparative statics analysis of how a
change in exogenous parameters – such as the number of individuals, or the number of
possible types per individual – aect the minimal subsidy. This allows us, for instance,
to check whether a change in the economic environment makes it more or less dicult
to implement an ecient provision rule for public goods. A nal contribution of our pa-
per is to spell out the conditions under which a model with a large but discrete number
of types behaves approximately in the same way as a model with a continuum of types.
These results are derived in a model in which many consumers, who have private in-
formation about their preferences, benet from the provision of a private or public good.
Their payos are quasi-linear in the transfers they need to pay for the good. Further,
many rms, which have private information about their costs, prot from the produc-
tion of goods. Firm prots are quasi-linear in the revenues they receive for producing
the good. Consumers’ consumption is bounded by the total output that is made available
by the rms. To derive the minimal subsidy, we proceed as follows: The social choice
function can be divided into a transfer and consumption rule for consumers and a rev-
enue and production rule for rms. First, we hold the consumption rule for consumers
xed and derive the maximal transfers that consumers are able to make if incentive com-
patibility constraints and participation constraints need to be respected simultaneously.
Similarly, we hold the production rule xed for rms and derive the minimal revenue
that rms are willing to accept if again incentive compatibility constraints and participa-
tion constraints need to be respected. The dierences between the maximal consumer
transfers and the minimal rm revenues is the minimal subsidy. If the minimal sub-
sidy is positive, i.e., the mechanism runs a decit, then the specied consumption and
production rules are not implementable. Contrary, if the minimal subsidy is negative,
the implementation of the social choice function is possible. For the characterization of
maximal consumer transfers and minimal rm revenues we use techniques developed
in the non-linear pricing literature (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005).
Our analysis proceeds as follows: We rst derive necessary and sucient conditions
for the implementation of a social choice function. For the characterization of the rst
condition, we consider the problem of maximizing consumers’ transfers and the prob-
6
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lem of minimizing rms’ revenues, taking only a subset of incentive compatibility and
participation constraints into consideration. Specically, we consider the participation
constraints of the consumer with the lowest valuation for consumption and the incen-
tive constraints that prevent consumers to communicate lower preferences. Similarly,
we take into consideration the participation constraint of the rm with the highest costs
of production and the incentive constraints that prevent rms from exaggerating their
costs. The expression that arises from this relaxed problem, where only a subset of con-
straints is considered, provides a lower bound on the minimal subsidy. Thus, a necessary
condition for the implementation is that the minimal subsidy of this relaxed problem is
negative. Second, we derive a sucient condition, which assures that the lower bound
of the minimal subsidy can be reached. This condition requires that the consumption
rule and the production rule are monotone, so that consumers with higher willingness
to pay for the good consume more than consumers with a lower willingness to pay; and
similarly, rms with lower costs produce more output than rms with higher costs.
These conditions have the following implications: First-best consumption and provi-
sion rules are monotone. Therefore, rst-best implementation is possible if and only if
the minimal subsidy is negative. When the rst-best provision rule is not implementable,
monotonicity of the consumption and provision rules can be achieved when the distribu-
tion of agents’ types satises a monotone hazard rate assumption. Hence, consumption
and production plans that maximize a social surplus function subject to the constraint
that the minimal subsidy is negative, are monotone and therefore implementable. To
derive the necessary condition, the monotonicity of hazard rates does not play a role.
We present a version of the impossibility results of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), when
consumers have a discrete number of types. Our specication uses only the necessary
condition to derive this result. We do not require the assumption of a monotone hazard
rate that was imposed by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) in order to attain the impossi-
bility result. Hence, our result holds under less restrictive assumptions.
We provide comparative static results that show how the minimal subsidy varies with
the number of types and the number of agents. In particular, we can compare the com-
parative static properties of the minimal subsidy in a private good setting with a public
good setting. A change in the number of agents aects the minimal subsidy in both set-
tings dierently. In a public good setting, an increase in the number of consumers leads
to a positive minimal subsidy, so that it is impossible to eciently provide the public
good. Contrary, when a private good setting is considered, an increase in the number
of buyers and sellers leads to a negative minimal subsidy. An increase in the number
of types, on the other hand, increases the minimal subsidy, so that in the private good
setting, as well as the public good setting, impossibility results occur when the number
of types grows large.
In order to understand how parameter changes aect the minimal subsidy, we decom-
pose the eect of a change in parameters in the surplus measure and the measure for
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information rents separately. We show that when each agent has a binary type set, then
parameters can be found such that ecient bilateral trade is possible. Further, if only
two consumers are considered, parameters can be found such that the public good can
be provided eciently. We show that the ability to reach possibility results hinges on the
observation that parameters need to be chosen in such a way that the surplus measure
is bigger than the information rents that need to be guaranteed. This raises the question
how (i) the agent’s type parameters, (ii) the probability weights on types (iii) the number
of types and (iv) the number of agents inuence the minimal subsidy. In particular, we
show that the possibility results that are derived with a binary type set ’approach’ the
impossibility results of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) if the number of types increases and if the new types are introduced in such a way
that the nite type set lies dense in the innite type set, i.e., every point of the innite
type set can be approximated by a point of the nite subset of types. We demonstrate
that the minimal subsidy in the discrete setting converges to the minimal subsidy in the
continuous setting if the environments are aligned.
Based on these observations, we study general convergence results. We specify what
we mean by one environment approaches another environment, so that results in a con-
tinuous setting and a discrete setting coincide. Therefore we dene an environment that
allows us to compare and relate dierent economies, e.g. the discrete and the contin-
uous bilateral trade economy. Each of the economies is characterized by four decisive
factors for implementability: the number of agents, the number of types, the probabil-
ity distribution and the parameter constellation. Formally, we can approximate ’similar’
economies by adjusting the single components; i.e., as we increased the number of types
and adjusted the probability distribution, we transfer the discrete bilateral trade setting
into the setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). If the components are adjusted
’appropriately’, we say that one economy will converge to the other economy. To re-
late and analyze implementability results of dierent settings, we calculate the minimal
subsidy and study what drives the possibility to attain ecient implementation in each
economy. We give general insights on how dierent applications of the independent
private values can be linked.
The reminder is organized as follows. The next section contains a more detailed dis-
cussion of the literature. Section 1.3 provides counterparts to Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) impossibility results. Section 1.4 intro-
duces the model. To motivate our more general analysis in subsequent sections, Section
1.5 presents necessary and sucient conditions for the implementation of social choice
functions and characterizes rst-best and second-best provision rules. Section 1.6 dis-
cusses comparative statics properties of the bilateral trade problem and the public good
provision problem. Further, this section studies the impact of increasing the number
of agents on the possibility result. Section 1.7 then shows how the discrete type setting
converges to the continuous type setting and analyzes the convergence in our examples.
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The last section contains concluding remarks. Preliminary proofs are in part 1.A of the
Appendix. Part 1.C introduces further applications.
1.2 Related literature
The independent private values model has been applied to study a wide variety of alloca-
tion problems, from the allocation of indivisible private goods (auctions), to the bilateral
trade problem, the provision of pure or excludable public goods, the regulation of exter-
nalities, the regulation of a monopolist, or the problem of partnership dissolution.
In auction theory, the independent private values model is central. The seminal paper
that introduced the second-price auction and the revenue equivalence theorem is Vick-
rey (1961). Optimal auctions for risk neutral bidders with independent types are derived
in Myerson (1981), Riley and W. (1981), Harris and Raviv (1981) (see McAfee and McMil-
lan, 1987, for further references). Che and Gale (2006) show that the revenue equivalence
theorem does not need to apply when the number of buyer types is nite.
Further, for the example of bilateral trade, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have
shown that if the buyer’s preferences and the seller’s costs are private information and
voluntary participation needs to be assured, ecient trade is not possible. They intro-
duce the notion of the minimal subsidy and thereby provide a measure of how severe
the impossibility result is. We will show that this impossibility result does translate into
a model with many nite types. For few nite types, however, parameters can be found
such that ecient bilateral trade is possible; i.e., the minimal subsidy is negative. A
special case of our setup is the paper of Matsuo (1989), who provides conditions under
which eciency in the bilateral trade example can be reached for discrete distributions
with two types.
The possibility to achieve ecient public good provision, as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in an independent private values model, has rst been established by D’Aspremont and
Gerard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). This literature has not taken voluntary partici-
pation into account. Güth and Hellwig (1986), Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) have shown that if preferences for public goods are private information, so that
incentive compatibility constraints need to be considered and if at the same time volun-
tary participation need to be guaranteed, then rst-best ecient public good provision
cannot be achieved. We will show that this impossibility result does not rely on the as-
sumption that preferences for public goods are continuously distributed by showing that
the impossibility extends to a setup with an arbitrary discrete type set. The provision of
a non-rival, but excludable good is studied in Güth and Hellwig (1986), Hellwig (2003),
Schmitz (1997) and Norman (2004).
The independent private values model has also been applied to study the dissolution
of partnerships, see Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987). They look at situations
where each of several agents possesses a fraction of a good and assume a continuous
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symmetric distribution of agents’ valuations. They show that an ecient reassignment
of shares is possible if initial shares are suciently equal distributed. However, when
a single agent possesses all shares of the partnership, then the same arguments as in
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) apply and an ecient dissolution is impossible. Hence,
whether the partnership can be dissolved eciently relies on the initial shares of the
partnership. As a corollary of our analysis of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) with
discrete types, we show that if the number of types is nite, then parameters can be
found such that the partnership can always be dissolved eciently, even when shares
are unevenly distributed.
Hellwig (2007) provides separate characterizations of optimal income taxes for a model
with a discrete set of types and for a model with a continuum of types. He argues that
for all steps in the proof for the continuous type set there exists an analogous step for
the discrete type set. The strategy of our paper is dierent in that we analyze the im-
plementation of social choice functions for an arbitrary number of discrete types. We
investigate the implication of this modeling choice by approximating the continuous
type set.
Kos and Messner (2013) provide a general characterization of implementable alloca-
tion rules. They describe bounds on the set of transfers that implement an allocation
rule. They do refrain from any assumption on the agent’s type set and utility function.
The work of Kos and Messner (2013) is related to this paper in that it makes use of mini-
mal subsidies to evaluate whether implementation of social choice functions is possible.
Opposed to them, we make more specic assumptions that allow us to elaborate more
clearly on necessary and sucient conditions for implementation. Further, it enables us
to do comparative statics analysis.
The specication of the independent private values model with a nite number of
types is well suited for directly testing mechanisms in the laboratory. Bierbrauer et al.
(2015) use this specication to test whether mechanism that are robust to agents’ prob-
abilistic beliefs (see Bergemann and Morris, 2005) fail when agents have social prefer-
ences.
1.3 Motivating examples
This section contains motivating examples, which illustrate the diculty of extending
the impossibility results by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Mailath and Postle-
waite (1990) to models with a discrete set of types. Throughout, we will use these two
examples to illustrate conceptual issues that arise.
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1.3.1 The bilateral trade problem
In the private good setting, there is one buyer and one seller. The seller produces
y ∈ [0, 1] units of a good. The buyer can purchase q ∈ [0, 1] units of the good. The
buyer’s utility is given by u(θ, q, t) = θq − t, so that θ is the buyer’s valuation for the
good and t is the transfer the buyer has to pay for the good. The seller’s prot is given
by pi(δ, y, r) = r − δy, so that δ is the cost of producing the good and r is the rev-
enue the seller receives for providing the good. The quantity that is consumed by the
buyer is equal to the quantity produced by the seller, so that for all (θ, δ) ∈ Θ × ∆,
q(θ, δ) = y(θ, δ) ∈ [0, 1]. Further, it is assumed that trade is voluntary and, in the
absence of trade, both parties realize a utility, respectively a prot of 0. We dene for
the buyer a function Q : Θ 7→ [0, 1], where Q(θk) = E(δ)[q(θk, δ)|θl]. This gives the
conditional expectation over the probability that the buyer gets the good, in case that
he announces type θk but having a true type θl. The conditional expected value of the
transfers T (θk), and the conditional expected values of revenues R(δk) and produced
quantity Y (δk) for the seller are dened analogously. The seminal analysis of the bi-
lateral trade problem by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) has focused on the question
whether there exists a Pareto ecient or surplus-maximizing social choice function that
is incentive-compatible for the buyer,
θlQ(θl)− T (θl) ≥ θlQ(θk)− T (θk) , ∀ θl, θk ∈ Θ , (1.1)
incentive-compatible for the seller,
R(δl)− δlY (δl) ≥ R(δk)− δlY (δk) , ∀ δl, δk ∈ ∆ , (1.2)
and compatible with the budget requirement,
E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] ≥ E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)] . (1.3)
Surplus-maximization requires that the function q : Θ × ∆ → [0, 1] is chosen so as to
maximize
E(θ,δ) [(θ − δ)q(θ, δ))] .
Hence, surplus-maximization requires that
q(θ, δ) =
{
0, if θ < δ ,
1, if θ > δ .
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) analyzed the bilateral trade problem under the as-
sumption of an atomless distribution functions with a monotone hazard rate1, and es-
1The hazard rate for the buyer is dened as 1−F (θ)f(θ) , where the cumulative distribution function of the
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tablished the following impossibility result.
Proposition 1.1. Myerson and Saerthwaite (1983): If the buyer’s valuation for the
good is independently drawn from the intervals [θL, θH ] and the seller’s costs for the good
are drawn from the interval [δL, δH ] with strictly positive densities, such that the interiors
of the intervals [θL, θH ] and [δL, δH ] are not disjunct, then there is no Bayesian incentive
compatible social choice function that is ex post ecient and gives every buyer type and
every seller type non-negative expected gains from trade.
We change the assumption of atomless type distributions and show: When the buyer’s
and the seller’s type set is discrete, then ecient trade is possible for some parameter
constellations.
Figure 1.1: Binary type set
0 = δL δH
θL θH = 1
Assume that each agent’s type occurs with equal probability. For certain parameter
constellations, e.g.
θs = 0 , θb =
1
8
, θ¯s =
7
8
and θ¯b = 1 ,
the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) impossibility result is obtained. Consider the fol-
lowing relaxed problem: The mechanism designer is interested in maximizing expected
surplus, subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (1.1) and (1.2) and subject
to the constraints that gains from trade have to be non-negative. The following Table
gives a solution to this relaxed problem.
Table 1.1: Positive minimal subsidy
(q, r, t) θs θ¯s
θb
(
1, 3
8
, 1
8
)
(0, 0, 0)
θb
(
1, 4
8
, 4
8
) (
1, 7
8
, 5
8
)
random variable is denoted by F and f is the density; for the seller, the hazard rate is dened as P (δ)p(δ) ,
respectively.
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The maximal expected transfer that the buyer is willing to make is E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] =
5
16
. The minimal expected revenue the seller is willing to accept is E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)] =
7
16
. Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem violates the budget constraint in (1.3).
The minimal subsidy that is necessary for ecient bilateral trade is E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)] −
E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] = 18 .
Contrary, for the following parameter constellation
θs = 0 , θb =
1
3
, θ¯s =
2
3
and θ¯b = 1 ,
the social choice function, which species (q, t, r) for all possible type combinations,
in Table 1.2 leads to ecient bilateral trade and satises the conditions in (1.1), (1.2),
(1.3) and assures non-negative payos.2 Whenever the buyer’s marginal valuation for
the good is higher than the seller’s marginal costs, the good is exchanged. The maximal
expected transfer that the buyer is willing to make is E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] = 12 . The minimal
expected revenue the seller is willing to accept is E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)] = 13 . Hence, the budget
constraint in (1.3) is satised. The minimal subsidy that is necessary for ecient bilateral
trade is E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)]− E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] = −16 .
Table 1.2: Negative minimal subsidy
(q, r, t) θs θ¯s
θb
(
1, 1
3
, 2
3
)
(0, 0, 0)
θb
(
1, 1
3
, 2
3
) (
1, 2
3
, 2
3
)
1.3.2 Public good provision
An indivisible public good is either provided or not. There are I = {1, . . . , n} consumers
and one producer. The utility function is taken to be linear so that u(θi, q, t) = θi q − t,
where q = 1 if the public good is provided, and q = 0, otherwise. The producer’s cost
function is taken to be publicly known. If the public good is produced, the costs are equal
to nc, where c is the per capita cost of public-goods provision. Since the cost function is
known, the producer’s incentive compatibility constraints are irrelevant, and a state of
the economy is exclusively dened by the vector of preference parameters θ. When the
public good is not provided, all consumers realize a utility of zero.
The analysis of public good provision by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) has focused
on the question whether there exists a Pareto ecient social choice function that is
2See Observation 1.1 below, for a proof.
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incentive compatible, so that the incentive constraints in (1.1) are satised for all i, and
that satises the resource requirement
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
≥ nc E(θ)[q(θ)] , (1.4)
where n denotes the number of consumers.
Surplus maximization requires that the function q : Θn 7→ [0, 1] is chosen so as to
maximize
E(θ)
[(
n∑
i=1
θi − nc
)
q(θ)
]
.
Hence, surplus maximization requires that
q(θ) =
{
0, if 1
n
∑n
j=1 θi < c ,
1, if 1
n
∑n
j=1 θi > c .
If the average valuation of a consumer exceeds the per capita costs, E(θ)[θi] > c, then
the public good should be provided. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) analyze the public
good provision under the assumption of atomless distribution functions with a mono-
tone hazard rate. They show that if the number of consumers grows without limit, public
good provision is zero under any social choice function that is incentive compatible and
respects participation constraints.
Proposition 1.2. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990): If the consumers’ valuation for the
public good are independently drawn from the intervals [θL, θH ]with strictly positive densi-
ties and the per capita costs are such that θL < c < θH , then limn→∞prob (q(θ)n > 0) = 0,
for any mechanism in the sequence of mechanism satisfying incentive compatibility con-
straints, voluntary participation and expected budget balance.
With many consumers, if the average valuation is higher than the marginal per capita
costs, then the ecient amount of public good provision will be almost surely equal to
1, yet the amount that is going to be implemented will be almost surely equal to 0, under
any mechanism that respects consumers’ voluntary participation.
Consider now the case where consumers have a binary type set and assume that
each consumer’s type occurs with equal probability. For all parameter constellations
θLi < c < θ
H
i , there is no social choice function, which maximizes surplus and satises
incentive compatibility constraints, ensures non-negative utility for all consumers and
fullls the budget requirement (see Proposition 1.5 below). With private information on
public good preferences, consumer i’s transfers have to be chosen such that the incentive
compatibility constraints in (1.1) are satised. However, when the number of consumers
grows large, a consumer’s impact on the public good provision becomes insignicant.
If no consumer has an impact on the provision, then incentive compatibility constraints
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imply that the transfers have to be similar. Thus, the maximal transfers per capita is θLi ,
which is smaller than the per capita costs of public good provision.
1.3.3 Comparison of private and public good.
Assume that there are two consumers and that each consumer type occurs with equal
probability. For the following parameters, θb = 1, c = 3 and θ¯b = 10, there is a social
choice function, which maximizes surplus, satises incentive compatibility constraints
in (1.1), assure voluntary participation and fullls the budget requirement in (1.4). By
contrast, for θb = 1, c = 3 and θ¯b = 6, there is no social choice function, which
maximizes surplus and fullls all constraints.3 It depends on the parameters whether we
have an impossibility result or not. With many individuals, the Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) result extends to a model with a discrete type set. As has been shown by Gresik
and Satterhwaite (1989), the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) result does not extend
to a model with a large number of buyers and sellers. This raises the following more
general questions: What impact does the number of agents have on the impossibility
results, and what impact does the assumption on the type set have? To address these
questions we will develop a general framework in the subsequent section.
1.4 The model
Consumers. There is a nite set of consumers, I = {1, ..., n}. The preferences of
consumer i are represented by the utility function
ui(θi, qi, ti) = v(θi, qi)− ti ,
where qi denotes i’s consumption of a public or private good and the function v gives
the utility of consumption. It depends on a preference parameter θi that belongs to a
nite ordered set of possible preference parameters Θi = {θ0i , θ1i , ..., θsi }, with θ0i < θ1i ,
etc. for every i ∈ I . The monetary payment of consumer i is denoted by ti.
The function v is assumed to have the following properties. Zero consumption gives
zero utility: for all θi ∈ Θ, v(θi, 0) = 0. The lowest type does not benet from con-
sumption: for all qi, v(θ0i , qi) = 0,∀ i ∈ I . For all other types, the marginal benet
from increased consumption is positive and decreasing, so that for all θi > θ0i and all qi,
v2(θi, qi) > 0
4 and v22(θi, qi) ≤ 0. The marginal benet of consumption is increasing in
the individual’s type, so that θ′i ≥ θi implies that v2(θ′i, qi) ≥ v2(θi, qi).
3See Observation 1.4 below, for a proof.
4The index 2 denotes the partial derivative with respect to the second argument; v2(θi, qi) = ∂v(θi,qi)∂qi .
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The consumer privately observes θi. From the perspective of all other agents it is
a random variable with support Θi and probability distribution fi = (f 0i , ..., f si ). The
random variables (θi)i∈I are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). We write
θ = (θ1, ..., θn) for a vector of all consumers’ taste parameters and θ−i for a vector that
lists all taste parameters except θi.
For later reference we introduce the following notation: We denote by fi(θi) a random
variable that takes the value f li if θi takes the value θli and by Fi(θi) a random variable
that takes the value
∑l
k=0 f
k
i , if θi takes the value θli. Also, we denote by θ+i a random
variable that takes the value θl+1i if θi takes the value θli, for l ∈ {0, . . . , s−1}. If θi = θsi ,
then the value of θ+i is some arbitrary number.
Producers. There is a set of producers, J = {1, ...,m}. Each producer contributes to
the supply of a public or private good. The contribution of producer j is denoted by yj
and comes with production costs k(δj, yj), where δj is a cost characteristic of rm j that
belongs to the nite ordered set ∆j = {δ1j , ..., δrj} of possible technology parameters.
We assume that δ1j < δ2j etc. ∀ j ∈ J . The prot of producer j is given by
pij(δj, rj, yj) = rj − k(δj, yj) ,
where rj is producer j’s revenue, or, equivalently, a monetary payment to producer j.
The function k is assumed to have the following properties. Zero production is cost-
less: for all δj ∈ ∆j , k(δj, 0) = 0. The marginal costs from increased production is
positive and increasing, so that for all δj and all yj , k2(δj, yj) > 0 and k22(δj, yj) ≥ 0.
The marginal cost of production is increasing in the rm’s type, so that δ′j ≥ δj implies
that k2(δ′j, yj) ≥ k2(δj, yj).
The technology parameter δj is privately observed by producer j. From the perspec-
tive of all other agents, it is a random variable with support ∆j and probability distri-
bution pj = (p1j , ..., prj). The random variables (δj)j∈J are i.i.d. We write δ = (δ1, ..., δm)
for a vector of technology parameters and δ−j for a vector that lists all technology pa-
rameters except δj .
We denote by pj(δj) a random variable that takes the value plj if δj takes the value δlj
and by Pj(δj) a random variable that takes the value
∑l−1
k=1 p
k
j if δj takes the value δlj , for
l > 1, and Pj(δj) takes the value 0 if δj = δ1j . We denote by δ−j a random variable that
takes the value δl−1j if δj takes the value δlj , for l ∈ {2, . . . , r}. If δj = δ1j , then the value
of δ−j is some arbitrary number.
The consumers’ preference parameters and the rms’ cost parameters are taken to
to be independent random variables. We will also refer to a vector (θ, δ) that lists all
taste and cost parameters as a state of the economy. The set of all states is given by
(Θni )i∈I × (∆mj )j∈J .
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Social choice functions/ Direct Mechanisms. A social choice function or direct
mechanism consists of a consumption and a payment rule for each consumer i and a
production and revenue rule for each producer j. The consumption rule is a function
qi : Θ
n ×∆m 7→ R+, that assigns to each state of the economy a consumption level for
consumer i. Analogously, ti : Θn ×∆m 7→ R species i’s payment as a function of the
state of the economy. The production and revenue rule for producer j are, respectively,
given by yj : Θn × ∆m 7→ R+ and rj : Θn × ∆m 7→ R. We also write q = (qi)i∈I for
the collection of all consumption rules, y = (yj)j∈J for the collection of all production
rules, etc.
A social choice function is implementable as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if there is a
game with Bayes-Nash equilibrium, so that the equilibrium allocation of this game co-
incides in each state of the economy with the allocation stipulated by the social choice
function. For the given setup, the revelation principle holds, so that we can without loss
of generality limit attention to the implementation of a social choice function via a di-
rect mechanism that induces a game in which truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we say that a social choice function is incentive-compatible if truth-telling is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the corresponding direct mechanism.
Incentive-compatibility. Incentive-compatibility for consumer i holds, provided that
for each θli ∈ Θi and for all θki ∈ Θi,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θki | θli, qi(θ−i, θki ))− T (θki ) , (ICC)
where V (θki | θli, qi(θ−i, θki )) := E(θ−i,δ)
[
v(θli, qi(θ−i, θ
k
i , δ))
]
is the expected consump-
tion utility for type θli of consumer i in case of announcing θki to the mechanism designer,
given that all other consumers and producers reveal their preferences and technologies.
Analogously, T (θki ) := E(θ−i,δ)
[
ti(θ−i, θki , δ)
]
is i’s expected payment in case of reporting
a preference parameter θki . The expectations operatorE(θ−i,δ) indicates that expectations
are computed with respect to the random variable (θ−i, δ). By contrast, the realization
of θi is known when computing this expectation.
Likewise, incentive-compatibility for rm j requires that for all δlj ∈ ∆j and for all
δkj ∈ ∆j ,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δkj )−K(δkj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δkj )) , (ICF )
whereR(δkj ) := E(θ,δ−j)
[
rj(θ, δ−j, δkj )
]
is j’s expected revenue in case of reporting a cost
parameter δkj , and K(δkj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δkj )) := E(θ,δ−j)[k(δl, yj(θ, δ−j, δkj ))] is the expected
cost for type δlj of rm j in case of announcing δkj to the mechanism designer.
Participation Constraints. Social choice functions have to respect lower bounds on the
consumers’ utility and the producers’ prots, respectively. Formally, we require that for
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all i and for all θli ∈ Θi,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ ui , (PCC)
where ui denotes a lower bound for the expected utility of consumer i. Likewise, for all
j and δlj ∈ ∆j ,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ pij , (PCF )
where pij is a lower bound for the expected prot of rm j.
The interpretation of these participation constraints depends on the application at
hand. For instance, we may think that the implementation of the given social choice
function replaces a status quo outcome and moreover requires a unanimous consent of
all consumers and producers. In this case, ui and pij would, respectively, be interpreted as
consumer i’s and producer j’s payo in the status quo. Alternatively, in a model in which
a government has coercive power, such a consent may not be needed but producers may
have the possibility to shut down, so that a social choice function has to provide them at
least with the level of prots that they would realize in this case. By choosing ui and pij
arbitrarily small, we can also capture situations for which participation constraints are
irrelevant.
Physical constraints. For many applications we assume that the consumers’ consump-
tion is bounded by the total output that is made available by the producers. Denote total
output by Y (θ, δ) =
∑m
j=1 yj(θ, δ). If we consider an allocation problem involving pri-
vate goods, then it has to be the case that, for all (δ, θ),
∑n
i=1 qi(θ, δ) ≤ Y (θ, δ). If the
good is non-rival and non-excludable then, for all i and all (δ, θ), qi(δ, θ) = Y (δ, θ). If
the good is non-rival, but excludable, then, for all i and all (δ, θ), 0 ≤ qi(δ, θ) ≤ Y (δ, θ).
We capture all these cases by postulating that, for all (θ, δ),
(qi(θ, δ))i∈I ∈ Λ(Y (δ, θ)) , (1.5)
where Λ(Y (δ, θ)) is an abstract consumption set. Its structure depends on whether the
goods in question are public or private.
Budget balance. We often assume that a social choice function has to satisfy a budget
constraint, which requires that the consumers’ expected payments suce to cover the
producers’ expected revenues,
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
≥ E(θ,δ)
[
m∑
j=1
rj(θ, δ)
]
. (1.6)
An alternative that we will also consider is that the consumer’s expected payments have
18
1.4 The model
to be sucient to cover the producer’s expected costs, i.e.,
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
≥ E(θ,δ)
[
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
. (1.7)
The budget condition in (1.6) is relevant in models in which producers have private
information. The budget condition in (1.7) is employed in models in which the producers’
cost functions are assumed to be publicly known information and in which prots in the
hands of producers are considered undesirable. Since there is no private information
there is also no impediment to reaching an outcome with zero expected prots, i.e., with
E(θ,δ)
[
m∑
j=1
rj(θ, δ)
]
= E(θ,δ)
[
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
.
However, as we will see below, such an outcome is out of reach if producers have private
information and if their participation in the system is voluntary so that pij(δj, rj, yj) ≥
pij , for all j.
These budget conditions allow for the possibility that there are decits in some states
of the economy and surpluses in others, provided that, in expectation, the surpluses are
at least as large as the decits. Thus, it is more permissive than having a separate bud-
get balance condition for each state of the economy. There are various justications
for working with this permissive notion of budget balance. First, for many applications
of the independent private values model, the following proposition holds true: If there
is a social choice function that is incentive-compatible, respects the relevant participa-
tion constraints and budget balance in expectation, there is an ’equivalent’ social choice
function that satises in addition a state-wise requirement of budget balance, see Börg-
ers and Norman (2009). Second, a requirement of budget balance in expectation may be
justied with an appeal to the Law of Large Numbers.5 If the numbers of consumers and
producers is large, the discrepancy between budget balance in expectation and budget
balance for each state separately becomes small, see Bierbrauer (2011b). Finally, many
analyses of the independent private values model have established impossibility results,
see Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) or Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). If there is no
social choice function that satises budget balance in expectation, then there is also no
social choice function that gives rise to budget balance in each state separately. Thus,
for the purpose of establishing an impossibility result, working with the requirement of
budget balance in expectation can be a useful modeling device.
5See e.g. Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985).
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Surplus measures. The total expected surplus that is generated by a social choice
function is given by
S((qi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J) = E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
.
In a model with quasi-linear preferences, a social choice function is Pareto ecient
if and only if the relevant budget constraint holds as an equality, the participation con-
straints in (PCC) and (PCF ) are satised and (qi)i∈I , and (yj)j∈J are chosen so as to
maximize total surplus S((qi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J) subject to the constraint of physical feasibility
in (1.5). Note that there are typically many dierent Pareto ecient social choice func-
tions. While the criterion of surplus-maximization pins down the functions (qi)i∈I and
(yj)j∈J , alternative specications of the payment and revenue rules (ti)i∈I and (rj)j∈J
give rise to dierent distributions of the surplus among consumers and producers.
1.5 Implementable provision rules
Before we turn to the question under which conditions ecient outcomes can be ob-
tained, we will provide, as a preliminary step, a characterization of the set of imple-
mentable social choice functions, i.e., social choice functions with the property that there
exists a direct mechanism that is incentive compatible, satises participation constraints,
and is budgetary and physically feasible.
We begin by deriving a necessary and a sucient condition for a social choice function
to be implementable as Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
1.5.1 Necessary condition
The following proposition states a necessary condition for the possibility to implement a
social choice function. More specically, it states an inequality constraint so that, if this
inequality is violated, we know that there is no mechanism that satises the incentive
compatibility constraints in (ICC) and (ICF ), participation constraints in (PCC) and
(PCF ), and the expected budget constraint in (1.6).
Proposition 1.3.
{
(qi)
n
i=1, (yj)
m
j=1
}
is part of an implementable social choice function
only if
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + {k(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
20
1.5 Implementable provision rules
A proof of the Proposition is in part 1.B of the Appendix. The social choice function
can be split into a transfer and consumption rule for consumers and a revenue and pro-
duction rule for producers. We begin by holding xed consumers’ consumption rule and
derive the maximal transfers that consumers are able to make if incentive compatibility
and participation constraints need to be both respected at the same time. Similarly, we
hold xed rms’ production rule and derive the minimal revenues that rms are will-
ing to accept if again incentive compatibility and participation constraints need to be
respected. We then check whether consumers maximal transfers cover rms’ minimal
revenues. If the mechanism is unable to generate consumer payments that are high
enough to cover the minimal revenue of provision, then there is no mechanism that
reaches eciency.
We make use of techniques used in the non-linear pricing literature (see e.g. Mussa
and Rosen (1978)). We consider the relaxed problem of maximizing consumers’ transfers
subject to the local downward incentive compatibility constraints and the participation
constraints for the lowest preference type. The local downward incentive compatibil-
ity constraints prevent type θli of consumer i to announce the next lower type to the
mechanism designer. Hence, only a subset of consumers’ incentive compatibility and
participation constraints are taken into account. Thus, the maximal transfers that can
be obtained at the solution to the relaxed problem, is an upper bound on the transfers
that can be obtained if all incentive compatibility constraints are taken into account. We
then show that the maximal transfers are given by the left-hand-side of the inequality
constraint in Proposition 1.3 above.
Similarly, we solve a relaxed problem on the production side, to dene the minimal
revenues rms need to receive, where the local upward incentive compatibility con-
straints and the participation constraints of the worst technology type δr are taken into
consideration. As under consumer transfer maximization, only a subset of rms’ incen-
tive compatibility constraints is considered, so that the minimal revenues that need to be
generated at the solution to the relaxed problem, is a lower bound on the revenues that
can be generated if all incentive compatibility constraints are taken into account. If we
plug the maximal transfers and the minimal revenues in the requirement of the budget
constraint in (1.6), we obtain the inequality in Proposition 1.3 above.
For the derivation of the necessary condition in Proposition 1.3, we did not assume
that the utility function ui and the prot function pij are dierentiable. Neither did we
need to assume, that qi and yj are monotonic. In contrast to a model that assumes the
set of possible types for all agents to be innite, we can avoid such assumptions on
endogenous objects.
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1.5.2 Sufficient condition
The next proposition establishes a sucient condition for the implementability of a so-
cial choice function. For this purpose, we consider only a subset of all provision and
production rules, namely those that satisfy the following monotonicity conditions: For
every i, for all (θ−i, δ) and all l ∈ {0, s− 1},
q(θ+i , θ−i, δ) ≥ q(θi, θ−i, δ) , (1.8)
i.e., consumption must be monotonically increasing in θi for every consumer i. For every
j, for all (θ, δ−j) and all l ∈ {2, ..., r},
y(δ−j , δ−j, θ) ≥ y(δj, δ−j, θ) , (1.9)
i.e., rm j’s contribution to production must be monotonically decreasing in δj .
Ecient mechanisms satisfy these monotonicity conditions. Thus, as long as we limit
ourselves to surplus-maximizing provision rules, the assumptions on monotonicity are
not restrictive.
Proposition 1.4. Let the monotonicity constraints in (1.8) and (1.9) be satised, then we
can implement the social choice function if
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + {k(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
Suppose that the condition in Proposition 1.4 holds. We need to show that we can
construct a payment scheme that satises all relevant constraints. We can choose our
transfer and revenue scheme such that they solve the relaxed problems that we studied
in the proof of Proposition 1.3. After that, we need to verify that the transfer and revenue
schemes, which solve the relaxed problems, satisfy not only the local downward incen-
tive compatibility constraints of consumers and the local upward incentive compatibility
constraints of rms, but all consumers’ and rms’ incentive compatibility constraints.
We prove that the fact that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints of
consumers are binding, together with the monotonicity constraints of consumption, im-
plies that all incentive compatibility constraints are satised. With that, consumption
is ecient for the consumer of highest type and distorted downwards for all other con-
sumers. And similarly, production is ecient for the rm of lowest costs and distorted
upwards for all other rms.
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Denition 1.1. We dene the minimal subsidy (MS(·)) as
MS((qi)i∈I ,(yj)j∈J) :=
n∑
i=1
ui −
m∑
j=1
pij
− E(θ,δ)
 n∑
i=1
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
m∑
j=1
k(δj , yj(θ, δ))
 S(·)
+ E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
{v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
−
m∑
j=1
{k(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)


IR(·)
Under the monotonicity constraints (1.8) and (1.9), the minimal subsidy gives the
amount of money that is required from an outside party to satisfy Proposition 1.4.6
Apart from the reservation utilities and prots, it consists of two components: The rst
component is surplus S(·), given by the dierence of consumers’ valuations and rms’
costs. The second component IR(·) is the dierence of consumers’ and rms’ infor-
mation rents. In an environment with complete information, the maximal transfer a
consumer i is is willing to pay is his true valuation. With private information about
preferences, however, the transfers are decreased by the expression {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ)) −
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}1−F (θi)f(θi) . That is why these expressions are often interpreted as informa-
tion rents. Similarly, for rms, the virtual costs account for the private information.
The revenues, rms would accept in an environment with complete information, are
increased by an information rent.
1.5.3 Efficiency
In the previous section, we have been concerned with deriving conditions such that
social choice functions could be implemented in an environment where agents’ have
private information about their preferences and costs, respectively. Now, we focus on
the welfare evaluation of implementable social choice functions.
6This notion follows Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), who call the amount that would be required
from an outside party to overcome the impossibility result minimal lump-sum subsidy.
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Corollary 1.1. A mechanism that maximizes surplus S(θ, δ), in the following denoted by{
(q∗i )
n
i=1, (y
∗
j )
m
j=1
}
, is implementable if and only if
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θi, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + {(δj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δ−j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
A necessary condition for the implementability of ((q∗i )ni=1, (y∗j )mj=1) is that the max-
imal transfers that can be extracted from consumers suce to cover the minimal rev-
enues that the production sector needs to obtain, which means that the minimal subsidy
is negative.
Suciency can be shown by constructing the transfers of consumers such that all
local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, and constructing the
revenues of producers such that all local upward incentive compatibility constraints are
binding. Finally, we choose the transfer of the consumer with the lowest preference
parameter such that budget balance is satised and the minimal utilities and resource
requirement is taken into consideration. Then, we obtain a mechanism that achieves
((q∗i )
n
i=1, (y
∗
j )
m
j=1) and satises all relevant constraints stated in Corollary 1.1.
From Corollary 1.1, it follows immediately that when participation constraints can be
violated, a social choice function can be implemented eciently. The minimal subsidy
can be decreased without limit. This is an alternative proof of the possibility results
obtained by D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979).
The following Corollary shows how the second-best mechanism can be derived.
Corollary 1.2. The second-bestmechanism, in the following denoted by ((q∗∗i )ni=1, (y∗∗j )mj=1),
can be found by maximizing S(θ, δ) subject to
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + {(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij
and the monotonicity constraints in (1.8) and (1.9).
In the solution to the second-best problem, the budget condition has to be binding.
Otherwise, expected consumer transfers can be reduced without violating any of the
incentive compatibility and participation constraints. The provision rule that solves
the second-best problem satises the monotonicity constraints for all consumers and all
rms. This follows because the optimal provision level is given by the rst-order con-
dition where the sum of virtual marginal valuation equals the sum of virtual marginal
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costs. The assumption that hazard rates are non-decreasing for consumers implies that
virtual valuation is increasing in consumer i’s type, and the assumption that the mono-
tone hazard rate is non-increasing for rms implies that virtual costs are increasing in
the cost type.
Continuous types. To study whether a model with a large but discrete number of types
behaves approximately in the same way as a model with continuum types, we state the
expression for the minimal subsidy for continuous type distributions. We know from the
literature (compare e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Greene, 1995) that for a surplus max-
imizing mechanism
{
(q∗i )
n
i=1, (y
∗
j )
m
j=1
}
in a continuous environment, implementability
is possible if the constraint in the following Remark is satised. It is based on the as-
sumption that functions are continuously dierentiable.
Remark 1. Suppose that qi and yj are continuously dierentiable functions. Then a mech-
anism that maximizes S(θ, δ), is implementable if and only if
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− v1(θi, q∗i (θ, δ))
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
dθi
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + k1(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ))
P (δj)
p(δj)
dδj
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
(1.10)
The dierences, in comparison to Corollary 1.1, are that {v(θ+i , q∗i (θ, δ))−v(θi, q∗i (θ, δ))}
and {k(δj, y∗j (θ, δ))−k(δ−j , y∗j (θ, δ))} are replaced by the derivatives v1(θi, q∗i (θ, δ)) and
k1(δj, y
∗
j (θ, δ)), respectively. Therefore, the dierentiability assumption is crucial with
a continuum of types.
1.6 Comparative statics I: From few to many agents
We use our results in Proposition 1.3 and 1.4 to obtain a more systematic understanding
of how a change in the parameters of the model aects the possibility to implement
ecient social choice functions. Again, we will check whether our results depend on
whether the allocation problem involves private or public goods.
1.6.1 Possibility results when the type set is binary
Bilateral trade. We have shown on Section 1.3.1 that parameter constellations can be
found such that ecient bilateral trade is possible. In order to investigate what drives
this possibility result, we make some simplifying assumptions.
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Assumption 1.1. All agents have a binary type set.7
Under Assumption 1.1, the buyer’s marginal valuation can be high or low, Θ = {θL, θH},
and the seller’s marginal costs can take two values, ∆ = {δL, δH}. We denote the re-
spective probabilities by Prob(θ = θL) = fL, Prob(θ = θH) = fH = 1 − fL and
Prob(δ = δL) = pL, Prob(δ = δH) = pH = 1− pL.
Assumption 1.2. (Symmetry) The distance between the low type and the high type is the
same for buyer and seller, θH − θL = δH − δL.8 The probability of a high valuation buyer
is equal to the probability of a low cost seller fH = pL and therefore fL = pH .
Analogously to the continuous environment of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), where(
interior[θL, θH ] ∩ interior ([δL, δH ]) 6= ∅ and [θL, θH ] 6= [δL, δH ], we assume that the
parameter constellation is such that δL < θL < δH < θH , with the normalization δL = 0
and θH = 1. The social choice function f is ecient if and only if q(θ, δ) = y(θ, δ),
q(θ, δ) satises
qf (θ, δ) =

0, if θ < δ ,
∈ [0, 1] if θ = δ ,
1, if θ > δ ,
and E(θ,δ)[tf (θ, δ)] = E(θ,δ)[rf (θ, δ)].
The following Observation follows from Matsuo (1989) under Assumptions 1.1 and
1.2.
Observation 1.1. Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 are satised and consider the direct
mechanism for f . There is a social choice function, which is ecient, implementable as
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and yields a non-negative material payo for every type of agent
if and only if
fL(θH − δL) + (θL − δH) > 0 ⇔ fL > δH − θL .
The proof of this Observation and all following Observations can be found in Ap-
pendix 1.E. It provides a sucient condition for the possibility to reach ecient bilateral
trade. Specically, the condition states that the probability of the low valuation buyer,
respectively on the high cost seller, needs to be bigger than the ratio that measures the
overlap of buyer’s and seller’s type sets (δH − θL), relative to the whole type set that we
normalized to 1 (θH − δL = 1). We call this ratio in the following d,
d :=
δH − θL
θH − δL = δ
H − θL .
7Without loss of generality, we specify the binary type set, in the following, as consisting of a low and
high type, where the high type exceeds the low type.
8We assume that Θ ⊆ R and ∆ ⊆ R, such that ’distance’ is well-dened by the Euclidean metric.
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The bigger the ratio d, the bigger is the overlap of buyer’s and seller’s type sets. If
d = 0, the type sets of buyer and seller are disjunct, and ecient trade is always possible,
regardless of the probability distribution. On the other hand, the maximum of d is given
by 1, where the type sets of the buyer and the seller are congruent.
To understand what drives the possibility result above, it is instructive to look at the
proof of Observation 1.1. By Proposition 1.4, we know that ecient bilateral trade is
possible if the minimal subsidy is negative. Given that trade is ecient for all states of
the economy but when the low valuation buyer faces the high cost seller, we have three
states of the economy that need to be evaluated, and weighted with the probability of
occurrence.
MS = –

fHfL(θH − δH) − fHfL(δH − δL)fH
fL
+ fHfH(θH − δL)
+ fLfH(θL − δL) − fLfH(θH − θL)fH
fL
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S(·)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
IR(·)

In the following we do comparative statics for dierent components of the model. As
a rst exercise, we x the probability of the low valuation buyer and the high cost seller
fL and vary the ratio d. Without loss of generality, we keep the normalization of the
whole type set, so that θH − δL = 1. In order to change d, the position of θL and δH can
be varied. By Assumption 1.2, θH − θL = δH − δL, so that a shift from the low valuation
buyer to the left goes hand in hand with a move of the high cost seller to the right, and
vice versa, as the following Figure illustrates.
Figure 1.2: Changing parameters in the bilateral trade setting
0 = δL δH
θL θH = 1
d
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Observation 1.2. Suppose we move the types as in Figure 1.2 above, such that d is in-
creased. This aects the minimal subsidy via the expected information rents and the ex-
pected surplus, where
∂IR(·)
∂d
> 0 , and
∂S(·)
∂d
< 0 .
For types outside the overlap, ecient trade takes place – independent of the op-
ponent’s type, i.e., the private information of the other party does not matter for the
decision whether trade takes place. This means, that the two-sided private information
only matters in the overlap. Thus, d can be understood as a measure for the importance
of two-sided private information. The rst eect depends on the distance of types for
each player. If d increases, higher expected information rents need to be paid under the
new parameter constellation, since the distance of high and low types increases for both
players. This has a negative eect on the possibility to achieve ecient trade, and there-
fore yields a negative information rent eect. Second, if d increases, the expected surplus
decreases, i.e., we have a negative surplus eect. Further, the average valuation for the
good goes down relative to the average costs if d is increased. Therefore, expected sur-
plus decreases, which has a negative eect on the possibility to achieve ecient trade.
Thus, an increase of d decreases expected surplus and increases expected information
rents. It is hence more costly to achieve eciency.9
Next, consider the situation where for a given d and fL implementation is possible.
We x the ratio that measures the overlap d and analyze how varying the probability fL
aects implementability.
Observation 1.3. Suppose d is xed and the probability fL is increased. This aects the
minimal subsidy via the expected information rents and the expected surplus, where
∂IR(·)
∂fL
< 0 , and
∂S(·)
∂fL
< 0 .
Incentive compatibility constraints are binding for the high valuation buyer and the
low cost seller, and slack for the other types. Hence, if fL increases, we will have to
pay less individuals information rents. This has a positive eect on the possibility to
achieve ecient trade. Second, we nd that the surplus eect is negative if θH − δH =
θL−δL < 1
2
. Since we start our analysis in a situation where implementation is possible,
we know that this conditions always holds. Thus, the increase of fL has an unambiguous
negative eect on implementability since it lowers the expected surplus. Intuitively, the
9Whenever we write ecient implementation gets more costly, we mean the following: If we compare
two sets that represent the tuples of fL and d, for which ecient trade is possible the set for which
eciency is more costly is a subset of the other. Analogously for the case where eciency is less costly
to achieve.
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expected surplus decreases since we expect more low valuation buyers, respectively high
cost sellers. Overall, an increases in fL increases the minimal subsidy, and thus has a
negative eect on the possibility to reach ecient trade: By Observation 1.1, we know
that an increase of fL makes it less costly to achieve ecient trade. Therefore, when
fL is increased, the reduction in expected information rents is bigger than the reduction
in expected surplus, so that an increase of fL makes it less costly to achieve eciency.
The intuition for this result is that there is more mass on the types that do not receive
an information rent. Overall, the eect of an increase in fL on the minimal subsidy is
negative such that implementation gets less costly.
Figure 1.3: Possibility of ecient trade
d
fL
1
1
fL = 0.5
d = 0.8
By assumption, fL and d are bounded by 0 and 1. If fL is for example xed at 0.5, then the distance
between the high cost seller and the low valuation buyer needs to be lower than 0.5 in order to
achieve ecient trade. And if the distance is for example xed at d = 0.8, then the probability of
the low type buyer, respectively the high cost seller, needs to be higher than 0.8 to get a possibility
result.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the interplay of the expected surplus eect and the expected infor-
mation rent eect on the possibility of ecient bilateral trade. The grey shaded area T0
gives every combination of fL and d, such that, ecient trade is possible,
T0 =
{
(fL, d) : fL > d =
δH − θL
θH − δL
}
.
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PublicGood. Given Assumption 1.1 holds, a social choice function f ′ species whether
the public good is provided qf ′(θ1, θ2), and the accompanying transfers tf
′
1 (θ1, θ2) and
tf
′
2 (θ1, θ2). Pareto ecient public good provision requires
qf
′
(θ1, θ2) =

0, if 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi < c ,
∈ {0, 1} if 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi = c ,
1, if 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi > c .
and E(θ)[tf
′
1 (θ1, θ2) + t
f ′
2 (θ1, θ2)] = 2c E(θ)[qf
′
(θ)] for all (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ.
The following Observation highlights that if there are just two consumers, then e-
cient implementation of the public good will be possible for some parameter constella-
tions.
Observation 1.4. Suppose Assumption 1.1 is satised, the per capita costs are such that
θL < c < θH , and consider the direct mechanism for f ′. There is a social choice function
which is ecient, implementable as Bayes Nash equilibrium, and it yields non-negative
utility for every type of consumer if and only if
fL − c− θ
L
θH − c > 0 .
Observation 1.4 provides a sucient condition for ecient public good provision. Fol-
lowing the proof of Observation 1.4, the public good can be provided eciently, if and
only if consumers’ expected transfers cover the costs of public good provision, so that
the minimal subsidy is negative
MS = −
[θH − c− fL(c− θL)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S(·)
− (1− fL)(θH − θL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IR(·)
 < 0 .
The rst term denotes expected surplus, depending on the cost c and the type distri-
bution, whereas the second term describes expected information rents.
In the following, we analyze what drives the possibility to reach ecient public good
provision. Again, we analyze the eect of a change in the type distribution fL and a
change in the cost parameters c and split the resulting eects into the expected surplus
and the expected information rent eect.
Observation 1.5. Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold.
i) Suppose further that fL is xed, then ∂S(·)
∂c
< 0 .
ii) Suppose further that c is xed, then
∂IR(·)
∂fL
< 0 , and
∂S(·)
∂fL
< 0 .
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When costs are increased, this does not aect the information rents of the agents, but
lowers the expected surplus. Higher per capita costs imply that in expectation, the share
of beneting types reduces compared to the share of suering types. This means that
for higher c, the average valuation for the public good decreases compared to the xed
per capita costs.
If c is xed, a change in fL aects the minimal subsidy in two ways: First, the expected
surplus decreases if fL increases. This has a negative eect on the possibility of ecient
public good provision. And second, for the expected information rents, we nd, that
if fL increases, we have to pay in expectation less agents an information rent. This
means, the higher the probability for low valuation consumers, the lower the expected
information rent term and the higher the possibility for ecient public good provision,
ceteris paribus. As we can see in Observation 1.4, the reduced expected information rent
eect dominates the negative expected surplus eect, such that an increase in fL makes
it less costly to provide the public good eciently, i.e., the minimal subsidy decreases.
Comparison. When a binary type set and two agents are considered, ecient bilat-
eral trade and ecient public good provision are possible when parameters are chosen
appropriately. Further, when the average valuation for the private or public good is in-
creased, it gets cheaper to achieve eciency, in the sense that the minimal subsidy goes
down. To understand the dierence between private and public goods, we study how
the increase in the number of the agents aects the minimal subsidy.
1.6.2 Many agents
The classical bilateral trade setting has one buyer and one seller. To that extent Obser-
vation 1.1 is not restrictive. Contrary, the impossibility result in the public good setting
is studied for a large economy, with many individuals. In the following, we want to an-
alyze these impossibility results under the assumption that the type set of individuals
remains binary.
Public good. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that ecient public good provision
is impossible when the number of individuals goes to innity. The following Proposition
shows that the assumption of continuous type sets has no impact on this impossibility
result. Even for a binary type set, ecient public good provision is impossible if the
number of individuals grows without limit.
Proposition 1.5. Suppose Assumption 1.1 holds. Consider the public good example and
an economy with n individuals. For any sequence of incentive-compatible mechanisms
(q, tn1 , . . . , t
n
n),
limn7→∞E(θ)
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
tni (θ)
]
= 0 .
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As n→∞, the probability of public good provision converges to 0 if c > θL, and converges
to 1 otherwise.
According to Proposition 1.5, the per capita revenue from individuals’ contribution
goes to zero. That is, with many individuals, any social choice function, which is at-
tainable when voluntary participation needs to be guaranteed, prescribes a public good
provision level that is equal to 0. Even if the average valuation for the public good is
larger than the per capita costs, the amount that is implemented is almost equal to 0,
although the ecient amount is almost equal to 1.
The reason for the impossibility result is that, for n → ∞, any individual’s impact
on the public good provision becomes negligible. The free-rider problem in public good
provision becomes extreme as the number of individuals becomes large. Since no indi-
vidual is pivotal for the production of the public good, incentive compatibility implies
that all individuals have to make the same lump-sum transfer that does not depend on
their announced preference intensity. Participation constraints imply that this lump-
sum transfer must not exceed θL. Thus, the aggregate of all individuals’ transfers is as
if every individual has a low valuation for the public good. This makes it impossible to
cover the costs of public good provision. Hence, for the impossibility result, the assump-
tion that the type set is discrete has no impact. Remember that Proposition 1.2 states that
public good provision is as well not possible under the assumption of a continuous type
set when the number of individuals goes to innity.
Private good. Consider a nite economy with I = {1, . . . n} buyers and J = {1, . . . n}
sellers. Buyers and sellers have equivalent binary type sets with the corresponding prob-
ability distributions (fLi , fHi ) and (pLj , pHj ).10 The agents face a price ρ ∈ [θLi , δHi ]. As we
have seen in previous sections, there exist parameter constellations and probability dis-
tributions, where trade does not take place. Now, we assume that the number of agents
grows without limits, i.e., n −→ ∞. The Law of Large Numbers applies, and probabili-
ties can be interpreted as cross-sectional distribution of types. In particular, this means
that for large economies one knows with probability 1, that there exist high type buy-
ers with a share of fHi , and low type sellers, with a share of pLj = fHi . For these agents,
trade always takes place. This proves the existence of trade in large economies for prices
ρ ∈ [θLi , δHi ] if agents have binary type sets.11
Gresik and Satterhwaite (1989) additionally show that trade in large economies is ef-
cient – ex-ante and ex-post – holding the ratio of buyer and seller xed. Further, they
provide results on the rate of convergence to the competitive equilibrium.
Comparison. When private and public goods are compared for economies with many
agents, we see that ecient public good provision is impossible when the number of con-
10fHi , f
L
i , p
H
j , p
L
j > 0,∀ i, j.
11This argument holds independently of whether the type set is nite or innite.
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sumers is large. Contrary, for the private good model ecient bilateral trade is possible
if there are many agents. The impossibility result of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) is
thus stronger than the impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in the
sense that it extends to any model with a discrete set of types.
1.7 Comparative Statics II: From few to many types
This section shows that the minimal subsidy for a discrete type set with a large num-
ber of types converges to the minimal subsidy for a continuous type set environment.
We proceed as follows: We rst show how one additional type aects the implemen-
tation rule for private and public goods and add a third type for each agent. To study
the changes of an increased number of types separately from changes in the number of
agents, we hold the number of agents xed in this section. Second, we consider the situ-
ation where the number of types gets larger and larger and study general convergence.
We provide conditions that need to be met for the convergence result and discuss how
violating these conditions aects our analysis.
1.7.1 Introducing a third type.
Bilateral trade. In the following, we consider what happens if we add step-by-step
new types in rounds to agents’ type sets of the pre-round. Thereby, we do not move the
existing types, but add new types ’between’ them.12 If the procedure of adding types
fullls two conditions we call it ’uniform extension’.
Denition 1.2. (Uniform Extension) Consider the agent sets I and J , fully ordered
nite type sets Θ0i = {θL0i, . . . , θH0i}, #Θ0i <∞, ∀ i ∈ I , ∆0j = {δL0j, . . . , δH0j}, #∆0j <
∞,∀ j ∈ J and the respective probabilities, such that fL0i + · · ·+ fH0i = 1 and pL0j + · · ·+
pH0j = 1. We add nitely many new types in every round k to every agent’s type set, such
that for every new type θki and δkj , it holds that θL0i < θki < θ
H
0i and δ
L
0j, < δkj < δ
H
0j ,
respectively. We call this procedure uniform extension if it has the following properties
• {θL0i, . . . , θH0i} = [θL0i, θH0i ] and {δL0j, . . . , δH0j} = [δL0j, δH0j] if the number of rounds
goes to innity.13
• For every θki ∈ Θki and δkj ∈ ∆kj , it holds that fi(θki) and p(δkj) are monotonically
decreasing from round to round.
The rst property assures, that in the limit, there are no neighbored types that have a
distance of more than an , which can be arbitrary small. That this is crucial to achieve
12Since we consider fully ordered type sets, ’between’ is well-dened.
13The closure S, of a subset S, consists of all points in S plus the limit points of S. The sets {θL0i, . . . , θH0i}
and {δL0j , . . . , δH0j} contain all types that are added up to a considered round k.
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implementability in the limit can be seen in the section counterexamples later on.
We start in a situation with a binary type set, see Section 1.3, and call this setting ’round
0’. Successively, we add new types and index the new situations by round numbers
k = 1, 2, . . . . Exemplary we calculate the new ecient trade possibility condition for
’round 1’, i.e., there are three types for the buyer and the seller. Hence, the buyer has
the extended type set Θ1 = {θL1 , θM1 , θH1 }, and the seller has the extended type set
∆1 = {δL1 , δM1 , δH1 }.14 Without loss of generality, we add the new types according to
the following procedure and call it uniform extension type I.
Denition 1.3. (Uniform Extension Type I) Consider given agent sets I0 and J0, for
which every agent i ∈ I0 has the same nite type set Θ0i and for which every agent j ∈ J0
has the same nite type set ∆0j . The probabilities assigned to the possible types of any agent
sum up to 1. This situation is called round 0. In every round k = 1, 2, . . . nitely many
new types are added to each agents’ type set. Thereby, new types θki and δkj are positioned
at the center between adjacent types from round k = 0, . . . , k − 1 .
In the following, we start with round 0, which is given by I0 = 1 and J0 = 1 and the
type sets Θ0 = {θL, θH} and ∆0 = {δL, δH} and the respective probabilities, such that
fL0 + f
H
0 = 1.15
Continuing, new types are introduced,in every ’round k’, in the middle of the sub-
intervals of type sets that existed already by ’round k − 1’. With this procedure, the
continuous type interval is approached, such that the rst condition in Denition 1.2
is fullled. Since the probability of an existing type cannot increase, both conditions
of Denition 1.2 are fullled. We consider the case where the introduced third type is
positioned such that θM1 > δH1 .16
Figure 1.4: Three buyer and seller types
0 = δL1 δ
H
1
θL1 θ
H
1 = 1
δM1
θM1
We can now derive which condition needs to be satised in order achieve ecient
bilateral trade when the buyer and the seller have an extended type set with three types.
Applying Proposition 1.4, the following Observation shows a condition for reaching ef-
cient bilateral trade.
14Since I = 1 and J = 1, we drop the indices that label the agent for ease of notation.
15Remember that by Assumption 1.2, fL = pH and fH = pL and analogously for every round k.
16The case where θM1 < δH1 can be found in Appendix 1.E.
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Observation 1.6. Without loss of generality, suppose parameters are as in Figure 1.4. For
the ’Uniform Extension Type I’ in ’round 1’, there is a social choice function which is e-
cient, implementable as Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and yields non-negative material payo
for every type of player if and only if
fL1 >
δH1 − θL1
θM1 − δM1
⇔
1
2
fL1
1 + 1
2
fL1
> d .
d still denotes δH−θL
θH−δL and did not change from ’round 0’ to ’round 1’. For the purpose
of illustration, assume that every type has equal probability: In ’round 0’ with a binary
type set, the condition in Observation 1.1 states that 1
2
> d. After adding a third type,
Observation 1.6 states that ecient bilateral trade is possible if 1
7
> d. So, even for only
one additional type, the possibility condition for ecient trade gets more restrictive.
As for the binary type set, the minimal subsidy is important to evaluate whether e-
cient trade is possible. It is decisive, for which states of the economy trade takes place,
i.e., for which combinations of buyer and seller types trade should take place, so that
q∗(θ, δ) = 1. From Observation 1.6 we know that the high type buyer and the low type
seller are not relevant. Intuitively, this is because even when a buyer with a lower val-
uation, i.e., θM1 , can trade with every possible type of seller, then this is as well true for
high type buyers. By the same logic, the seller with the lowest valuation does not en-
ter the implementability condition. Mathematically, for buyer’s high type (and seller’s
low type), terms of the expected surplus eect and the expected information rent eect
coincide and thus cancel out. Instead, the middle type (which is the lowest types that
can trade with every possible seller) needs to be considered. When subsequent rounds
are considered, we generalize this observation and analyze for which types the expected
surplus eect and the expected information rent eect coincide. We dene the buyer
types and the seller types, for which the eects do not cancel out and thus are relevant
for the evaluation of possibility.
When the type sets Θ1 and ∆1 are considered, expected surplus is given by
S(·) = (θM1 − δM1 )fM1 − d fL1 (fM1 + fH1 ) .
Expected information rents are given by
IR(·) = (fM1 + fH1 )2(θM1 − δM1 + d)− fH1 (θM1 − δM1 ) .
Expected surplus is bigger than expected information rents if
1
2
fL1
1+ 1
2
fL1
> d. This is the
inequality we know from Observation 1.6.
The following Figure illustrates that implementation is more costly, i.e., the minimal
subsidy goes up, if we add types to the setting. The lighter shaded area T0, known from
Figure 1.3, gives the set of tuples (fL, d), for which trade with two types is possible. If
35
Chapter 1 On the independent private values model - A unied approach
we add a third type, the set T1 (the darker shaded area) gives the combinations for which
ecient trade is possible, where
T1 =
{
(fL, d) : fL1 >
δH1 − θL1
θM1 − δM1
=
2d
1− d
}
,
so that T1 ⊆ T0.
Given Denition 1.3, we can express the new type θM1 in terms of the types θL1 and θH1 .
Therefore we can compare the sets T0 and T1 in a coordinate system, with axes labelled
d and fL.
Figure 1.5: Bilateral trade – Comparison between ’round 0’ and ’round 1’
d
fL
1
0.5 1
Figure 1.5 implies that if ecient trade is possible in round 1, then it is as well possible in ’round 0’.
The opposite is, however, not true. Imagine that the ratio of overlapping is 0.5 in ’round 0’. Then,
there is no value fL can take, such that ecient bilateral trade is still possible.
Counterexamples. In order to illustrate the importance of Denition 1.2 and 1.3, we
present examples that violate the ’Uniform Extension’ procedure.
Observation 1.7. Suppose parameters are as in Figure 1.4. Implementation in ’round 1’ is
less costly then in ’round 0’ if
fL1 >
2fL0
1 + fL0
.
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For the purpose of illustration, assume that fL0 = 15 . In ’round 0’ with a binary type set,
Observation 1.1 states that if 1
5
> d, then ecient bilateral trade is possible. Suppose now
that fL1 = 12 , according to Observation 1.7 ecient bilateral is possible if
1
2
> d. Hence,
T1 ⊇ T0. If the probability of the low type increases over rounds, so that the second
condition of Denition 1.2 is violated, then ecient bilateral trade gets less costly. For
this result, the monotone hazard rate assumption plays no role. The probabilities on
types fH1 and fM1 can be chosen such that the monotone hazard rate either holds or is
violated.
Consider next the case, where the introduced third type is positioned such that θM1 <
δM1 .
Figure 1.6: Violating the ’Uniform Extension’ procedure
δL1 δ
H
1
θL1 θ
H
1
δM1
θM1
Applying Proposition 1.4, the following Observation shows a condition for reaching
eciency.
Observation 1.8. Suppose parameters are as in Figure 1.6. There is a social choice func-
tion which is ecient, implementable as Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and yields non-negative
material payo for every type of agent if and only if
fL1 + f
M
1 > d .
Comparing Observation 1.6 with Observation 1.8 illustrates that violating the rst
condition in Denition 1.2 makes it less costly to achieve ecient bilateral trade.
1.7.2 Introducing many types
To understand what leads to the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) impossibility result
when the number of types is getting large, we must analyze the following characteristics
of their model: Type sets are closed and connected sets.17 Intuitively, this means that
there are no gaps in the type set. When we add new types, we have to respect this
characteristic of the model and achieve it in the limit.
17A set B is closed if it contains the limit points of every possible sequence xn ∈ B, with xn → x,
for n → ∞. A set B is connected if it cannot be represented as the union of two or more disjoint
non-empty open subsets.
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Denition 1.4. (Uniform Extension Type II) Consider the ’Uniform Extension Type I’
Denition. Additionally, equal probability mass is put on all types, in every round.
Making use of Denition 1.4, we can show that a discrete specication of the model
approaches in the limit the continuous specication of the model.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose Assumption 1.1 holds. Consider the ’Uniform Extension Type
II’ procedure. There is no social choice function which is ecient, implementable as Bayes-
Nash equilibrium and yields non-negativematerial payo for every type of agent if k →∞.
The uniform extension procedure is one way to assure that the discrete specication
of the bilateral trade problem approaches the continuous specication of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983). In the proof we show that an increase in the number of types leads
to an increase of the minimal subsidy. If suciently many types are introduced, then
there exists a round k < ∞, where the minimal subsidy is positive, i.e., it is impossible
to reach ecient bilateral trade.
Public Good provision. Similar to the bilateral trade problem, the condition relates
the type distribution to the relative position of the per capita costs for the public good.
Therefore, we dene
e =
c− θL
θH − c .
Since θL < c < θH , the per capita costs c split the type set into two sub-intervals: the
rst, where the costs exceed the low valuation, and the second, where the costs lie below
the high valuation. Thus, e is a measure for the net gains of free-riding. If consumer i has
high preferences for the public good, he faces the following trade-o: If he announces
his type truthfully, the public good will be provided for sure but he will have to pay
higher transfers than if he is lying. However, if he understates his preferences, he will
have to pay lower transfers but will risk that the public good will not be provided.
As for the bilateral trade setting, we use Denition 1.3 to show that implementa-
tion is getting more costly when more types are introduced. Analogously to the bi-
lateral trade example, we consider the case where the third type is positioned such that
1
2
(
θL1 + θ
M
1
)
> c.
Figure 1.7: Three consumer types
θL1 θ
H
1c θ
M
1
In order to eciently provide the public good, when there are three consumer types,
the inequality in the following Observation needs to be satised.
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Observation 1.9. Suppose parameters are as in Figure 1.7. There is a social choice function
which is ecient, implementable as Bayes-Nash equilibrium and yields non-negative utility
for every type of consumer, if and only if
fL1 >
c− θL1
θM1 − c
.
As for the private good example, the expected surplus eect for the high valuation
consumer equals the expected information rent eect. Thus, the parameter for the high-
valuation buyer does not show up in Observation 1.9.
The comparison of Observations 1.4 and 1.9 shows that implementation is getting
more costly with three consumer types. Even for one additional type, the possibility
condition for ecient public good provision gets more restrictive. Graphically, a com-
parison of ’round 0’ and ’round 1’ resembles the graphic in the bilateral trade example.
Figure 1.8: Public good – Comparison between ’round 0’ and ’round 1’
e
fL
1
0.25 0.5
The gray shaded area D0 in Figure 1.8 gives every combination of fL and e, such that
the public good is eciently provided, i.e., Observation 1.9 holds,
D0 =
{
(fL, e) : fL > e =
c− θL0
θH0 − c
}
.
Analogously, D1 gives the tuples (fL, e), for which eciency is achieved, if we have
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three possible types,
D1 =
{
(fL, e) : fL >
c− θL1
θM1 − c
=
2e
1− e
}
.
Hence, D1 ⊆ D0.
If we introduce a continuous type set to the public good setting with only two con-
sumers, ecient public good provision is impossible.
Proposition 1.7. Börgers (2015): If consumers’ valuation for the public good are inde-
pendently drawn from the interval [θL, θH ], then there is no Bayesian incentive compatible
social choice function that is ecient and yields non-negative utility for every type of agent.
We provide a proof that is an adaption of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to the
public good provision setting. Comparing Propositions 1.6 and 1.7, we can see that the
assumption of a continuous type set makes both ecient bilateral trade as well as public
good provision impossible. For the latter, the assumption of a large economy is hence
not necessary for the impossibility to reach ecient public good provision.
1.7.3 General convergence
As we have seen in the previous subsections, there exist qualitatively dierent results
concerning implementability in discrete and continuous environments. We analyze now
how the results for discrete settings relate to the results in continuous settings. To an-
swer this question, we reconstruct our given environment, such that we are able to link
discrete and continuous environments technically and can specify how the respective
implementation conditions are related. This reconstructed environment enables us to
generalize our results concerning the eects of changing type sets or number of agents
on implementability.
The economic environment in our paper contains a set of agents, a type set for every
agent, and density functions. To combine the decisive factors for implementability, we
bundle them in the denition of an economy. This generates a set of dierent economies
whose elements can dier in the number of types, the number of agents, the density
functions, or the allocation functions. On this set, we dene sequences and the meaning
of convergence. We frame requirements for this environment under which it is pos-
sible to align the implementability conditions in dierent economies. Thereby we nd
that under some assumptions concerning the similarity of these two environments (type
sets, density functions and allocation functions), the implementability result in discrete
settings approaches the result in the continuous setting. We are able to approach the My-
erson and Satterthwaite (1983) result, even if we start with a parametrization, for which
ecient trade is possible. We show conditions that need to be met in order to guarantee
that we end up in an environment, that equals the setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite
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(1983). This means, that it is not a sucient condition to have innitely many types in
the bilateral trade setting to get the impossibility result. The position of the types in the
type set and the probabilities matter. A rst intuitive evidence for this relation is given
by Observation 1.1. To show that even in case of innitely many types ecient trade
can take place, we will give some counterexamples to justify the conditions that we in-
troduce afterwards. Thereafter we formulate the environment of economies for which
we dene the needed convergence and phrase the conditions, under which the innite
number of types is a sucient condition for the impossibility of implementation. Even
if the analysis of the counterexamples is done for the bilateral trade setting, the derived
results apply to every independent private value setting. There will be a general result,
when and under which conditions it is possible to link discrete and continuous (with
respect to the type set) settings.
Consumption Economy.
Denition 1.5. We dene a consumption economy (I,Θ, f, q) as the tuple consisting of
a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}, the Cartesian product of type sets (one type set for every
consumer i) Θ = ×i∈IΘi with the corresponding density functions fi : Θi → [0, 1], where
f := (f1, . . . , fn), and the allocation rule q : Θ → R+, which maps types into allocations.
The economies can dier in the number of agents, the type set, the density function,
or the allocation rule. To relate dierent economies, we have to introduce convergence
to our set of economies. Especially, we want to link the nite and the innite economy,
where we consider nite and innite type sets. For this, we dene a sequence of con-
sumption economies as given by (Ik,Θk, fk, qk)k∈N, where Ik is a sequence of consumer
sets, Θk a sequence of type set, fk a sequence of density-functions, and qk a sequence
of allocation functions. We denote the innite setting by (I∞,Θ∞, f∞, q∞), where we
have an innite number of agents and types. f∞, q∞ are the corresponding density or
allocations functions. As our economy contains dierent formal objects, namely sets
and functions, we have to dene convergence component-wise.
Denition 1.6. A sequence of consumption economies (Ik,Θk, fk, qk)k∈N converges to a
limit economy (I,Θ, f, q), if the sequences of consumers, type sets, density functions and
allocation functions converge to the respective limit given by the limit consumption econ-
omy.
When we look at the convergence of an economy, we require that every element of the
economy converges. In the following we dene in detail the components of an economy
sequence and the corresponding concept of convergence.
Consumers. Let Ik = {1, . . . , nk} be the set of consumers in round k. We say, that
(Ik)k∈N → I∞ if the number of consumers is increasing for k →∞.
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Ik aects the dimension of the other components of an economy. Since we need a
type set for every agent, the type set component in the economy consists of a Cartesian
product over the type sets for every single agent. The domain of the density and the
allocation function change accordingly.
Type sets. Fix a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}. An element Θk of the sequence (Θk)k∈N
is the Cartesian product over the consumers’ type sets in round k. Since we assume
symmetry, every consumer i ∈ I in round k has the same type set. We call this type set
Θki. The component Θk of an economy in a sequence is hence given by Θk = (Θki)n.
Since the type set component of the economy is a product over many type sets, we
dene the convergence of this Cartesian product element-wise, hence consumer-wise.
This means, that for every consumer i ∈ I , the sequence of his type sets has to converge.
We use the topological concept of density to dene convergence.18
Denition 1.7. Fix a consumer set I . If we write (Θk)k∈N → Θ, this means (Θki)k∈N →
Θi, k → ∞ for every i ∈ I . At that, Θi gives the limit of the sequence of type sets that is
assigned to consumer i ∈ I . Thereby, it holds, that Θi is the limit of the sequence (Θki)k∈N,
if and only if, there exists a K , such that for all k ≥ K , Θki lies dense in Θi,∀ i ∈ I .
The sequence of the Cartesian products over type sets is generated by adding new
types to every single type set of every consumer in a round k.19 We add the same nite
number of types to every one’s type set. As mentioned above, whenever the number
of consumers or the type sets change, the density function and the allocation rule has
to change as well. In every round k and for every consumer i ∈ Ik, the sum over all
probabilities of types is 1. Thus, we face the following issue: Whenever we add new types
to type sets, we do not only need to assign a probability to them but also have to change
probabilities of existing types, i.e., take probability mass of the old types and redistribute
it to the new types. Thereby we make the assumption that for every single type, the
probability cannot increase over rounds. This means, that the collected probabilities of
the old types are shared exclusively among the newly added types.
Density Functions. Fix a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}. The sequence (fk)k∈N consists
of fk = (fk0, . . . , fkn), where fki is the density function of consumer i ∈ I in round
k over his type set Θki. The change in the type sets means, that we face a change in
the domains of the density functions, such that the standard concept of convergence for
function sequences cannot be used. Thus, for our purpose we require that for every type
in the limit type set, that is also contained in one of the nite type sets, the dierence be-
tween the probability assigned by the limit density function and the sequence of density
functions has to become arbitrarily small if the number of rounds becomes large.
18A set A ⊆ B lies dense in the set B, if A = B, thereby A = A ∪ {limn an, an ∈ A} .
19Mathematically this means: Θki = Θ(k−1)i ∪ {θm|m = 1, . . . ,M ;M <∞}.
42
1.7 Comparative Statics II: From few to many types
Denition 1.8. Fix a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}. We say (fk)k∈N → f, f = (f1, . . . , fn) :
Θ→ [0, 1]n if for any θ ∈ Θ, that lies also in Θk, for some k <∞, there exists a K <∞,
such that for all k ≥ K it holds that |f(θ)− fk(θ)| < . This has to hold component-wise.
Hence, for every consumer κ: |fi(θ)− fki(θ)| < , i = 1, . . . , n, k ≥ K .
For the allocation functions, we do not have to change the outcomes in round k for
the types that are contained in Θk∩Θk−1. Since we consider rst-best environments, we
only have to dene the outcomes assigned to new types. Since the domain changes for
allocation functions, we require analogously for the density functions that for every type
in the limit type set, that is also contained in one of the nite type sets, the dierence
between the outcome assigned by the limit allocation function and sequence of allocation
functions has to become arbitrarily small if the number of rounds becomes large.
Allocation Functions. Fix a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}. The sequence of allocation
functions is given by (qk)k∈N : (Θk)k∈N → (zk)k∈N, zk ∈ R, where qk : Θk = (Θki)n →
R+.
Denition 1.9. We say (qk)k∈N → q : Θ→ R+ if for any θ ∈ Θ, that lies also in Θk, for
some k <∞, there exists aK <∞, such that for all k ≥ K it holds that |q(θ)−qk(θ)| < .
For the public good example, we have already seen in Proposition 1.5 that a nite
but suciently large number of consumers yields the same result as the Theorem by
Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) for innitely many consumers: The public good will not
be provided. To apply these concepts to the private good example, we need the analogous
denitions for the producer side. The respective denitions and concepts of convergence
follow the same logic as for the consumer side and can be found in Appendix 1.D.
1.7.4 Convergence of type set
We are now able to bring together the implementation condition in discrete and con-
tinuous settings. The terms ’discrete’ and ’continuous’ refer to the set of types – for
the private good application. We found that the implementability conditions in dis-
crete environments approached the conditions in continuous environments such that
the qualitative results concerning ecient implementation converge. Now, we can be
more precise on what we mean by ’approach the results’:
As we know from Section 1.5, ecient implementation is possible when consumers’
expected transfers exceed rms’ expected revenues. The expected transfers and rev-
enues are calculated, taking the respective incentive compatibility and participation
constraints into account. This logic also applies for continuous settings. To compare
the implementability conditions for private goods in discrete and continuous environ-
ments, we increase the number of types, while holding the set of agents xed. We nd,
that with the given denitions of economies and convergence, the expected payments
for a nite type set converge to the expected payments in the continuous economy. The
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payments that we get for a mechanism (q, t) in a continuous environment that fullls in-
centive compatibility and participation constraints can be found in equation (1.10). With
the same arguments, we get the convergence of the revenues for the producer side, see
Appendix 1.D.
Proposition 1.8. Let (I,Θk, fk, qk)k∈N → (I,Θ∞, f∞, q∞), for k → ∞. Then it holds
that for every consumer i ∈ I : For every  > 0 ∃K : ∀ k ≥ K∣∣∣∣∣E(θki)
[(
v(θki, qki(θ, δ))− {v(θ+ki, qki(θ, δ))− v(θki, qki(θ, δ))}
1− Fk(θki)
fk(θki)
)]
−
E(θ∞i)
[
v(θ∞i, q∞i(θ, δ))− v1(θ∞i, q∞i(θ))1− F∞(θ∞i)
f∞(θ∞i)
dθ∞i
] ∣∣∣∣∣ < .
Thus, for the private good application, we get equivalent conditions for ecient im-
plementation of nite but suciently large type sets and the innite type set.
For public goods, we know from Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) that for an innite
number of consumer and a nite type set, the public good will never be provided if in-
centive compatibility, participation, and the resource constraints have to be fullled. As
shown in Proposition 1.6, we nd that for a nite but suciently large set of consumers,
the same result is true: The public good will not be provided. While increasing the
number of agents, the number of types remains unchanged.
Summarizing, we changed the element of the economies in the private and the public
good example that had innite dimension. For the bilateral trade application this is given
by the type set, whereas it is the set of agents in the public good example. If we approach
these innite components of the economies (and the resulting changes in the density and
allocation functions) by a sequence of nite but increasing elements, we can generate
the same implementation result for the nite environments as for the original innite
cases.
The stated convergence result does also apply to every possible application of the
independent private values model that fullls the conditions. Thus, this result enables
us to link results for discrete and innite settings. Thereby, either type sets or agent sets
(or both) can be varied from a nite number of elements to an innite set.
1.8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate the independent private values model when types are dis-
crete. We use this model for the analysis of how impossibility results by Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) are aected by the specication
of the number of individuals and the specication of the type set. The existing literature
on this topic neglects the question of how the discrete specication and the continuous
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specication of the independent private values model relate to each other. Our analysis
provides a framework to study the convergence.
Our analysis yields the following key insights: First, the impossibility results for e-
cient bilateral trade and ecient public good provision vanish when a binary type set is
considered. Moreover, we nd that the Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) result extends to
any model with a discrete set of types. The Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) result, by
contrast, extends only to a model with a large but nite number of types.
Second, the discrete version of the independent private values model leads to the same
outcomes as the continuous version of the model if many types are introduced in the
right way. We discuss various factors that have an inuence on the convergence. This
analysis does not support the presumption that the increase in the type set alone leads
to the convergence of both model specications.
The analysis was made possible by a combination of insights from the non-linear
pricing literature and mechanism design. We believe that the applicability of a large class
of problems that have been studied in the empirical economics and behavioral economics
literature can be simplied by using the discrete specication of the independent private
values model.
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Appendix 1.A Preliminaries
Lemma 1.1. For all i, the incentive constraints in (ICC) hold if the following local incentive
constraints are satised: For any l < s,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i ) , (1.11)
and for all l > 0,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl−1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl−1i ))− T (θl−1i ) . (1.12)
Moreover, the local incentive constraints imply that, for all i, q(θ−i, θli) ≥ qi(θ−i, θl−1i ), for
all l > 1.
Proof: We rst show that qi(θ−i, θl+1i ) ≥ qi(θ−i, θli) for each i and each l. Equation (1.12)
as stated in the Lemma for θi = θl+1i :
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i ) ≥ V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) .
Adding equation (1.11) as stated above yields:
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli)) + V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θli)− T (θl+1i ) ≥
V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i )) + V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θl+1i )− T (θli)
⇔ V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli)) + V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i )) ≥
V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i )) + V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli))
⇔ V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli)) ≥
V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))
Since θ′i ≥ θi implies that v2(θ′i, qi) ≥ v2(θi, qi), this holds, as long as qi(θ−i, θl+1i ) ≥
q(θ−i, θli).
We show that equation (1.11) implies that
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl+2i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))− T (θl+2i ) .
To see this, rewrite equation (1.11) as
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V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))−T (θli) ≥
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i )
− [V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))] .
Since qi(θ−i, θl+2i ) ≥ qi(θ−i, θl+1i ), we have
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))−T (θli) ≥
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i )
− [V (θl+2i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))− V (θl+2i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))] .
Moreover, condition (1.11) for θi = θl+1i is
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i ) ≥ V (θl+2i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))− T (θl+1i ) .
Adding the last two inequalities yields
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl+2i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))− T (θl+1i ) .
Hence, an individual with preference parameter θli does not benet from announcing
θl+2i . Iterating this argument once more establishes that this individual does neither
benet from announcing θl+3i , etc. The proof that an individual with preference param-
eter θli does not benet from announcing θ
l+j
i , for any j ≥ 1 is analogous and left to the
reader.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose that, for some individual i, all local downward incentive compati-
bility constraints are binding and that qi(θ−i, θli) ≥ qi(θ−i, θl−1i ), for all l > 1. Then all
incentive constraints of i are satised.
Proof: If all local downward incentive constraints are binding for individual i, this im-
plies that, for all l ≥ 1,
T (θli) =
l∑
k=1
{V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θk−1i | θki , qi(θ−i, θk−1i ))}+ T (θ0i ) .
Using that vi(θ0i , qi) = 0, for all l > 0, the equation can be equivalently written as
T (θli) =V (θ
l
i | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))
−
l−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}+ T (θ0i ) .
To establish incentive compatibility, Lemma 1.1 implies that it suces to show that
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all local upward incentive constraints are satised, i.e., for all l,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i ) ,
or equivalently,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))−T (θli) ≥
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i )
− [V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))] .
ByT (θli) = V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))−
∑l−1
k=0{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))−V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}+
Ti(θ
0
i ), this inequality can be written as
l−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))−V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))} ≥
l∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}
− [V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))] ,
or
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i )) ≥
V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli))− V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli)).
As θl+1i > θli, the inequality is satised if
qi(θ−i, θl+1i ) ≥ qi(θ−i, θli) .
These monotonicity constraints are satised by assumption.
Lemma 1.3. If for individual i, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are
binding, then the expected utility of individual i from ex ante perspective is given by
E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))− ti(θ)] = E(θ)
[
{v(θ+i , qi(θ))− v(θi, qi(θ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]
− T (θ0i ) .
Proof: Equation
T (θli) =V (θ
l
i | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))
−
l−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}+ T (θ0i ) ,
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in the proof of Lemma 1.2 and the law of iterated expectations imply that,
E(θ)[ti(θ)] =
s∑
j=0
f ji T (θ
j
i )
=
s∑
j=0
f ji E(θ−i)[v(θ
j
i , qi(θ−i, θ
j
i ))]
−
s∑
j=1
f ji
j−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}+ T (θ0i )
= E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))] + T (θ0i )
−
s∑
j=1
f ji
j−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}
= E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))] + T (θ0i )
−
s∑
j=1
(
1−
j∑
k=0
f ji
)
{V (θji | θj+1i , qi(θ−i, θji ))− V (θji | θji , qi(θ−i, θji ))}
= E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))] + T (θ0i )
−
[
s∑
j=1
fki {V (θji | θj+1i , qi(θ−i, θji ))− V (θji | θji , qi(θ−i, θji ))}
1−∑jk=0 fki
f ji
]
= E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))]− E(θ)
[
{v(θ+i , qi(θ))− v(θi, qi(θ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]
+ T (θ0i )
Lemma 1.4. For all i, if the (PCC) is satised for θi = θ0i , then it is satised as well for
all θi 6= θ0i .
Proof: Let θi 6= θ0i . Then, by the incentive constraints in (1.12)
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θ0i | θli, qi(θ−i, θ0i ))− T (θ0i ) .
Moreover, θi > θ0i implies that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds
V (θ0i | θ0i , qi(θ−i, θ0i ))− T (θ0i ) ,
which is non-negative by (PCC) for θi = θ0i . This proves that (PCC) is not binding for
θi 6= θ0i .
Lemma 1.5. Let q be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the problem of choosing
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a mechanism (t1, ..., tn) in order to maximize total transfers
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (1.12) and the interim participation
constraints in (PCC). At a solution to this problem, the participation constraint in (??) is
binding for θi = θ0i and is slack otherwise.
Proof: By Lemma 1.4 we only need to show that it is binding for θi = θ0i . We show that
it is possible to increase the expected payments of individual i in an incentive compatible
way if, for some i, the participation constraint for θi = θ0i does not hold as an equality. It
is instructive to rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints in (1.12) as follows: For
each i, for each θli ∈ Θi, and for each θˆi 6= θli ∈ Θi,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− V (θˆli | θli, qi(θ−i, θˆli)) ≥ T (θli)− T (θˆi) .
Consider a new payment rule for individual i such that for each θi ∈ Θi, T (θli) increases
by some  > 0, this implies that the right-hand side of the incentive constraints states
above remains constant, i.e., the increase of i’s expected payments does not violate the
incentive compatibility. Since revenue increases in the expected payments of individual
i, the revenue maximizing mechanism must be such that a biding participation constraint
for θi = θ0i prevents a further increase of individual i’s payments.
Lemma 1.6. Let q be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the "relaxed problem" of
choosing a mechanism (t1, ..., tn) in order to maximize total transfers
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
,
subject to the downward incentive compatibility constraints in (1.12) and the ex interim
participation constraints in (PCC). At a solution to this problem, all downward incentive
constraints are binding, and the participation constraint in (??) is binding for θi = θ0i and
slack otherwise.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that, for all i, all downward incentive constraints
are binding. Otherwise the expected payments of some individual could be increased
without violating any one of the constraints of the relaxed problem. It remains to be
shown that, for all i, the participation constraint in (PCC) is binding for θi = θ0i and
is slack otherwise. By Lemma 1.4 we only need to show that, for all i, the participation
constraint in (PCC) is binding for θi = θ0i . Suppose otherwise, then is was possible to
increase T (θ0i ) without violating any constraint.
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Lemma 1.7. Let q be a given provision rule with the property that for all i, and all l, the
monotonicity constraints qi(θ−i, θli) > qi(θ−i, θ
l−1
i ) are satised. Consider the problem of
choosing (t1, ..., tn) in order to maximize the total transfers
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (1.12) and the interim participation
constraints in (??). The maximal transfers at a solution to this problem is equal to
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
[
v(θi, qi(θ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ))− v(θi, qi(θ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]]
.
Proof: First, consider the "relaxed problem" of maximizing expected transfers subject to
the local downward incentive constraints in (1.12) and the participation constraints for
θi = θ
0
i . The arguments in the proofs of Lemma 1.4 – 1.6 imply that, for all i, all local
downward incentive constraints as well as the ex interim participation constraints are
binding for θi = θ0i .
Since the given provision rule q satises the monotonicity constraints in qi(θ−i, θli) >
qi(θ−i, θl−1i ) for all i and all l, Lemma 1.2 implies that all incentive compatibility con-
straints are satised at a solution to the relaxed problem. Hence, the solution to the
relaxed problem is the revenue maximizing mechanism.
Given that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, Lemma
1.3 implies that, for all i,
E(θ) [ti(θ)] = E(θ)
[
v(θi, qi(θ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ))− v(θi, qi(θ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]
+ Ti(θi) .
Since the participation constraints are binding, for all i, whenever θi = θ0i , we have
Ti(θ
0
i ) = −ui, for all i, and hence
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
n∑
i=1
{v(θ+i , qi(θ))− v(θi, qi(θ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]
−
n∑
i=1
ui .
Lemma1.8. For all j, the incentive constraints in (ICF ) hold if the following local incentive
constraints are satised: For any l < r,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl+1j )−K(δl+1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl+1j )) , (1.13)
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and for all l > 1,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j )) . (1.14)
Moreover, the local incentive constraints imply that, for all j, yj(δ−j, δlj) ≤ yj(δ−j, δl−1j ),
for all l > 2.
Proof: We rst show that yj(δ−j, δl+1j ) ≤ yj(δ−j, δlj) for each j and each l. Equation
(1.13) as stated in the Lemma for δj = δl−1j :
R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j )) ≥ R(δlj)−K(δlj | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δlj)) .
Adding equation (1.14) as stated above yields:
K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥
K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δlj | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δlj)).
Since δ′l > δl, this implies htat k2(δ′j, yj) ≥ k2(δl, yl), as long as yj(δ−j, δlj) ≤ yj(δ−j, δl−1j ).
We show that equation (1.14) implies that
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl−2j )−K(δl−2j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−2j )) .
To see this rewrite equation (1.14) as
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥
R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))
+ [K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))] .
Since yj(δ−j, δl−2j ) ≥ yj(δ−j, δl−1j ), we have
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥
R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))
+K(δl−2j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−2j ))−K(δl−2j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−2j )) .
Moreover, condition (1.14) for δj = δl−1j is
R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j )) ≥ R(δl−2j )−K(δl−2j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−2j )) .
Adding the two last inequalities yields
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl−2j )−K(δl−2j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−2j )) .
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Hence, a rm with technology parameter δlj does not prot from announcing δl−2j . It-
erating this argument once more establishes that this rm does neither prot from an-
nouncing δl−3j , etc. The proof that a rm with technology parameter δlj does not prot
from announcing δl−jj , for any j ≥ 1 is analogous and left to the reader.
Lemma 1.9. Suppose that, for some rm j, all local upward incentive constraints are bind-
ing and that yj(δ−j, δlj) ≥ yj(δ−j, δl−1j ), for all l > 2. Then all incentive compatibility
constraints are satised.
Proof: If all local upward incentive constraints are binding for rm j, this implies that,
for all l < r,
R(δlj) =
r−1∑
k=l
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δk+1j | δkj , yj(δ−j, δk+1j ))}+R(δrj ) .
For all l > 2, the equation can equivalently be written as
R(δlj) =K(δ
l
j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))
+
r−1∑
k=l+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))}+R(δrj ) .
To establish incentive compatibility, Lemma 1.8 implies that it suces to show that all
local downward incentive compatibility constraints are satised, i.e., for all l,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j )) ,
or equivalently,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥
R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))
+
[
K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))]
]
.
By equation
R(δlj) =K(δ
l
j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))
+
r−1∑
k=l+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))}+R(δr) ,
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this inequality can be written as:
r−1∑
k=l+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))} ≥
r−2∑
k=l
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))}
+
[
K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))
]
,
or
K(δlj | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δlj))−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥
K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j )) .
This inequality is fullled if
yj(δ−j, δl−1j ) ≥ yj(δ−j, δlj) .
These monotonicity constraints are fullled by assumption.
Lemma 1.10. If for rm j, all local upward incentive constraints are biding, then the
expected prot of rm j from ex ante perspective is given by
E(δ)[rj(δ)− k(δj, yj(δ))] = E(δ)
[
{k(δj, yj(δ))− k(δ−j , yj(δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
]
+R(δrj ) .
Proof: Equation
R(δlj) =K(δ
l
j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))
+
r−1∑
k=l+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))}+R(δr) ,
in the proof of Lemma 1.9 and the law of iterated expectation imply that
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E(δ)[rj(δ)] =
r∑
i=1
pijR(δ
i
j)
=
r∑
i=1
pij
[
E(δ−j)[k(δ
i
j, yj(δ−j, δ
i
j))]
+
r−1∑
k=i+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))} −R(δrj )
]
= E(δ)[k(δj, yj(δ))]−R(δrj )
r∑
i=1
pij
r−1∑
k=i+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))}
= E(δ)[k(δj, yj(δ))]−R(δrj )
+
r∑
i=1
r−1∑
k=i
pi−1j {K(δij | δij, yj(δ−j, δij))−K(δij | δi−1j , yj(δ−j, δij))}
= E(δ)[k(δj, yj(δ))] + E(δ)
[
{k(δj, yj(δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
]
−R(δrj )
Lemma 1.11. For all j, if the (PCF ) is satised for δj = δrj , then it is satised as well for
δj 6= δrj .
Proof: Let δj 6= δrj . Then by (1.13)
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δrj )−K(δrj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δrj )) .
Moreover, δj < δrj implies that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds
R(δrj )−K(δrj | δrj , yj(δ−j, δrj )) ,
which is non-negative by (PCF ) for δj = δrj . This proves that (PCF ) is not binding for
all δj 6= δrj .
Lemma 1.12. Let y be an arbitrary production rule. Consider the problem of choosing a
mechanism (r1, ..., rm) in order to minimize revenue
E(δ)
[
m∑
j=1
r(δ)
]
,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (1.13) and the interim participation
constraints (PCF ). At a solution to this problem, the participation constraint in (PCF ) is
binding for δj = δrj and slack otherwise.
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Proof: By Lemma 1.11 we only need to show that it is binding for δj = δrj . We show
that it is possible to decrease expected revenues of rm j in an incentive compatible way
if, for some j, the participation constraints for δj = δrj does not hold as an equality. It
is instructive to rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints in (ICF ) as follows: For
each j, for each δlj ∈ ∆j , and for each δˆj 6= δlj ∈ ∆j ,
R(δlj)−R(δˆj) ≥ K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))−K(δˆj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δˆj)) .
Consider a new revenue rule for rm j such that for every δj ∈ ∆j , R(δlj) decreases
by some  > 0. This implies that the left-hand side of the incentive constraint remains
constant, i.e., the decrease of j’s expected revenue does not violate the incentive compat-
ibility. Since revenue increase in the expected transfers to rm j, the revenue minimizing
mechanism must be such that a binding participation constraint for δj = δrj prevents a
further increase of rms j’s revenues.
Lemma 1.13. Let y be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the "relaxed problem"
of choosing a mechanism (r1, ..., rm) in order to minimize total revenue
E(δ)
[
m∑
j=1
rj(δ)
]
,
subject to the upward incentive compatibility constraints in (ICF ) and the interim partic-
ipation constraints (PCF ). At a solution to this problem, all upward incentive constraints
are biding, and the participation constraint in (PCF ) is binding for δj = δrj and slack
otherwise.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that, for all j, all upward incentive constraints
are binding. Otherwise, the expected revenue of some rm j could be decreased without
violating any one of the constraints of the relaxed problem. It remains to be shown that,
for all j, the participation constraint in (PCF ) is binding for δj = δrj . Suppose otherwise,
then it was possible to decrease R(δrj ) without violating any constraint.
Lemma 1.14. Let y be a given provision rule with the property that for all j, and all l, the
monotonicity constraints yj(δ−j, δlj) ≤ yj(δ−j, δl−1j ) are satised. Consider the problem of
choosing (r1, ...rm) in order to minimize the total revenue
E(δ)
[
m∑
j=1
rj(δ)
]
,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (ICC) and the interim participation
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constraints (PCC). The minimal revenue at a solution to this problem is equal to
E(δ)
[
m∑
j=1
{k(δj, yj(δ))− k(δ−j , yj(δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
−
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(δ))
]
−
m∑
j=1
R(δr) ,
Proof: First, consider the "relaxed problem" of minimizing expected revenues subject
to the local incentive constraints in (1.13) and the participation constraints for δj = δrj .
The arguments in the proofs of Lemma 1.11 – 1.13 imply that, for all j, all local upward
incentive constraints as well as the participation constraint for δj = δrj are binding.
Since the given production rule y satises the monotonicity constraints in yj(δ−j, δlj) ≤
yj(δ−j, δ−j ) for all j and all l, Lemma 1.9 implies that all incentive compatibility con-
straints are satised at a solution to the relaxed problem. Hence the solution to the
relaxed problem is the revenue minimizing mechanism.
Given that all local upward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, Lemma
1.10 implies that, for all j,
E(δ) [rj(δ)] = E(δ)
[
{k(δj, yj(δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
− k(δj, yj(δ))
]
−R(δrj ) .
Since the participation constraints are binding, for all j, whenever δj = δrj , we have that
r(δrj ) = pij , for all j, and hence
E(δ)
[
m∑
j=1
{k(δj, yj(δ))− k(δ−j , yj(δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
−
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(δ))
]
−
m∑
j=1
pij .
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Appendix 1.B Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries
Proof of Proposition 1.3.
Consider the ’rst relaxed problem’ of maximizing expected transfers subject to local
downward incentive compatibility constraints in (1.12) and interim participation con-
straints in (PCC). The arguments in the proofs of Lemma 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 imply that,
for all i, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints as well as the interim
participation constraints are binding for θi = θ0. In these Lemmata the provision rule
for the publicly provided good is not taken as given. However, this does not aect the
logic of the argument.
Given that all local incentive compatibility constraints are biding, Lemma 1.2 implies
that, for all i,
E(θ,δ)[ti(θ, δ)]
=E(θ,δ)
[(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
+ T (θ0i ) .
Since the participation constraints are binding, for all i, whenever θi = θ0i , we have
T (θ0i ) = −ui, for all i, and hence
E(θ,δ)[ti(θ, δ)]
=E(θ,δ)
[(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
− ui .
Second, consider the ’second relaxed problem’ of minimizing revenues subject to the
local downward incentive compatibility constraints in (1.14) and the interim participa-
tion constraints in (PCF ). The arguments in the proofs of Lemmata 1.9, 1.11 and 1.12
imply that, for all j, all local upward incentive compatibility constraints as well as the
interim participation constraints are binding for δj = δr. In these Lemmata the produc-
tion rule for the good is not taken as given. However, this does not aect the logic of the
argument.
Given all local incentive compatibility constraints are binding, Lemma 1.9 implies, for
all j,
E(θ,δ)[rj(θ, δ)]
=E(θ,δ)
[(
k(δj, yj(θ, δ)) + {k(δj, yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)]
+R(δrj ) .
Since the participation constraints are binding, for all j, whenever δj = δr, we have
R(δrj ) = pij , for all j, and hence
E(θ,δ)
[(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + {k(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)]
+ pij .
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Consequently, a necessary condition for the implementability of {(qi)ni=1, (y)mj=1} is that
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)]
≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + {k(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
) .
Proof of Proposition 1.4.
Suppose that the condition in Proposition 1.4 holds. We need to show that we can con-
struct a payment scheme satisfying all relevant constraints. Suppose rst that the condi-
tion in Proposition 1.4 holds as an equality. Then we can choose a payment scheme that
solves the relaxed problem, that we studied in the Proof of Proposition 1.3. To show this,
we need to verify that the payment scheme which solves the relaxed problem in Propo-
sition 1.3 satises not only the local downward incentive compatibility constraints, but
all incentive compatibility constraints. This is a consequence of the Lemmata 1.2 and
1.9.
Since the given provision rule qi satises the monotonicity constraints qi(θ−i, θ+i , δ) ≥
qi(θ−i, θi, δ) for all i and all l, Lemma 1.9 implies that all incentive compatibility con-
straints are binding. Lemma 1.3 implies that, for all i,
E(θ,δ)[ti(θ, δ)] =
E(θ,δ)
[(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
+ T (θ0i ) .
Now choose
T (θ0i ) =
1
n
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + {k(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)
+ pij

− 1
n
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)
− ui
]
,
for all i. By assumption this is smaller or equal to zero, so that the interim participation
constraints are satised, for all i. It remains to be shown that budget balance holds. This
follows since, by construction,
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E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
= E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
+ T (θ0i )
= E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + {k(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)
−E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
(v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)]
Proof of Proposition 1.5.
Recall that at a solution to consumer transfer maximization
Ti(θ
L) = θLQni (θ
L) ,
and
Ti(θ
H) = θH(Qni (θ
H)−Qni (θL)) + θLQni (θL) ,
which implies that
Rn =
1
n
n∑
j=1
{f(θH)θH(Qni (θH)−Qni (θL))}+ θLQni (θL) .
We can view the transfer maximization problem as consisting of θLQni (θL) that every
consumer has to pay and an incremental transfer if f(θH)θH(Qni (θH) − Qni (θL)) that
applies only for consumers with a high valuation for the public good. Proposition 1.5
states that the revenue due to these incremental payments goes to zero as the number
of consumers becomes large.
To proof this, we proceed in two steps:
Step 1. We rst show that limn→∞V n = 0, where
V n := maxQn()
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
Qni (θ
H)−Qni (θL)
)
.
Fix θ′. The weight of Qn(θ′) in
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H)−Qni (θL)) is given by
wn(θ′) := m(θ′)f(θH)m(θ
′)−1(1−f(θH))n−m(θ′)−(n−m(θ′))f(θH)m(θ′)(1−f(θH))n−1−m(θ′) ,
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where m(θ′) is the number of individuals with θ′i = θH .
Consequently, Qn(θ′) is chosen equal to 1 if wn(θ) ≥ 0 and equal to 0 otherwise. Equiv-
alently,
Qn(θ′) =
{
1, if m(θ
′)
n
≥ f(θH) ,
0 if m(θ
′)
n
< f(θH) .
Substituting these expression into V n implies
V n =
1
n
n∑
x= ˆf(θH)n
(
n
x
)
f(θH)x(1− f(θH))n−x − (n− x)f(θH)x(1− f(θH))n−1−x ,
where ˆf(θH)n is the smallest integer larger than nf(θH). Equivalently,
V n =
1
f(θH)(1− f(θH))
n∑
x= ˆf(θH)n
(
n
x
)
f(θH)x(1− f(θH))n−x
(x
n
− f(θH)
)
=
1
f(θH)(1− f(θH))
n∑
x= ˆf(θH)n
prob
(
m(θ)
n
= x
)(x
n
− f(θH)
)
.
Note that m(θ)
n
= 1
n
∑n
i=1 zi, where (zi)ni=1 is a collection function of i.i.d. random vari-
ables such that zi = 1 if θi = θH and zi = 0 otherwise. By the strong Law of Large
Numbers, for any  > 0,
limn→∞prob
(∣∣∣m(θ)
n
− f(θH)
∣∣∣ > ) = 0 .
Hence, limn→∞V n = 0.
Step 2. Under any incentive compatible mechanism, 1
n
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H) − Qni (θL)) con-
verges to zero. It follows from the incentive compatibility constraints that Qni (θH) −
Qni (θ
L) ≥ 0. This implies that 1
n
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H) − Qni (θL)) ≥ 0. By Step 1, the upper
bound on 1
n
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H)−Qni (θL)) converges to 0. Hence, 1n
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H)−Qni (θL))
also converges to 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.6.
In order to proof that a further increase in the message set leads to Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) impossibility result, we proceed as follows. In each round k = 1, 2, . . .
we introduce more types for the buyer/the seller by placing new types at the center of
every given sub-interval of [θL, θH ] and [δL, δH ]. The partition into sub-intervals, we
have in the beginning of round k is dened by the types set in all previous rounds. Thus,
after round k we are facing a partition of [θL, θH ] into 2k−1 · 2 = 2k sub-intervals and
the number of types is given by #Θ = 2k + 1,#∆ = 2k + 1. Since the rst introducing-
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round, we have added 2k − 1 types. In terms of the original types, the introduced types
are given by
1 = 1, . . . , 2k
θlk =
1
2k+1
(
(δH − θL)(l − 2k) + (l + 2k))
δlk =
1
2k+1
(
(δH − θL) + 1)
θkl − δk(2
k−l) =
(
δH − θL) l − 2k
2k
+
l
2k
Consider the Example and the mechanism that include 2k + 1 types. There is a social
choice function which is ecient, implementable in Bayes-Nash equilibrium and yields
non-negative material payo for every type of individual if and only if
(δH − θL)
 1∑
l=l¯kB
[ l − 2k
2k
2k − l + 1
2k + 1
]
− (2k − l¯kB + 1)
− 1∑
l=l¯kB
l
2k
2k − l + 1
2k + 1
≥ 0 ,
where l = l¯kB is the index of the buyer with valuation θl¯ := min{θ : θ > δH} is the
lowest type, that does not lie in the interval δH − θL in round k.
Remark: In every round k = m, the types introduced in round {1, . . . ,m− 1} are given
a new label, such that after round k = m there does not exist any type θlk, δlk with k 6= m.
We assume that all types have equal probability 1
2k+1
.
Idea. Since the consumer perspective can be translated into the producer perspective by
adjusting the indices, we only consider the consumer side to give an intuition for the
stated result:
• To calculate the expected surplus in a certain round k (and thus to nd out, if e-
cient implementation is possible), we sum up the gains from trade for all possible
states of the world (combination of types), weighted with their probabilities.
• All types (expect the lowest and the highest) enter this sum positively and neg-
atively. Positively, because buy the utility the considered type would get. And
negatively, because each type is part of the information rent calculation of the
type just below him. If these terms are equally high, the considered type does not
enter the decision concerning ecient implementation.
• All θlk for which q(θlk, ·) = q(θ(l−1)k , ·), for all δlk (holding k xed), cancel out. The
reason is, that the probability mass of all positive and negative (hazard rate term of
the type below θlk ) terms are equal. (The expected information rent eect equals
the expected surplus eect.)
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• If the condition above does not hold for the neighboring types, there remains a
residuum by summing up the positive an negative terms, which means, that the
considered type enters the expected surplus in a positive way.
• The weight by which a specic buyer θlk enters the expected surplus is the prob-
ability of the state (θlk, δlk), for which q(θlk, δlk) 6= q(θ(l−1)k , δlk) multiplied with the
sum over all probabilities of higher types. (This comes from the specic form of
the hazard rate in discrete settings.)
• This is true for every buyer θlk ≤ θl¯kB .
• Adding up and rearranging all these terms provides the stated result.
Proof of Proposition 1.7.
Consider the Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) setup for I = {1, 2},Θ = [θL, θH ]. We
assume, that θL + θH > 2c. Then the ecient allocation rule is given by
q(θ) =
{
0, if θ1 + θ2 < 2c ,
1, if θ1 + θ2 > 2c .
Then g can be implemented, if and only if
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)q(θ)] ≥ cE(θ)[q(θ)]
Or equivalently,∫
θ1
∫
θ2
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ θ2 − 1− F2(θ2)
f2(θ2)
)
q(θ1, θ2)f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
≥ c
∫
θ1
∫
θ2
q(θ1, θ2)f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
⇔ ∫
θ1
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ θ2 − 1− F2(θ2)
f2(θ2)
)
f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
≥ c
∫
θ1
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
1f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
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The left-hand side of the inequality can be written as∫
θ1
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
1
2
[(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ θ2
)
f(θ2)− 1 + F2(θ2)
]
f1(θ1)dθ1dθ2
=
∫
θ1
[
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
)
F2(θ2)
∣∣∣θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
+ θH2
−max{θL2 , 2c− θ1}F2(max{θL2 , 2c− θ1})−
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
F2(θ2)dθ2
− θH2 +max{θL2 , 2c− θ1}+
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
F2(θ2)dθ2
]
f1(θ1)dθ1
=
∫
θ1
1
2
(
(θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+max{θL2 , 2c− θ1}
)(
1− F2(max{θL2 , 2c− θ1})
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
Case 1: max{θL2 , 2c− θ1} = 2c− θ1.∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ 2c− θ1
)(
1− F2(2c− θH1 )
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
(−(1− F1(θ1))(1− F2(2c− θH1 )) + 2cf1(θ1)(1− F2(2c− θH1 ))) dθ1
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 ) [1− 2cf(θ1)− F1(θ1)] dθ1
+
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
cf(θ1)dθ1 − 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + cF2(2c− θH1 )
− 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )2cf(θ1)dθ1
Case 2: max{θL2 , 2c− θ1} = θL2 .∫ θH2
2c−θH1
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ θL2
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
=
1
2
∫ θH2
2c−θH1
(
θ1f1(θ1)− (1− F1(θ1)) + θL2 f1(θ1)
)
dθ1
=
1
2
(
θ1F1(θ1)
∣∣∣θH2
2c−θH1
−
∫ θH2
2c−θH1
F1(θ1)dθ1
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−
∫ θH2
2c−θH1
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + θL2 F (θ1)
∣∣∣θH2
2c−θH1
)
=
1
2
(
θH2 − (2c− θH1 )F1(2c− θH1 )
)− ∫ θH2
2c−θH1
1dθ1 + θ
L
2 (1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
=
1
2
(
θH2 − (2c− θH1 )F1(2c− θH1 )− θH2 + (2c− θH1 ) + θL2 (1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
)
=
1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )(1− F1(2c− θH1 )) + c− cF1(2c− θH1 )
Combining Case 1 and Case 2 the left-hand side of the inequality is given by∫
θ1
1
2
(
(θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+max{θL2 , 2c− θ1}
)(
1− F2(max{θL2 , 2c− θ1})
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + cF2(2c− θH1 )
− 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )2cf(θ1)dθ1
+
1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )(1− F1(2c− θH1 )) + c− cF1(2c− θH1 )
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + c
− 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )2cf(θ1)dθ1 +
1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )(1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
The right-hand side of the inequality can be written as
c
∫
θ1
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
1f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
=
∫
θ1
(
1− F2(max{θL2 , 2c− θH1 })
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
= c
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
(
1− F2(2c− θH1 )
)
f(θ1)dθ1 +
∫ θH2
2c−θH1
1f(θ1)dθ1
= c
(∫ θH2
θL2
1f1(θ1)dθ1 −
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )f(θ1)dθ1
)
= c
(
1−
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )f(θ1)dθ1
)
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The inequality can hence be written as
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + c
− 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )2cf(θ1)dθ1 +
1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )(1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
≥ c
(
1−
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )f(θ1)dθ1
)
⇔
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + 1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
≥ 0
The inequality cannot be fullled. The public good can therefore not be provided e-
ciently.
Proof of Proposition 1.8.
Reminder:fD, FD are the density-, distribution function in the discrete environment. For
every individual, they are dened as follows:
fD(θ) =
∫ θl+1+θl
2
θl+θl−1
2
f(θl)dθl , θl ∈ (θ0, θs)
fD(θ
0) =
∫ θ1+θ0
2
0
f(θl)dθl
fD(θ
s) =
∫ θs
θs+θs−1
2
f(θl)dθl
Without loss of generality (for I < ∞), we consider a situation with one individual on
each side we take δ as given and calculate the ex ante expected payment. All arguments
also apply in case of more than one agent and taking expectation over (θ, δ). The ex ante
expected payment is given by the following equation
Eθ
[(
v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))
]− s∑
l=1
f(θl){v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))}1− FD(θ
l)
fD(θl)
)
.
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We neglect the rst term for the moment and consider the second:
∑
l
f(θl){v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))}1− FD(θ
l)
fD(θl)
=
∑
l
{v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))}(1− FD(θl))
=
∑
l
v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))
θl+1 − θl (θ
l+1 − θl)(1− FD(θl)) .
Adding types in every round k, yields that |θl+1− θl| → 0. Thus the dierence quotient
of the value function converges to the partial derivative of v with respect to θl.
lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))
θl+1 − θl (θ
l+1 − θl)(1− FD(θl))
=
∑
l
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
θl
(1− FD(θl)) .
Since v is monotone we can change summation and take the innum/supremum. The
limit of the upper- and the lower-sum of the above function coincide and FD(θl) →
F (θl), thus the integral exists and is given by20
lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
inf
z
(
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
z
(1− FD(z))
)
= lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
sup
z
(
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
z
(1− FD(z))
)
=
∫ θs
θ0
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
z
(1− F (z))dz .
Using integration by parts and Fubini’s Theorem (to change the order of integration),
we get ∫ θs
θ0
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
s
(1− F (s))dr =
∫ θs
θ0
∂v
∂θi
∣∣∣
x
(1− F (x))dx
=
∫ θs
θ0
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
∫ θs
x
f(z)dzdx
=
∫ θs
θ0
∫ θs
x
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
f(z)dzdx
=
∫ θs
θ0
∫ z
θs
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
f(z)dxdz
=
∫ θs
θ0
∫ z
θs
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
dxf(z)dz .
20Reminder: We summarize over all possible types l = 0, . . . , s. This is not a summation over agents.
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For the neglected term Eθ
[
v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))
]
=
∑
l fD(θ
l)v(θl, q∗(θ, δ)), we consider the
limes inferior and the limes superior and nd, that it converges:
lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
inf
θl
(
v(θl, q∗(θl, δ))
)
= lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
sup
θl
(
v(θl, q∗(θl, δ))
)
=
∫ θs
θ0
v(z, q∗(z, δ))f(z)dz .
Combining the converged terms, this yields
∫ θs
θ0
(
v(z, q∗(z, δ))− ∫ z
θs
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
dx
)
f(z)dz =
Eθ[t(θ, δ)], which gives the claimed result.
Proof of Corollary 1.1.
Let us assume for a moment that the mechanism that maximizes expected surplus subject
to (ICF ) and (PCF ) satises the monotonicity constraint yj(θ, δ−j, δlj) ≥ yj(θ, δ−j, δl+1j ),
for all l. This will be veried below.
A necessary condition for the maximization of S is that consumers’ transfers need to be
higher than rms’ revenues. The budget constraint (1.6) needs to hold with equality,
otherwise it was possible to decrease transfers without violating any constraints of the
surplus maximization problem. Hence,
S(θ, δ) := E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
.
Now suppose that the solution to this problem involves overproduction,
n∑
i=1
qi(θ, δ) ≤
m∑
j=1
yj(θ, δ) .
Then increasing
∑n
i=1 qi(θ, δ) involves no costs, i.e. rm prots remain unaected, but
increases consumer surplus as E(θ,δ)[
∑n
i=1 v(θi, qi(θ, δ))] goes up. This is a contradiction
to the assumption that the optimum involves underproduction. Hence, we need that∑n
i=1 qi(θ, δ) =
∑m
j=1 yj(θ, δ).
We can therefore once more rewrite the problem of choosing an optimal provision rule:
Choose (qi)ni=1, (yj)mj=1 in order to maximize
S(θ, δ) := E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
,
subject to
∑n
i=1 qi(θ, δ) =
∑m
j=1 yj(θ, δ). The solution to that problem is such that the
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following rst order condition is satised:
n∑
i=1
v2(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ)) =
m∑
j=1
k2(δj, y
∗
j (θ, δ)) .
The rst order condition implies that for every δ, qi(θ−i, θli) ≥ qi(θ−i, θl−1i ) and for every
yj(δ−j, δlj) ≥ yj(δ−j, δl+1j ). This implies that the monotonicity conditions, for all l, are
satised.
Now we construct the expected transfers of consumers such that all local downward
incentive compatibility constraints are binding and choose T (θ0i )ni=1 such that
n∑
i=1
T (θ0i ) = E(θ,δ)
[ n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θi, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)
−
m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + {k(δj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δ−j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)]
.
It follows from Lemma 1.2 that for all consumers incentive compatibility constraints are
satised. Also it follows from Proposition 1.4, that the expected transfers are given by
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
=
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + {k(δj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δ−j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)− n∑
i=1
ui .
It follows as well from Proposition 1.4 that maximal revenue that can be extracted from
consumers are equal to
E(θ,δ)
[ n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, q
∗(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θi, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)]
.
Consequently, a necessary condition for the implementability of (q∗i )ni=1, (y∗j )mj=1 is that
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θi, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui
≥ E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + {k(δj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δ−j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
Suciency of this condition can be shown by using once more, the construction in the
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Proof of Proposition 1.4. If the condition above holds and we let for all i,
T (θ0i )−
(
E
[ n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θi, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)
−
m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + {k(δj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δ−j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)])
≥ 0 ,
we obtain a mechanism that achieves (q∗i )ni=1, (y∗j )mj=1, satises all relevant constraints.
Proof of Corollary 1.2.
Suppose that the constraint in Corollary 1.1 is violated, then the inequality constraint
in Proposition 1.2 is binding, and the optimal provision rule maximizes the following
Lagrangian
L = E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(v(θi, q(θ, δ))− k(δj , yj(θ, δ)))
]
+ λ
(
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)]
− E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + {k(δj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)) ,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier which, at a solution to this maximization problem,
has to be strictly positive, λ > 0.
To complete the proof it remains to be shown that a solution to the maximization prob-
lem satises the monotonicity constraints.
To see that qi(θ+−i, θi) ≥ qi(θ−i, θi), for all i and all l holds, note that the monotone hazard
rate assumption implies that
E(θ,δ)
[(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− {v(θ+i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θi, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
≥ 0 ,
is an increasing function. Consequently, the solution to the maximization problem is
such that qi(θ+−i, θi, δ) ≥ qi(θ−i, θi, δ) , for all i, θ−i and δ.
To see that yj(θ, δ−j, δ−j ) ≥ yj(θ, δ−j, δj), for all j , note that
E(θ,δ)
[(
k(δj, y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + {k(δj, yj(θ, δ))− k(δ−, yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)]
≥ 0 ,
also is an increasing function. This implies that, for all j, δ−j and θ, yj(θ, δ−j, δ−j ) ≥
yj(θ, δ−j, δj).
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Appendix 1.C Applications
Here, we present a further application that highlight the dierence between discrete
and continuous type settings. For the partnership dissolution framework of Cramton,
Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987), we demonstrate that irrespectively of the original dis-
tribution of shares in the partnership, this partnership can be dissolved eciently for
examples with discrete types.
Partnership dissolution, Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987). There are
I = {1, 2} consumers, also referred to as partners, and no producers. They form a
partnership in which any one agent i initially holds a share ei ∈ [0, 1], with e1 + e2 = 1.
The allocation problem is to change the ownership structure. Let si be agent i’s share in
the partnership after the reassignment of shares. Let ti be the monetary payment of i,
which is positive if i has to compensate others for receiving their shares and is negative if
i sells some of her shares to other partners. Partner i evaluates this outcome according
to the utility function θi si − ti. We can relate this setup to the general framework
developed in Section 1.4 by dening qi = si − ei as the change of the shares held by
agent i. Partner i’s utility gain from the change of the ownership structure can then be
written as θi qi − ti. A social choice function consists of a collection of consumption
functions qi : Θn → R, i ∈ I , so that, for all θ,
q1(θ) + q1(θ) = 0 and, for all i, −ei ≤ qi(θ) ≤ 1− ei . (1.15)
The partners have to agree unanimously on the new ownership structure so that ui = 0,
for all i. The surplus that is generated by the change of the ownership structure is, again,
given by Eθ [θ1q1(θ) + θ2q2(θ)].
A key insight by Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) is that the specication of
the initial ownership structure, i.e. the choice of e = (e1, e2), has an inuence on the
possibility to dissolve a partnership in a surplus-maximizing way. Below, we will show
that our discrete type specication allows us to communicate this insight in a very sim-
ply way, without having to invoke all the calculus that an analysis with an atomless
distribution would require.
In the following we assume that there are two types per individual, i.e. Θ1 = {θL1 , θH1 }
and Θ2 = {θL2 , θH2 }. We denote the probability of the event θi = θLi by fLi and fHi :=
1−fLi . For ease of notation we dene the interim expected change of share in partnership
as:
Q1(θ
L
1 ) := f
L
1 q1(θ
L
1 , θ
L
2 ) + f
H
1 q1(θ
L
1 , θ
H
2 ) ,
and analogously Q1(θH1 ), Q2(θL2 ) and Q2(θH2 )
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Proposition 1.9. Suppose that q1 and q2 are such that
Q1(θ
L
1 ) ≤ Q1(θH1 ) ≤ 0, and Q2(θL2 ) ≤ Q2(θH2 ) ≤ 0 ,
then there exists (t1, t2) so that (q1, q2, t1, t2) satises incentive compatibility, voluntary
participation and expected budget balance if and only if
Eθ[θ1q1(θ1, θ2) + θ2q2(θ1, θ2)]− fL1 (θH1 − θL1 )Q1(θH1 )− fH2 (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 ) ≥ 0 .
In a discrete type version of Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) an ecient dis-
solution of partnership is possible, even though the initial ownership is such that one
party owns everything and the other party nothing. This is dierent under a continuous
distribution of types. The possibility result relates to Observation 1.1. If initial shares
are distributed more equally between two parties, ecient dissolution of partnership is
possible with discrete and continuous distribution of types, as the following Proposition
highlights.
Proposition 1.10. Suppose that q1 and q2 are such that
Q1(θ
L
1 ) ≤ 0 ≤ Q1(θH1 ), and Q2(θL2 ) ≥ 0 ≥ Q2(θH2 ) ,
then there exists (t1, t2) so that (q1, q2, t1, t2) satises incentive compatibility, voluntary
participation and expected budget balance if and only if
Eθ[θ1q1(θ1, θ2) + θ2q2(θ1, θ2)] ≥ 0 .
Proofs of Application.
Proof of Proposition 1.9.
For the given allocation function q the incentive compatibility and participation con-
straints for individual i are given by
θLi Qi(θ
L
i )− Ti(θLi ) ≥ θLi Qi(θHi )− Ti(θHi ) (1.16)
θHi Qi(θ
H
i )− Ti(θHi ) ≥ θHi Qi(θLi )− Ti(θLi ) (1.17)
θLi Qi(θ
L
i )− Ti(θLi ) ≥ 0 (1.18)
θHi Qi(θ
H
i )− Ti(θHi ) ≥ 0 . (1.19)
Additional we have the expected budget balance condition:
E(θ) [t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2)] = 0
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For standard arguments, we assume, that the participation constraint for the worst-o
type and the incentive compatibility constraint for the best-o are binding and solve the
relaxed problem under these conditions. Subsequently we show, that the found solution
fullls the neglected conditions. Since Q1(θ1j) ≤ 0, j ∈ L,H we refer to individual 1 as
the seller and individual 2 as the buyer. Thus equations (1.17) and (1.18) are binding for
individual 2 and equations (1.16) and (1.19) are binding for individual 1.
Rearranging these conditions yields
T2(θ
L
2 ) = θ
L
2Q2(θ
L
2 )
T1(θ
H
1 ) = θ
H
1 Q1(θ
H
1 )
T2(θ
H
2 ) = θ
H
2 Q2(θ
H
2 )− (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 )
T1(θ
L
1 ) = θ
L
1Q1(θ
L
1 )− (θL1 − θH1 )Q1(θH1 )
Plugging these transfers into the neglected conditions:
0 ≥ θL2Q2(θH2 )−
(
θH2 Q2(θ
H
2 )− (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 )
)⇔ Q2(θH2 ) ≥ Q2(θL2 ) (1.20)
θH2 Q2(θ
H
2 )− θH2 Q2(θH2 )− (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 ) ≥ 0 . (1.21)
Equation (1.21) always holds. The constraints for player 1 are analogous. We check now
the budget balance condition
fH1
(
θH1 Q1(θ
H
1 )
)
+ fL1
(
θL1Q1(θ
L
1 )− (θL1 − θH1 )Q1(θH1 )
)
=− (fL2 (θL2Q2(θL2 )) + fH2 (θH2 Q2(θH2 )− (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 ))) .
Thus, forQi(θHi ) ≥ Qi(θLi ) we found the desired transfers, such that t1(θ1, θ2), t2(θ1, θ2),
q1(θ1, θ2), q2(θ1, θ2) fulll incentive compatibility constraints, participation constraints,
if and only if
Eθ[θ1q1(θ1, θ2) + θ2q2(θ1, θ2)]− fL1 (θH1 − θL1 )Q1(θH1 )− fH2 (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 ) ≥ 0 .
Proof of Proposition 1.10.
We solve the relaxed problem and check, whether the solution fulll the neglected condi-
tions. Incentive compatibility and participation constraints are given by equations (1.16)
- (1.19).
We assume that the participation constraints are binding. Thus
Ti(θ
L
i ) = θ
L
i Qi(θ
L
i )
Ti(θ
H
1 ) = θ
H
i Qi(θ
H
i )
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Check for the incentive compatibility constraints:
0 ≥ θLi Qi(θHi )− θHi Qi(θHi )
0 ≥ θHi Qi(θLi )− θLi Qi(θLi ) .
Since Qi(θHi ) ≥ 0 and Qi(θLi ) ≤ 0, both incentive compatibility constraints hold. To
check budget balance, we plug the transfers into the budget balance condition and get
the desired result.
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Appendix 1.D From discrete to continuous for the
firm side
Production Economy. We dene a production economy (J,∆, p, y) as the vector con-
sisting of producers j ∈ J , the Cartesian product of type sets (one type set for every rm
j) ∆ = ∆1×· · ·×∆m with the corresponding density functions pj : ∆j → [0, 1], where
p := (p0, . . . , pm), and the allocation rule y : ∆ → R+, that maps reported types into
allocations. Thus, a sequence of production economies is given by (Jk,∆k, pk, yk)k∈N,
where Jk is a sequence of producer sets, ∆k a sequence of type set-products, pk a se-
quence of density-function vectors and yk a sequence of allocation functions. We intro-
duce some additional denitions and notations:
Producer. We keep the set J = 1, . . . ,mk be the set of consumers in round k. For
ease of notation, we write J instead of Jk and J∞k in every element of the sequence of
production economies.
Type sets. An element ∆l of the sequence (∆k)k∈N is given by the Cartesian product
over the type sets of the rms in round k. Since we assume symmetric rms, every rm
κ ∈ J has the same type set ∆kκ. Thus ∆k = (∆kκ)mk
Density Functions. The sequence (pk)k∈N consists of pk = (pk1, . . . , pkmk), where pkj is
the density function over a nite type set, namely ∆kj , for all j < mk <∞, j ∈ J .
Allocation Functions.The sequence of allocations functions is given by (yk)k∈N : (∆k)k∈N
→ (xk)k∈N, xk ∈ R, where yk : ∆k → R. Remark: The denitions of convergence are
analogously to the consumption side. The revenues that we receive for a mechanism
(y, r) in a continuous environment, that fullls incentive compatibility constraints and
participation constraints can be found in equation (1.10)
Proposition 1.11. Let (J,∆k, pk, yk)k∈N → (J,∆∞, p∞, y∞), for k →∞. Then it holds,
that for every producer j ∈ J : For every  > 0 ∃ K : ∀ k ≥ K
∣∣∣∣∣E(δkj)
[(
k(δkj, ykj(θ, δ)) + {k(δkj, ykj(θ, δ))− k(δ−k(kj), ykj(θ, δ))}
Pk(δkj)
pk(δkj)
)]
−
E(δ∞j)
[
k(δ∞j, y∞j(θ, δ)) + k1(δ∞j, y∞j(θ, δ))
P∞(δ∞j)
p∞(δ∞j)
dδ∞j
] ∣∣∣∣∣ <  .
Proof of Proposition 1.11.
The arguments are similar to the ones used in Proposition 1.8 and therefore left to the
reader.
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Appendix 1.E Proof of Observations
Proof of Observation 1.1.
In the direct mechanism, there are 4 states of the economy, namely: (θH , δH), (θH , δL),
(θL, δH) and (θL, δL). Since q(θL, δH) = 0, straightforward computations yield
(θH1 , δ
H
1 ) : f
HfL
[
θH − δH + (δH − δL)f
H
fL
]
(θH1 , δ
L
1 ) : +f
HfH
[
θH − δL]
(θL1 , δ
L
1 ) : +f
LfH
[
θL − (θH − θL)f
H
fL
− δL
]
≥ 0
Hence, implementation of the social choice function is possible if and only if
fL ≥ δ
H − θL
θH − δL .
Proof of Observation 1.2.
The expected surplus is
S() =fHfL
[
θH − δH]+ fHfH [θH − δL]+ fLfH [θL − δL]
=fHfL
[
θH − δH + θL − δL]+ fHfH [θH − δL]
=fHfL
[
1− (δH − θL)]+ fHfH1
=fHfL [1− d] + fHfH
Hence ∂S()
∂d
< 0 .
The expected information rents are
IR() =fHfL
[
δH − δL + θH − θL]
=fHfL
[
1 + δH − θL]
=fHfL [1 + d]
Hence ∂IR()
∂d
> 0 .
Proof of Observation 1.3.
From the proof of Observation 1.2, we know that
S() = (1− fL)fL [1− d] + (1− fL)2 .
Therefore, whenever θH − δH < 1
2
,
∂S()
∂fL
< 0 .
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The expected information rents are
IR() = fHfL [1− d] .
So that ∂IR()
∂fL
< 0 .
Proof of Observation 1.4
Consider the Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) setup for I = {1, 2},Θi = Θ = {θL, θH}.
We assume, that 0.5
(
θL + θH
)
> c. (For ease of notation: f(θL) = fL) Then g can be
implemented eciently, if and only if
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)g(θ)] ≥ cE(θ)[g(θ)] .
Since trade takes place, if at least one consumer has a high valuation, and g is either 0
or 1, the right-hand side of the equation equals
cE(θ)[g(θ)] =c(1− Prob(both have a low valuation))
= c
(
1− (fL)2) = c ((1 + fL)(1− fL)) = c ((1 + fL)fH) .
The left-hand side is given by
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)g(θ)]
=
1
2
(fH)2
[
2θH
]
+
1
2
2fH fL
[
θL − 1− F (θ
L)
fL
(θH − θL) + θH
]
= fH
(
θL + fLθH
)
.
This yields that ecient implementation is possible, if and only if
θL + fLθH ≥ (1− fL)c⇔ fL ≥ c− θ
L
θH − c
Proof of Observation 1.5.
MS = −
[θH − c− fL(c− θL)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S(·)
− (1− fL)(θH − θL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IR(·)
 ≤ 0 .
i) If fL is xed, then ∂S()
∂c
< 0.
ii) If c is xed, then ∂S()
∂c
< 0 , and ∂IR()
∂c
< 0.
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Proof of Observation 1.6.
Consider the mechanism, in which the third type θM and δM for each player is added by
cutting the existing intervals [θH , θL] and [δH , δL] into halves and set
δM =
1
2
(
δH − θL + 1− (δ
H − θL)
2
)
,
and
θM =
1
2
(
δH − θL + 1− (δ
H − θL)
2
)
+
1− (δH − θL)
2
.
The mechanism works like the mechanism with outcome function f . We assume, that
the new middle type has probability, fM1 .
Ecient implementation is possible, whenever Corollary 1.1 applies.
If an additional type is introduced for the buyer and the seller, there are 9 states of the
economy. Trade is inecient when the low valuation buyer faces the high cost seller.
(θH , δH) : fH1 f
L
1
[
θH −
(
δH + (δH − δM )f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
)]
(θH , δM ) : fH1 f
M
1
[
θH −
(
δM + (δM − δL) f
H
1
fM1
)]
(θH , δL) : fH1 f
H
1
[
θH − δL]
(θM , δH) : fM1 f
H
1
[
θM − (θH − θM ) f
H
1
fM1
−
(
δH + (δH − δM )f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
)]
(θM , δM ) : fM1 f
M
1
[
θM − (θH − θM ) f
H
1
fM1
−
(
δM + (δH − δM ) f
H
1
fM1
)]
(θM , δL) : fM1 f
L
1
[
θM − (θH − θM ) f
H
1
fM1
− δL
]
(θL, δM ) : fL1 f
M
1
[
θL − (θM − θL)f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
−
(
δM + (δM − δL) f
H
1
fM1
)]
(θL, δL) : fL1 f
H
1
[
θL − (θM − θL)f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
− δL
]
Hence, by using the denition for θ11 and δ11 implementation of the social choice function
is possible if and only if
fL1 (θ
M
1 − δM1 ) ≥ δH1 − θL1 .
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If we introduce a third type for each player, so that θM1 < δH1
Figure 1.9: ’Round 1’, Case b
δL1 δ
H
1
θL1 θ
H
1
δM1
θM1
Applying Proposition 1.4, ecient bilateral trade is possible if and only if
fL1 (θ
H
1 − δL1 ) ≥ δH1 − θL1 .
Proof of Observation 1.7.
By Observation 1.1, we know that implementation in ’round 0’ is possible if
fL0 > d .
By Observation 1.9, we know that implementation in ’round 1’ is possible if
fL1 >
δH1 − θL1
θM1 − δM1
.
Making use of Denition 1.2, implementation in ’round 1’ is less costly than in ’round
0’, i.e., the minimal subsidy decreases, if
fL1 >
2fL0
1 + fL0
.
The monotone hazard rate assumption is satised if
0 ≤ f
H
1
fM1
≤ f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
.
When fM1 is suciently small, the monotone hazard rate assumption is violated and
implementation can still be possible in ’round 1’.
Proof of Observation 1.8.
Consider the mechanism, in which the third type θM and δM for each player is added
such that θM1 < δM1 . Ecient implementation is possible, whenever Corollary 1.1 applies.
If an additional type is introduced for the buyer and the seller, there are 9 states of the
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economy. Trade is ecient only in 5 of them.
(θH , δH) : fH1 f
L
1
[
θH −
(
δH + (δH − δM )f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
)]
(θH , δM ) : fH1 f
M
1
[
θH −
(
δM + (δM − δL) f
H
1
fM1
)]
(θH , δL) : fH1 f
H
1
[
θH − δL]
(θM , δL) : fM1 f
L
1
[
θM − (θH − θM ) f
H
1
fM1
− δL
]
(θL, δL) : fL1 f
H
1
[
θL − (θM − θL)f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
− δL
]
Hence, implementation of the social choice function is possible if and only if
fL1 ≥
δH − θL
θH − δL .
Proof of Observation 1.9.
Consider the Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) setup for I = {1, 2},Θi = Θ = {θL1 , θM1 , θH1 }.
We assume, that 0.5
(
θL1 + θ
M
1
)
> c. Then g can be implemented eciently, if and only
if
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)g(θ)] ≥ cE(θ)[g(θ)]
Since trade takes place, if at least one consumer has a middle valuation, and g is either
0 or 1, the right-hand side of the equation equals
cE(θ)[g(θ)] =c(1− Prob(both have a low valuation))
= c
(
1− (fL1 )2
)
= c
(
(1 + fL1 )(1− fL1 )
)
= c(1 + fL1 )(f
H + fM1 )
The left-hand side is given by:
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)g(θ)]
= θM1
[
fL1
(
fH1 + f
M
1
)]
+ θL1
(
fH1 + f
M
1
)
= θM1 f
L
1
(
fH1 + f
M
1
)
+ θL1
(
fH1 + f
M
1
)
This yields that ecient implementation is possible, if and only if
fL1 >
c− θL1
θM1 − c
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On the durability
of price and quantity mechanisms
2.1 Introduction
This chapter contributes to the theory of externalities. It looks at a model in which
productive activities by rms cause environmental damages, which are harmful to con-
sumers. Specically, it compares dierent instruments a regulatory agency can use to
control the damages.
There is already a rich literature to this debate. A crucial question is to derive condi-
tions under which the regulation of externalities by means of a permit system is supe-
rior to taxation. Martin Weitzman (1974) set the starting point with his seminal paper
"Prices versus Quantities". He examined the welfare implication of price and quantity
instruments when avoidance costs and avoidance benets are uncertain. Thus, there is
uncertainty about the state of the economy in which the chosen policy instrument will
inuence the behavior of rms and consumers. Weitzman demonstrated that when the
regulator’s objective is to maximize the surplus of controlling the externality, the slopes
of demand (that is shaped by the distribution of preferences for externality reduction)
and supply (that is shaped by the distribution of costs) curves are important to deter-
mine which instrument leads to higher surplus. His basic reasoning is that the choice
of instrument depends on whether the regulator wants to get the amount of externali-
ties right or whether he wants to have certainty on the costs. Quantity regulation, via
tradable permits, assures that the desired externality reduction takes place, regardless of
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costs. In contrast, price regulation, via corrective taxes, assures that the marginal costs
of externality regulation never exceed the tax, but the overall reduction of externalities
remains uncertain. In situations where it is crucial to get the amount of reduction right,
a quantity instrument should be preferred over a price instrument. And a price instru-
ment should be preferred when the marginal costs of reduction vary strongly with the
amount of reduction.
However, in Weitzman’s work and most of the literature that followed, incomplete,
but symmetric information was assumed; i.e., the regulating agency, as well as rms
and consumers are uninformed about the costs and benets of externality regulation.
This literature does not model information problems that arise if rms privately observe
their avoidance costs, and consumers privately observe the harm that the environmen-
tal damage causes. But most likely rms have superior information than the regulatory
agency about the avoidance costs, and also consumers will have better information about
how much they benet from reduced externalities. The literature that is based on the
assumption of symmetric information does not answer the question of how a regulator
would obtain the information about the costs and benets that his intervention causes.
To obtain these information he would have to communicate with consumers and rms
in the economy. Both groups, on the other hand, may have an incentive to communicate
strategically, so as to inuence the regulator’s perception of costs and benets of exter-
nality reduction. Therefore, private information has a profound impact on the regulation
of externalities.
In this chapter, I study how price and quantity instruments should be designed if
information is private. For an assessment of the two instruments, I introduce an opti-
mal unconstrained mechanism to regulate externalities. Hence, a rst contribution of
this chapter is to describe an optimal unconstrained mechanism when many rms can
reduce the externality. I show that the optimal amount of externality reduction is de-
termined according to the Samuelson rule (see Samuelson, 1954), so that the sum of
marginal benets of the externality reduction is equal to the marginal costs. A second
contribution is to characterize price and quantity instruments under private informa-
tion. I show that both instruments fail to satisfy the Samuelson rule. Specically, the
eciency conditions, when price or quantity instruments are employed, are based on
the regulator’s expectations about consumers’ preferences and rms’ costs. Whenever
these expectations do not coincide with the realized preferences and costs, price and
quantity instruments fail to achieve eciency. A third contribution of this chapter is
to analyze whether an unconstrained mechanism is able to Pareto improve upon price
and quantity mechanisms. I show that price and quantity mechanisms are durable, in the
sense that there is at least one type of consumer that achieves higher utility, respectively
prots under the already introduces mechanism.
The analysis of this chapter is based on the independent private values model, intro-
duced in Chapter 1, with the following features: On the one hand, there are rms that
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can reduce externalities; they dier with respect to their costs. On the other hand, there
are consumers that benet from the externality reduction; they dier in their valuation
for the externality reduction. Furthermore, consumers need to compensate rms for the
reduction. The regulator can either use a price or a quantity instrument to control the
externality, or he can use a mechanism design approach. The regulator needs to intro-
duce the instrument before uncertainty is resolved that is before consumers’ preferences
and rms’ costs are known. To understand the dierence between the three policy in-
struments, I set my focus to the market of externality reduction. Specically, I use a
partial equilibrium model to derive the optimal regulation of externalities. I assume that
rms can reduce externalities by using available technologies, e.g. introducing lters to
cut emissions. Thus, I do not account for rms to reduce externalities by producing less
output.
The regulator faces the problem of preference and cost elicitation. He has to provide
incentives for a truthful revelation of privately held information. I impose that rms
need to reduce externalities voluntarily. Hence, rms cannot be forced by the regulator
to reduce externalities. As I excluded the possibility that rms can reduce externalities
by cutting production, I assume that it is not in the regulator’s interest that rms make
losses when reducing externalities, and with that eventually force rms out of business.
Contrary, I assume that the regulator can use his coercive power and force consumers
to pay for the externality reduction, even if that makes some consumers worse o com-
pared to the case where no externality reduction takes place. The reason for treating
consumers’ and rms’ participation dierently is rst, that this looks empirically plausi-
ble that if the regulator needs to use his coercive power, he uses it to force consumers to
pay a tax rather than risking that rms need to close. As consumers’ participation con-
straints need not to be satised, consumers can be forced to pay for externality reduction
although they might not benet from it, and rms do receive monetary compensation.
Second, this framework is most closely related to Weitzman’s (1974) analysis, that does
not account for changes in the demand and supply of externality reduction due to the
introduction of price and quantity instruments.
The analysis proceeds as follows: First, I characterize an optimal unconstrained mech-
anism to control externalities as a benchmark case. I start the analysis by deriving the
unconstrained mechanism and show that the surplus-maximizing externality regulation
needs to fulll the condition that the sum of consumers’ marginal benets equals the
the rm’s marginal costs of externality reduction. This is the classical optimality con-
dition for a public good, derived by Samuelson (1954), when many rms provide the
public good. If one thinks about CO2-emissions as an externality, the amount of emis-
sions experienced by one consumer is not inuenced by other consumers experiencing
it. Hence, such externalities have the characteristics of being non-excludable and non-
rivalrous; the characteristics of a public good.
Second, I describe how the government can regulate externalities with a price in-
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strument. Corrective pricing works such that a tax is introduced that is equal to the
marginal costs of externality reduction. I derive the optimal price instrument that max-
imizes expected surplus and show that the Samuelson rule is no longer satised. Under
the price regulation, a modied condition has to hold where the expected sum of con-
sumers’ marginal benets equals the rm’s marginal costs of emission reduction; i.e.,
the Samuelson rule is only fullled in expectation. The regulator xes the subsidy be-
fore uncertainty is resolved, so that the marginal costs of emission reduction are certain,
however, the amount of externality reduction is uncertain and varies with rms’ real
costs. The optimality condition for externality reduction, when a price mechanism is
used, states that the regulator should x the marginal costs such that they coincide with
his expectation about marginal benets. Whenever the regulators ex ante expectations
on preferences and costs dier from their ex post realizations, the price instrument fails
to reach ecient outcomes.
The third instrument, a regulator can use to reduce externalities, is a quantity in-
strument. The regulator demands a xed amount of externality reduction. A relevant
question is how the government decides to what extend a single rm should reduce ex-
ternalities. I describe the quantity mechanism that maximizes expected surplus. I show
that a rm’s share of reduction is going to depend on its marginal costs of externality
reduction. To account for rms’ private information, I design the quantity instrument
such that no rm has an incentive to misreport its type. The regulator xes the amount
of externality reduction, being uncertain about the preferences and costs. I demonstrate
that the quantity mechanism satises again only a modied Samuelson rule where the
sum of expected preferences times the marginal benets of overall emission reduction
equals the expected sum of marginal costs. As under the price instrument, whenever the
regulator’s expectations about agents’ private information dier from their realization,
the quantity regulation fails to reach ecient outcomes.
A mechanism design approach that can make outcomes such as the transfers and
quantities depend on demand and supply for externality reduction, is more exible than
price and quantity instruments. A mechanism designer species the ecient externality
level for every realization of costs and preferences. This observation is a challenge for
externality regulation by means of price and quantity instruments because the uncon-
strained mechanism leads to rst-best ecient outcomes. One would therefore assume
that if the regulator proposes to switch from price and quantity instruments to an un-
constrained mechanism, Pareto improvements will be possible.
In order to check if an optimal unconstrained mechanism to control externalities can
Pareto improve upon optimal price and quantity instruments, I introduce the concept of
durable contracts, in the sense of Holmström and Myerson (1983). An optimal uncon-
strained mechanism that does not rely on a priori assumptions on the form of regulation
policy reaches surplus-maximizing outcomes. Hence, it leads to higher surplus than the
before introduced price and quantity instruments. I consider whether renegotiation is
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possible. The outcomes of the price and quantity regulation are the default options for
renegotiation. The optimally designed externality mechanism can only replace the price
or quantity instrument if all agents achieve higher or equal utility, respectively prots,
under the new unconstrained mechanism. If the optimal unconstrained mechanism is
not unanimously accepted, then price and quantity instruments stay in place. I show
that price and quantity instruments are durable; the unconstrained mechanism cannot
Pareto improve upon already installed price and quantity instrument.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section gives a more de-
tailed literature review. Section 2.3 species the economic environment. Section 2.4 in-
troduces as a benchmark case an optimally designed unconstrained mechanism. Section
2.5 contains the description of the price and quantity mechanisms, under the assump-
tion that there is a social planner that maximizes surplus. Section 2.6 claries whether
a switch from a price or quantity mechanism to an optimally designed unconstrained
mechanism leads to Pareto improvements. Section 2.7 relates my results to Weitzman’s
results. The last section contains concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature
This chapter is related to dierent strands of the literature. The main part of this chapter
builds on the analysis of Weitzman (1974). His paper had a profound impact on the
externality literature. The question if price or quantity instrument should be used has
mainly been studied in the context of environmental economics (see Cropper and Oates,
1992, for a survey). However, the question, which instrument to use when agents have
private information, has not been analyzed so far.
Second, this chapter draws on the literature that uses a mechanism design approach,
under the constraint that rms’ voluntarily reduce externalities. I do abstract from im-
posing the constraint that consumers’ participation in the mechanism is voluntary be-
cause the mechanism design literature has shown that, under the assumption of con-
sumers having private information about their preferences for externality reduction,
there exists no mechanism that assures ecient outcomes, see e.g., Rob (1989) and Mailath
and Postlewaite (1990).1 Contrary, if the regulator can force consumers to pay for ex-
ternality reduction, although they may not benet, then eciency can be reached even
under the assumption that consumers have private information (see Arrow, 1979, and
D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet, 1979). Most of the literature on externality regulation
assumes that there is one representative rm reducing the externality and the costs of
reduction is commonly known. Here, I apply the framework developed in Chapter 1 as it
allows me to study allocation problems where many rms that have private information
1Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) focus on limit results when the number of consumers goes to innity
and assume that the there is a continuum of possible preference types. Chapter 1 shows that this
impossibility result holds as well under the assumption that the set of possible types is discrete.
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on their costs, provide shares of a public good.
Finally, this chapter builds on Holmström and Myerson (1983) in that it provides a dy-
namic formalization of the question whether price and quantity instruments are durable,
meaning that no other regulation can Pareto improve upon the two instruments. In par-
ticular, I want to compare the status quo results of a price or a quantity instrument with
the outcomes of the unconstrained mechanism. Two recent papers have linked external-
ity regulation and dierent outside options. Harstad (2012) analyzes a dynamic game in
which countries make decisions on how much greenhouse gases to emit and how much
to invest in technologies to reduce emissions. Further, countries can write incomplete
contracts, so as that they can contract on emissions but not on technology investments.
He nds that rst-best implementation is possible in an incomplete contract model when
renegotiation is possible. However, Harstad abstracts from a production side, private
information and the possibility to opt out of climate agreements. This chapter is also
related to Grüner and Koriyama (2012). They analyze whether ecient emission reduc-
tion takes place when it is necessary that each consumer is made better o relative to
an outcome with majority voting about externality reduction, rather than the usual as-
sumption that the outside option is no externality reduction. They nd that ecient
externality reduction is possible. My approach diers in that the threat point is either
an already installed price or an already installed quantity mechanism.
2.3 The economic environment
2.3.1 Firms
There is a set of rms J = {1, ...,m}. A rm’s payo is given by
pij(δj, rj, qj) = rj − δjc(qj) ,
where qj is the externality reduction by rm j. Each rm receives a revenue rj for re-
ducing externalities. c is an increasing and convex cost function that satises c(0) = 0,
limq→0 c′(q) = 0 and limq→∞ c′(q) =∞, where the Inada conditions avoid corner solu-
tions. The cost parameter δj is privately observed by the rm. From the perspective of
all other agents it is a random variable with support {δ1, ..., δr}, and probability distri-
bution (p1, ..., pr). I assume that δl < δl+1 ∀ l ∈ {1, ..., r− 1}, so that rms with a lower
index have a lower cost type. The distribution is assumed to be common knowledge. I
denote by pl that δj = δl and by P (δlj) the probability that δj > δl. The random vari-
ables (δj)j∈J are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). I write
δ = (δ1, ..., δm) for the vector of all cost parameters and δ−j for the vector that lists all
cost parameters except δj . I impose a monotone hazard rate assumption: The function
h(δj) :=
P (δj)
p(δj)
is assumed to be non-decreasing.
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2.3.2 Consumers
The set of consumers is denoted by I = {1, ..., n}. The preferences of consumer i are
given by the utility function:
ui(θi, Q, ti) = θib(Q)− ti ,
where Q =
∑m
j=1 qj ∈ R+ denotes the total externality reduction, ti is the monetary
payment of consumer i to the rms and θi is consumer i’s preference parameter that
belongs to a nite ordered set Θ = {θ0, θ1, ..., θs}. I assume that θl < θl+1 ∀ l ∈
{0, ..., s− 1}, etc. The consumer privately observes θi. From the perspective of all other
agents it is a random variable with support Θ and probability distribution (f 0, ..., f s). I
denote by f l that θi = θl and by F (θli) the probability that θi > θl. This distribution is
assumed to be common knowledge. The random variables (θi)i∈I are assumed to be i.i.d..
I write θ = (θ1, ..., θn) for a vector of all preference parameters and θ−i for a vector that
lists all preference parameters except θi. I impose a monotone hazard rate assumption,
so that the function g(θi) = 1−F (θi)f(θi) is assumed to be non-increasing.
Firms’ cost parameters and consumers’ preference parameters are assumed to be stochas-
tically independent. I refer to a vector (θ, δ) that lists all preference and technology
parameters as state of the economy. In the following, whenever I use the expectations
operator, this indicates that expectations are taken with the joint probability distribution
of δ and θ.
2.3.3 Mechanism
A mechanism design approach is used to characterize the reduction level and the pric-
ing of externalities. I restrict myself to direct mechanisms, by appealing to the revelation
principle (see Myerson, 1985), so that a truthful revelation of costs by rms and of pref-
erences by consumers is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
A direct mechanism is a collection of functions (qj, rj)mj=1 and (Q, ti)ni=1, where qj :
Θn × ∆m 7→ R+ characterizes j’s externality reduction as a function of the vector of
agents’ reports of their types to the mechanism designer. Analogously, rj : Θn×∆m 7→
R determines j’s monetary revenue as a function of the vector of agents’ reports. And
the function ti : ∆n × ∆m 7→ R species i’s payment as a function of the vector of
consumers’ preference parameters and rms’ cost parameters; Q =
∑m
j=1 qj species
the level of the overall externality reduction.
Incentive compatibility constraints. Truth-telling of rm j is a best response if, for all
l and all k,
Rj(δ
l)− δlCj(δl) ≥ Rj(δk)− δlCj(δk), (ICF )
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where Rj(δl) ≡ E(θ,δ−j)
[
rj(θ, δ−j, δj)|δj = δl
]
is the expected revenue for rm j and
Cj(δ
l) ≡ E(θ,δ−j)[cj(qj(θ, δ−j, δj))|δj = δl] are the expected production costs, in case
of reporting a cost parameter δl, given that all other rms and consumers reveal their
private characteristics to the mechanism designer. Due to the assumption that rms’
cost parameters and consumers’ preference parameters are stochastically independent,
all rms have the same belief about δ−j and θ. Thus, I can examine j’s expected transfers
and production level as a function that only depends on j’s announcement.
In the same way, truth-telling of consumer i is a best response if, for all l and k,
θlBi(θ
l)− Ti(θl) ≥ θlBi(θk)− Ti(θk), (ICC)
whereBi(θl) ≡ E(θ−i,δ)
[
bi(Q(θ−i, θi, δ))|θi = θl
]
are the expected benets of externality
reduction, when consumer i announces θl and Ti(θl) ≡ E(θ−i,δ)
[
ti(θ−i, θi, δ)|θi = θl
]
are
the expected payments, in case of reporting a preference parameter of θl.
Participation constraints. A mechanism also has to satisfy participation constraints,
which ensure that rm prots from the externality reduction are bigger than a minimal
prot requirement.
The interim participation constraints for rms are: For all j, and all l,
Rj(δ
l)− δlCj(δl) ≥ pij, (PCF )
where pij denotes a lower bound for rm j’s prot in order to make it participate vol-
untarily in the mechanism. These constraints ensure that after all rms have discovered
their own cost parameter, no rm is worse o relative to a status quo situation in which
no externalities needed to be reduced and prots were pij . An alternative interpretation
is that rms have veto rights that protect them from receiving revenues that do not cover
the costs of externality reduction. Consequently, a deviation from the status quo calls
for an unanimous agreement of all rms to reduce the externality. Additionally, these
constraints ensure that the number of rms on the interim stage is exogenously given
because no rm is forced out of business as it needs to reduce externalities.
For the consumers, however, I require no participation constraints. I assume that the
regulator can rely on his coercive power when nancing the reduction of externalities.
I impose no participation constraints, as it has been shown by Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) that with many consumers no externality reduction will take place if consumers’
participation is voluntary. The reason is that, with many consumers, a single consumer’s
inuence on the externality reduction is close to zero. Due to voluntary participation
constraints, consumers can drive their transfers down to zero. Hence, insucient trans-
fers are collected to nance the externality reduction.
Budget constraint. I assume that the direct mechanism has to satisfy a budget con-
straint. It requires that the consumers’ expected transfers are larger than the rms’
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expected revenues,
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
≥ E
[
m∑
j=1
rj(θ, δ)
]
. (BC)
2.4 Optimal Mechanism Design
Before I introduce price and quantity instruments to regulate externalities, an uncon-
strained mechanism to externality regulation will be dened as a benchmark. As a rst
step, I provide a necessary and sucient condition for a mechanism to be incentive-
compatible and budgetary feasible and in addition satises rms’ participation con-
straints.
Proposition 2.1. Let Q be a reduction level with the property that for all i, and all l, the
monotonicity constraints Bi(θl) ≥ Bi(θl−1) are satised and qj be a production rule with
the property that for all j, and all k, the monotonicity constraints Cj(δk−1) ≥ Cj(δk) are
satised. There exists a mechanism that is incentive compatible and that fullls (PCF ) if
and only if
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q(θ, δ))
]
≥ E
[
m∑
j=1
(
δj +
P (δj)
p(δj)
)
c(qj(θ, δ))
]
+
m∑
j=1
pij .
A proof can be found in the Appendix. The term
(
δj +
P (δj)
p(δj)
)
c(qj(θ, δ)) is known as
rm j’s virtual costs for the externality reduction. Virtual costs can be interpreted as the
minimal amount that type δj of rm j needs to receive for the externality reduction when
incentive compatibility and participation constraints need to be satised. In a setting
with complete information, the minimal amount would be the true costs δj . With private
information on costs this expression is increased by the hazard rate
(
P (δj)
p(δj)
)
c(qj(θ, δ)),
which can thus be interpreted as an information rent. That consumers do not achieve
information rents relies on the fact that their participation constraints do not need to be
satised; i.e., the regulator is able to force consumers to nance of externality reduction.
Proposition 2.1 says that Pareto-ecient externality reduction is possible if and only if
the expected benets of externality reduction exceed the expected virtual costs. Propo-
sition 2.1 applies to any decision rule Q such that Bi is increasing for all i, and qj such
that Cj is decreasing for all j.
There is one mechanism that is of particular interest, namely the mechanism that
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maximizes expected surplus2
S(θ, δ) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(θib(Q(θ, δ)))−
m∑
j=1
(δjc(qj(θ, δ)))
]
.
The following Proposition introduces the optimal unconstrained mechanism given
that a mechanism design approach was chosen to regulate the externality.
Proposition 2.2. The optimal unconstrained mechanism that maximizes S(θ, δ), in the
following denoted by {(q∗j , r∗j )mj=1, (Q∗, t∗i )ni=1}, subject to the constraints in (ICF ), (ICC),
(PCF ) and (BC), has the following properties:
i) Consumer surplus under the optimal unconstrained mechanism is equal to
U(θ, δ) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(θib(Q
∗(θ, δ)))−
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c(q
∗
j (θ, δ))
]
−
m∑
j=1
pij .
ii) Expected rm prots are
Π(θ, δ) = E
[
m∑
j=1
h(δj)c(q
∗
j (θ, δ))
]
+
m∑
j=1
pij .
iii) Output is undistorted. For every (θ, δ), the reduction level q∗j (θ, δ), for all rms j,
satises
n∑
i=1
θib
′
(
m∑
j=1
q∗j (θ, δ)
)
= δjc
′(q∗j (θ, δ)) .
The mechanism designer can use his coercive power and force consumers to pay for
the externality reduction. Thus, the ecient regulation comes at costs for consumers.
Consumers’ transfers do not only need to cover the costs of reduction but as well rms’
information rents, due to the fact that rms have private information about their costs
and that their prots need to be at least as high as the minimal prot requirement pij . The
optimal unconstrained mechanism violates consumers’ participation constraints when
the virtual costs of externality reduction exceed consumers virtual valuation of the ex-
ternality reduction.3 For consumers that benet only little from externality reduction,
the participation constraints are always violated.
The Proposition demonstrates that rst-best ecient externality reduction can be at-
tained if consumers and rms have private information on their characteristics. Exter-
2For a generalization of the surplus function, see Chapter 3.
3Similarly to rms’ virtual costs, consumer i’s virtual valuation for externality reduction is given by
θi − 1−F (θi)f(θi) . This term can be interpreted as the maximal amount that consumer i with type θi will
pay when incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints need to be respected.
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nalities should be reduced up to the point where the sum of marginal benets equals the
marginal costs of externality reduction; this result has been established by Samuelson
(1954) for a model of public good provision, with no private information on consumers’
preferences and rms’ costs. A model of externality reduction can be translated into a
model of public good provision if one thinks about non-depletable externalities.4 Propo-
sition 2.2 iii) is the classic optimality condition for public good provision; known as
Samuelson rule, given that many rms provide parts of the public good.
2.5 Price and qantity mechanisms under asymmetric
information
The regulating agency of the preceding section could make the externality dependent
on changes in costs and preferences. For every state of the economy (θ, δ), the ecient
externality reduction takes place and the Samuelson rule is satised. However, in real-
world applications, externality regulation is not based on planning that conditions the
reduction on the future state of the economy. Rather, price and quantity instruments are
introduced before the uncertainty is resolved. Then, it becomes a relevant question to
ask whether asymmetric information has an impact on the regulating choice between
price and quantity instruments.
The discrepancy in eciency between prices and quantities was rstly analyzed by
Weitzman (1974). In his seminal paper, "Prices versus Quantities", he shows that under
incomplete information both instruments dier with respect to eciency. If a price in-
strument is chosen to regulate externalities, the regulator sets a price that a rm gets
per unit of reduction. Weitzman assumes that the regulator sets this price based on his
expectation about the future state of the economy. Further, he assumes that the reg-
ulator can commit to not change the price anymore. As the regulator xes the price,
marginal costs of externality reduction are certain but uncertainty remains about the
marginal benets. If instead the regulator xes the quantity, then the marginal benets
will be certain but uncertainty will remain about the marginal costs. Weitzman derives
a comparative advantage measure to show the eciency gain of using one instrument
over the other. In section 2.7, I show how Weitzman’s setup relates to the one of this
chapter.
As Weitzman, I am interested in a regulator that wants to maximize total surplus when
marginal costs and marginal benets are uncertain at the moment the regulator needs
to decide whether to employ a price instrument or a quantity instrument to regulate
the externality. In contrast to Weitzman, I do assume that information is asymmetric
and agents may have an incentive to communicate strategically. The regulating agency
4An externality is said to be non-depletable if one consumer’s benet of the externality reduction does
not diminish another consumer’s ability to benet from the reduction; see e.g. Chapter 11 Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Greene (1995).
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can either set a price that rms receive per amount of externality reduction or set the
quantity by xing the overall amount of externality reduction. Price and quantity in-
struments are designed optimally under the assumption that the regulator remains un-
informed about the current state of preferences and costs.
The main insight of the analysis below is that optimally designed price and quantity
mechanisms fail to achieve rst-best ecient outcomes; the Samuelson rule is no longer
satised. I will show that the Samuelson rule under price and quantity instruments is
only fullled in expectation.
2.5.1 Price Regulation
One way for the regulator to control externalities is to impose a subsidy on the external-
ity reducing activity. This mechanism is known as Pigouvian taxation, see Pigou (1954).
I proceed in two steps: First, I take the marginal costs of externality reduction as given
and solve for the price instrument reaching that target, before I identify the optimal price
for externality reduction in a second step.
Reaching a given target. When a subsidy s is announced, every rm will decide how
much externality reduction to contribute. Every rm is maximizing its payos that is
pij(δj, s) = sqj(δj, s)− δjc(qj(δj, s)) .
Every rm j therefore chooses qj(δj, s) according to the rst order condition
s− δjc′(qj(δj, s)) ≤ 0 ,
with equality for qj(δj, s) > 0. These conditions determine the optimal amount
qj(δj, s) every rm j reduces, which depends solely on the announced subsidy and rm
j’s cost parameter δj . It is rm j’s reaction function to a subsidy s. The other rms’
cost parameters are not relevant for rm j’s externality reduction qj , which is dierent
under the unconstrained mechanism. Note that qj(δj, s) is maximizing rm j’s prot.
Whenever rm j deviates to qj(δ′j, s), prots are declining. Thus, rm j’s incentive
compatibility constraints in (ICF ) are satised.
Further, the price mechanism assures voluntary participation because rms would
decide to not reduce any part of the externality reduction if this had come along with
losses. The resource costs under a price instrument are the subsidies paid times the
expected sum of externality reduction and rms’ minimal resource requirement
R(δ, s) = sE
[
m∑
j=1
qj(δj, s)
]
+
m∑
j=1
pij = sE[Q(δ, s)] +
m∑
j=1
pij .
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The optimal target. The subsidy s is determined by the regulator before consumers
learn their preferences and rms learn their costs. As under the unconstrained mecha-
nism, the regulator has no outside funding option, so that expected consumer transfers
need to cover the expected resource costs E [
∑n
i=1 ti] ≥ R(δ, s). A given subsidy there-
fore induces a level of total surplus that equals
S(θ, δ, s) = E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q(δ, s))−
m∑
j=1
δjc(qj(δj, s))
]
.
The following Proposition characterizes the surplus-maximizing price mechanism.
Proposition 2.3. The surplus maximizing price mechanism has the following properties:
i) Expected consumer surplus is equal to
U(θ, δ, s∗) = E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q(δ, s
∗))
]
−R(δ, s∗) .
ii) Expected rm prots are
Π(δ, s∗) = R(δ, s∗)− E
[
m∑
j=1
δjc(qj(δj, s
∗))
]
.
iii) Externality reduction fails to satisfy the Samuelson rule. The subsidy s∗ satises the
rst order condition
s∗ = E
[
n∑
i=1
θib
′(Q(δ, s∗))
]
.
Expected consumer surplus does not only depend on preferences and costs, as in
Proposition 2.2. When a price mechanism is used to regulate emissions, the introduced
subsidy inuences expected consumer surplus and expected rm prots.
The Proposition shows that the Samuelson rule is violated. Here the Samuelson rule
is only satised in expectation, as the marginal costs of externality reduction s need to
equal the expected sum of marginal benets. When the marginal benets dier from
the ex ante expectations, rst-best ecient externality reduction cannot be achieved
with a price instrument. For
∑n
i=1 θib
′(Q(θ, δ)) > E [
∑n
i=1 θib
′(Q(δ, s∗))], the subsidy
s∗ is lower than the subsidy that leads to ex post eciency. Hence, ex post, there is not
enough reduction of externalities.
This expected Samuelson rule is well suited to describe how Weitzman’s (1974) anal-
ysis is related to my setup. As the regulator xes the price, the marginal costs of ex-
ternality reduction are certain. Uncertainty remains about the amount of externality
reduction. If demand (that is shaped by consumers’ preferences for emission reduction)
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and supply (that is shaped by rms’ costs) dier from the expected demand and sup-
ply, only the amount of emission reduction can adapt to these changes. Contrary to the
unconstrained mechanism, the price cannot change, so that a surplus loss occurs. How
big the surplus loss under a price instrument is, depends on how much the ex ante ex-
pectations on costs and preferences dier from the ex post realization. The more these
values dier, the more severe is the surplus loss of a price instrument in comparison
to the unconstrained mechanism, and the higher is the misspecication of externality
reduction.5
2.5.2 Q_uantity Regulation
Beside a price mechanism, the regulator can as well control externalities with a quantity
mechanism. That is, the regulator decides ex ante on the total amount of externality
reduction Q and the production sector needs to provide this reduction. The quantity
mechanism should not be understood such that the regulator asks rms about their types
and decides by how much the externalities should be reduced by every single rm. The
timing is such that the regulator has expectations about rms’ cost parameters and con-
sumers’ preference parameters and decides on the ex ante stage how much externalities
should be reduced. The total amount of externality reduction is then subdivided into
parts and the fraction each rm reduces depends on its announced cost parameter. In
the following I seek to characterize the mechanism with this property. Again, I proceed
in two steps. First, I take the quantity goal as given, and solve for the quantity mecha-
nism reaching that target, before I identify the optimal externality reduction in a second
step.
Reaching a given target. I am interested in reaching the externality reduction that
maximizes expected surplus. Beside consumers’ and rms’ incentive compatibility con-
straints, rms’ participation constraints and the budget constraint, I impose a quantity
constraint, i.e., for all δ,
m∑
j=1
qj(δ, Qˆ) = Qˆ , (QU)
so that the externality reduction of all rms need to add up to the set target Qˆ.
The following Proposition characterizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that a monotone hazard rate assumption holds (h(δj) is a non-
decreasing function). The surplus-maximizing quantity mechanism that satises the con-
straints in (ICF ), (PCF ), (ICC), (BC) and (QU), has the following properties:
5For a detailed analysis, see Chapter 3.
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i) The expected consumer surplus under the optimal quantity mechanism is
U(θ, δ, Qˆ∗) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(
θib(Qˆ
∗)
)
−
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c(qj(δ, Qˆ
∗))
]
−
m∑
j=1
pij .
ii) Expected rm prots are
Π(δ, Qˆ∗) = E
[
m∑
j=1
(
h(δj)cj(qj(δ, Qˆ
∗))
)]
+
m∑
j=1
pij .
Proposition 2.4 shows that the ex ante set amount of externality reduction inuences
expected consumer surplus and expected rm prots, contrary to the unconstrained
mechanism, derived in Proposition 2.2, where outcomes depended only on preferences
and costs for emission reduction. Under the quantity mechanism, benets of emission
reduction are certain, but consumer surplus and rm prots will vary with preferences
and costs, respectively.
The optimal target. I assume that the externality target is formulated before the con-
sumers’ preferences and rms’ costs are drawn. The following Proposition shows what
the quantity mechanism looks like.
Proposition 2.5. The quantity mechanism that maximizes S(θ, δ, Qˆ) subject to the con-
straints in (ICF ), (PCF ), (ICC), (BC) and (QU) has the following property: Externality
regulation fails to satisfy the Samuelson rule. The externality reduction Qˆ∗ satises the rst
order condition
E
[
n∑
i=1
θi
]
b′(Qˆ∗) = E
[
m∑
j=1
δjc
′(qj(δ, Qˆ∗))
]
,
where c′(qj(δ, Qˆ∗)) =
∂c(qj(δ,Qˆ
∗))
∂qj(δ,Qˆ∗)
∂qj(δ,Qˆ
∗)
∂Qˆ∗
.
An optimal choice of externality reduction, under the quantity mechanism, requires
again that a Samuelson rule holds in expectation, i.e., that the sum of marginal benets
times the expected preferences is equal to the sum of expected marginal costs of exter-
nality reduction. As Qˆ∗ is xed, marginal benets are certain but uncertainty remains
about the marginal costs and consumers preferences. The price at which the reduction
is achieved can vary.
Again, the condition in Proposition 2.5 is well suited to describe the relation to Weitz-
man’s (1974) paper to my setup. The quantity restriction has the eect that the actual
level of externality reduction is not sensitive to changes in θ and δ as it would be re-
quired by optimality (see Proposition 2.2 iii)). When the regulator’s ex ante expectation
on preferences and costs dier from the ex post realizations, the realized demand and
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supply will dier from the ex ante expected ones. A sensitive adaption of the quantity
restriction would therefore be optimal. However, as the quantity is xed, the quantity
mechanism fails to achieve ex post ecient outcomes. How big the loss in eciency is,
when using a quantity mechanism instead of the optimal unconstrained mechanism, de-
pends on how much the optimal externality level varies with the regulator’s expectation
about θ and δ.
2.6 On the durability of price and qantity
mechanisms
The results of the previous sections have shown the following: An optimally designed
unconstrained mechanism can achieve ex post eciency; for all possible states of the
economy, the mechanism specied the optimal amount of externality reduction and the
respective transfers. On the other hand, price and quantity mechanisms were less exi-
ble. Once the regulator xed the subsidy only the amount of externality reduction could
adapt to changes in the economy, and if the regulator xed the quantity, only the costs
could adapt to changes. Therefore, whenever the regulator’s expectation on preferences
and costs diers from the realized values, ex post inecient externality regulation oc-
curs. According to the Coase theorem, see Coase (1960), ex post inecient price and
quantity mechanisms should not be observed when information is complete and when
bargaining is costless. All agents in the economy should be willing to switch to an uncon-
strained mechanism that leads to ex post eciency. However, Holmström and Myerson
(1983) have shown that this concept does not necessarily translate to an environments
with private information. In the following I am interested in the question whether an
unconstrained mechanism can Pareto improve upon price and quantity mechanisms.
2.6.1 Durability
In settings of complete information, the notion of Pareto eciency is clearly dened.
If all consumers and rms consider the Pareto superior unconstrained mechanism to
regulate externalities to a status quo with price and quantity instruments, then an unan-
imous agreement to change from the status quo to the unconstrained mechanism should
be possible. Holmström and Myerson (1983) extend that concept to settings with private
information. They consider the following game where all agents vote simultaneously for
either the status quo or a given alternative; in the case of this chapter the unconstrained
mechanism. After the vote, the unconstrained mechanism will only be implemented if
all consumers and rms vote for it.
In the denition of Holmström and Myerson (1983), a price or quantity mechanism
is durable if and only if, when it is the status quo, for the unconstrained externality
regulating mechanism being the alternative, it is an equilibrium of the voting game that
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at least one type of consumer or one type of rm surely votes for the status quo, for all
possible states of the economy.
I will distinguish between two concepts of eciency: ex post when all private in-
formation is common knowledge and interim, when consumers and rms have learned
their own types, respectively.
2.6.2 The main result
To check whether price and quantity mechanisms are durable, I consider the following
setup: The regulating agency decides to either use a price or a quantity mechanism
to reduce externalities. Then, consumers and rms learn their types. To see whether
the unconstrained mechanism is able to interim Pareto improve upon the status quo,
the regulating agency asks all consumers and rms to vote simultaneously. I use the
initial price respectively quantity mechanism as the default option, so that consumers
as well as rms can reject the new unconstrained mechanism and with that the old
regulation persists. The new mechanism can therefore be interpreted as a take-it-or-
leave-it oer. This means that the new mechanism replaces the initial regulation if all
agents are at least as well o as under the initial mechanism but one agent is strictly
better o. To see whether the unconstrained mechanism interim Pareto improves upon
price or quantity mechanism, the regulating agency lets all consumers and all rms vote
when they learned their own types but remain uninformed about the outcomes of price
and quantity mechanisms. If a single agent votes for the status quo, then the price or the
quantity instrument stays in place. In order to see whether ex post Pareto improvements
are possible, the regulating agency lets all agents vote when all information is common
knowledge. The following Proposition summarizes the outcomes.
Proposition 2.6.
i) The unconstrained mechanism can neither ex post Pareto improve a quantity mech-
anism nor a price mechanism.
ii) The unconstrained mechanism can neither ex interim Pareto improve a quantity
mechanism nor a price mechanism.
The Proposition shows that although the unconstrained mechanism is ecient, it can-
not replace price or quantity mechanisms. Price and quantity mechanisms are hence
durable. To provide an intuitive understanding of this result, I discuss the main steps of
the analysis.
Ex post eciency. For an arbitrary consumer i, I compare the ex post utility when
an unconstrained mechanism is used to the ex post utility when a price mechanism or a
quantity mechanism is used. Similarly, for any rm j, I compare the ex post prot of the
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unconstrained mechanism with the ex prot when a price or a quantity mechanism was
introduced. If one agent is worse o under the unconstrained mechanism, then the price
mechanism, respectively the quantity mechanism, is durable. Comparing Proposition
2.2 with Propositions 2.3 and 2.5, respectively, the total amount of emission reduction
under the unconstrained mechanism does not coincide with the total amount of emission
reduction when price and quantity mechanisms are used.
For the case where the unconstrained mechanism leads to more emission reduction
than the price or quantity mechanism, a consumer with low preferences for externality
reduction does not benet from surplus-maximizing externality reduction. As price and
quantity mechanism satisfy production eciency, the unconstrained mechanism cannot
achieve more emission reduction at lower production costs. If rms reduce more emis-
sions under the unconstrained mechanism, they need to receive higher transfers than
under the status-quo mechanism. In order to assure that the optimal unconstrained
mechanism assures budget balance, consumers’ transfers need to be higher under the
unconstrained mechanism than under the status quo. The disutility of higher transfers
therefore makes a consumer with low preferences for the externality reduction veto the
unconstrained mechanism.
Consider next the case where the optimal unconstrained mechanism leads to less ex-
ternality reduction than the price mechanism, as well as the quantity mechanism. This
implies as well that there is at least one rm that needs to reduce less emissions under the
unconstrained mechanism compared to the status quo. But rms’ prots are increasing
in the amount of reduction, so that it vetoes the unconstrained mechanism. This rm
prefers a larger fraction of externality reduction of a second-best price or quantity mech-
anism over a smaller fraction of the unconstrained mechanism that reaches rst-best
eciency.
Consumers’ realized preferences and rms’ realized technologies do not aect the de-
sign of the unconstrained mechanism. This may be questioned on the following ground:
The incentive compatibility constraints serve to ensure that consumers and rms an-
nounce their types truthfully. If the outcome of the price and quantity mechanisms are
known, then the regulator knows all private information. Accordingly, a mechanism
might be designed that makes use of the public information. However, if consumer and
rms predict this behavior of the regulator, they might refrain from communicating their
private information truthfully in the rst place. Holmström and Myerson (1983) note that
if agents are selecting a decision rule after they have learned their private information,
then interim eciency is a reasonable requirement.
Interim eciency. To analyze whether an unconstrained mechanism can Pareto im-
prove upon price and quantity mechanism on the interim stage, the following sequential
structure is imposed: Consumers and rms have learned their own types but remain un-
certain about the other agents’ types. After having learned their own type agents need
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to vote for either the status quo, with the price or the quantity mechanism in place, or the
unconstrained mechanism. Proposition 2.6 ii) shows that there is at least one consumer
or rm that is better o under the status quo, so that price and quantity mechanisms
stay in place.
The main argument. To understand why Pareto improvements are not possible, I
discuss the main steps of the formal analysis. The expected prot of rm j, from an
interim perspective are derived as follows: when interim participation constraints are
respected, they get an information rent, which equals E
[
P (δj)
p(δj)
c(qj)
]
. Hence, a rm’s
expected prot is increasing in the share of externality reduction q. That implies, in
particular, that the willingness of rm j to switch from the quantity mechanism to
the unconstrained mechanism depends on its cost parameter. If a rm has low costs
of emission reduction, it expects more reduction under the unconstrained mechanism
than under the quantity mechanism and is hence voting for the unconstrained mecha-
nism, ceteris paribus. Contrary, a rm with high costs expects less reduction under the
unconstrained mechanism and therefore votes for the quantity mechanism. In order to
make rms with high costs not veto the unconstrained mechanism, transfers needed to
increase under the unconstrained mechanism. This is, however, not possible because a
consumer that benets only little from externality reduction vetoes against mechanisms
where consumers’ transfers are increased. These derivations imply that there is at least
one agent that is better o under the already installed quantity mechanism. Hence, the
quantity mechanism is durable.6
The price mechanism is as well durable. On the interim stage, a rm j knows its prots
under the price mechanism. That is, only if all rms expect that they make at least as high
prots under the unconstrained mechanism, a switch from the price mechanism to the
unconstrained mechanism is possible. As production eciency is given under the price
mechanism, the emission reduction cannot be achieved at lower costs. Prots under the
unconstrained mechanism can therefore only be higher if either less emission reduction
takes place and the expected revenues do not decline, or if the emission reduction level
stays the same but the expected revenues increases. In the latter case, this implies as well
that consumers need to pay higher transfers in order to nance the revenue requirement,
which implies as well an increase of consumers’ expected transfers. Knowing that rms
would only vote for the unconstrained mechanism if they expect at least as high prots
as under the price mechanism, a consumer with low preferences for emission reduction,
votes against the unconstrained mechanism. For the second case, where the revenue
requirement stays the same but less emission reduction is reduced, all consumers that
have high preferences for emission reduction would veto the unconstrained mechanism.
6The concept of durable mechanisms is restricted by the assumption that only one alternative will be
considered to the status quo, see e.g. Crawford (1985). Nevertheless, the unconstrained mechanism
always leads to ex post ecient results and is therefore a good focal point when agents can negotiate
eciently.
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2.7 Extension
In his seminal paper "Prices versus Quantities", Weitzman (1974) explored the question
of whether it is better to regulate externalities by the means of a price or a quantity in-
strument under the assumption that redening instruments is not possible. He showed
that uncertainty concerning the marginal benets and marginal costs of externality re-
duction aects the choice between the two regulatory instruments. In this section I will
discuss how "Prices versus Quantities" by Weitzman (1974) relates to this chapter’s setup.
In Section 2.5 I have introduced a model of asymmetric and incomplete information.
The setup of Weitzman (1974), however, diers from mine in that he does not consider
the agents to have private information. In his paper, uncertainty stems from incom-
plete information on marginal cost and benet curves. In this chapter’s framework, the
marginal benet curve is derived from consumers valuation for emission reduction and
the marginal cost curve is determined by the production sector that has to reduce emis-
sions. As Weitzman (1974), I assume that policy is dened on the ex ante stage, e.g. before
agents learn their types and only the ex ante likelihoods of θ and δ are known by the
regulating agency. A consumer’s goal is to maximize expected utility, with expectation
about future types. Respectively, a rm’s objective is to maximize payos.
In the following, I will look at an example and assume that there is uncertainty on
the ex ante stage about the parameters that shape the marginal cost and benet curves.7
As Weitzman (1974) I assume that β is a random variable whose distribution is known
to the regulating agency but whose realization is not observed at the time price and
quantity mechanisms are announced. Instruments are dened under the assumption that
zero possibility is assigned to the event that the parameter β is changing. Thereafter, I
check whether a price or a quantity instrument leads to higher surplus. Additionally to
Weitzman (1974), I depict how surplus is changing if β diers from the regulator’s ex
ante expectation.
Example: There is one rm to which is delegated the reduction of CO2-emissions. The
emission reduction qj leads to costs δjc(qj), where δj is a cost characteristic of the rm that
belongs to the set ∆ = {δL, δH} and c is a quadratic cost function, c(qj) = β 12q2j . The
probability that the rm has low costs is denoted by pL and accordingly pH = 1 − pL
denotes that the rm has high costs. n consumers benet form the emission reduction. The
benet function b(Q) = φQ1/2 is assumed to be concave, where Q =
∑m
j=1 qj denotes the
amount of emission reduction and φ is a random variable. The regulating agency knows the
distribution. θi is consumer i’s preference parameter and belongs to the nite ordered set
Θ = {θL, θH}, where fL denotes the probability that consumers have low preferences and
fH = 1− fL denotes the probability that consumer have high preferences for the emission
7Functional forms where chosen such that the Weitzman (1974) assumptions of b′′ < 0 and c′′(qj) > 0
are met.
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reduction.
The following Observation highlights that the cost parameter β plays a crucial role
when deciding which instrument leads to higher surplus.8
Observation 2.1. Consider the Example. Suppose that S(θ, δ, Qˆ, β) and S(θ, δ, s, β) are
continuous functions on [0, 10]. Then, there exists a range β ∈ [βˆ, 10] such that a price
mechanism leads to higher expected surplus than the quantity mechanism. For β ∈ [0, βˆ]
a quantity mechanism leads to higher surplus than the price mechanism.
Figure 2.1: Prices versus quantities
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The parameter choices are [n(fLθL + fHθH)] = 30, pL = pH = 0.5, δL = 2,δH = 4, φ = 1, βˆ =
5. The straight blue line depicts the expected total surplus function under a quantity mechanism.
The dashed green curve shows the expected total surplus under a price mechanism.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the implication of a change in β graphically. If β coincides with
the regulator’s expected β∗ = 5, the price instrument leads to the same surplus than the
quantity mechanism. The same holds true for a threshold-value of β = 1. However, for
β > 1 a price instrument leads to higher surplus. In comparison to Weitzman (1974), I do
not just consider a deviation from β to some alternative β′ but rather compare the com-
petitive surplus advantage of one instrument over the other for the range of β ∈ [0, 10].
That one instrument is not outperforming the other, independently of the specication,
can be explained by the fact that the surplus function under a price mechanism9
S(θ, δ, s, β) = [n(fLθL + fHθH)]
4/3
[
pL
(
s
βδL
) 1
2
+ pH
(
s
βδH
) 1
2
]
− 1
2
s2
(
pL
βδL
+
pH
βδH
)
,
8I have assumed that rms are able to reduce emissions and therefore are the ones that respond to
regulation. If instead I had allowed for consumers to be able to reduce emissions, e.g. via better heating
technologies, the parameter φ would become decisive.
9See Chapter 3, for a derivation.
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is not monotonically increasing in β. The higher β, the less emissions a single rm
is reducing (∂qj
∂β
< 0), so that the expected costs of emission reduction are decreasing
in β. But at the same time, the benets are decreasing as the total amount of emission
reduction decreases. If β is marginally decreased from β∗, the lower cost outweigh the
lower benets of emission reduction. If β is decreasing further, the loss in benets is
higher than the reduced costs, so that surplus is decreasing. For β > βˆ, costs of emission
reduction are getting bigger, and benets in a dierent emission level are even smaller,
so that surplus is decreasing the bigger the dierence between β and βˆ.
Under a quantity mechanism, however, the expected provision level is certain and
with that the benets of emission reduction
S(θ, δ, Qˆ, β) = [n(fLθL + fHθH)] Qˆ
1
2 − 1
2
β(pLδL + pHδH)Qˆ2 .
The lower β, the lower are the costs of emission reduction under the quantity mecha-
nism, so that S(θ, δ, Qˆ, β) is strictly decreasing in β.
For the parameters in Figure 2.1, if β is close to the ex ante expected value, the price
instrument leads to higher expected surplus than the quantity mechanism. But if β
diers strongly from the ex ante expected β∗, the quantity mechanism can lead to higher
expected total surplus.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
The analysis has combined the classical price and quantity instruments to regulate exter-
nalities with a mechanism design framework. I have shown that the presence of private
information made it impossible to reach ecient outcomes, when price and quantity
instruments were used to regulate externalities. The analysis has established a link be-
tween unconstrained mechanism design that reached ecient outcomes and price and
quantity instruments. I have shown that although price and quantity instruments lack
the exibility of the unconstrained mechanism, they are durable. The unconstrained
mechanism was unable to Pareto-improve upon the classical instruments.
This chapter has abstracted from business-generating activities of rms. Instead, I
have isolated the interaction between externality regulation and the design of opti-
mal mechanisms. As a result, the analysis has shown that an optimal unconstrained
mechanism cannot improve upon existing price and quantity instruments. Further, I
did abstract from consumers responding to the externality. Such problems would likely
strengthen the regulation with an unconstrained mechanism, as uncertainty is even
higher to misspecify the instruments on the ex ante stage. It is beyond that chapter
to provide a game-theoretic analysis of the relationship between consumers and rms
when both groups are able to reduce externalities.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Only if – part. Given a provision rule, Lemmata 1.7-1.12 in
the Appendix 1.A imply that the minimal rm revenue that is possible in the presence
of rms’ interim participation constraints equals
E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c(qj(θ, δ))
]
.
If this expression is bigger thanE [
∑n
i=1 θib(Q(θ, δ))], budget balance cannot be achieved.
Thus, constraint eciency cannot be achieved.
If – part.
Step 1. I need to show that if
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q(θ, δ))
]
≥ E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c(qj(θ, δ))
]
,
then, given the provision rule (qj)mj=1, (rj)mj=1 can be chosen such that for all j, the
incentive compatibility constraints and interim participation constraints are satised.
By the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1.11 (see Appendix 1.A, Chapter 1), the
participation constraints are satised if Rj(δr) ≥ pij . Since monotonicity constraints
Cj(δ
k) ≤ C(δk−1) are satised for all j and all l, Lemmata 1.8 and 1.9 in Appendix
1.A imply that incentive compatibility holds if expected transfers are chosen such that
all local upward incentive compatibility constraints are binding and that the expected
transfer of rm j are equal to
E[tj(θ, δ)] = E[(δj + h(δj))c(qj(θ, δ))] + pij .
Step 2. It needs to be shown that if
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q(θ, δ))
]
≥ E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c(qj(θ, δ))
]
,
then, given the provision rule Q, (t1)ni=1 can be chosen such that for all i, the incentive
compatibility constraints are satised.
Step 2.1 I introduce a pricing schedule in combination with a lump-sum tax (θ), so that
for each i and l,
Ti(θ
l) = θ + s(Bi(θ
L)) ,
where s : R+ 7→ R+ is a non-decreasing schedule with s(0) = 0. I will show that
this pricing mechanism satises incentive compatibility constraints. The proof follows
Bierbrauer (2011a).
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Suppose that the price schedule is not incentive compatible. Then, there exists i, l and
k so that
θlBi(θ
l)− Ti(θl) < θlBi(θk)− Ti(θk) .
For each x ∈ {Bi(θ0), ...., Bi(θm)}, Ti(x) = τ + s(x), implies that
θlBi(θ
l)− τ − s(Bi(θl)) < θlBi(θk)− τ − s(Bi(θk)) .
This contradicts the assumption thatBi(θl) ∈ argmaxx∈R+{θlx−τ−s(x)}. Hence, the
assumption that a pricing schedule is not incentive compatible leads to a contradiction
and therefore, must be wrong.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Cost minimization without participation constraints. I rst study the following
optimization problem: Given a provision rule (qj)mj=1 that satises the monotonicity
constraintCj(δl−1) ≥ Cj(δl), for all j and all l, and given expected payments (Rj(δr))mj=1
for rms with a δr-costs, I seek to minimize expected costsE
[∑m
j=1 δjc(qj(θ, δ))
]
subject
to the rms’ incentive compatibility constraints
Rj(δ
l)− δlCj(δl) ≥ Rj(δk)− δlCj(δk) ,
for all j, l and k. For brevity I refer to this problem as AUX1. The following propo-
sition characterizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 2.7. A solution (tj)mj=1 to problem AUX1 has the following properties:
i) For all j and l, the local upward incentive compatibility constraint,
Rj(δ
l−1)− δl−1Cj(δl−1) ≥ Rj(δl)− δl−1Cj(δl) ,
is binding, and all other local upward incentive compatibility constraints are not bind-
ing.
ii) The expected payos equals
E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))cj(qj(θ, δ))
]
+
m∑
j=1
Rj(δ
r) .
iii) The expected rm surplus equals
E
[
m∑
j=1
h(δj)cj(qj(θ, δ))
]
+
m∑
j=1
Rj(δ
r) .
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The proof follows from Lemmata 1.7-1.12, see Appendix 1.A.
Cost minimization with participation constraints. I dene problem AUX2 as fol-
lows: Given a provision rule (qj)mj=1 that satises the monotonicity constraintCj(δl−1) ≥
Cj(δ
l), for all j and all l, I seek to minimize expected costsE
[∑m
j=1 δjc(qj(θ, δ))
]
subject
to the rms’ incentive compatibility constraints (ICF ) and the participation constraint
Rj(δ
r)− δrCj(δr) ≥ pij ,
for all j, and l.
Proposition 2.8. A solution (rj)mj=1 to problem AUX2 has the following properties:
i) It has the properties stated in Proposition 2.7.
ii) The participation constraint
Rj(δ
r)− δrCj(δr) ≥ pij ,
is binding for every rm j, whereas all other participation constraints are not binding.
Note that if I modify problem AUX1 so that the payments (Rj(δr))mj=1 can be freely
chosen subject to the participation constraint for δr-types, Rj(δr) ≤ pi, for all j, then
the solution will be such that Rj(δr)) = pij , for all j. To complete the proof it therefore
suces to use the results of Lemmata 1.7-1.12, see Chapter 1.
From Lemma 1.2 in Chapter 1, I know that consumers’ incentive compatibility con-
straints in (ICC) are satised if for all i, Bi(θl) ≥ Bi(θl−1), for all l > 1.
I consider the problem of maximizing expected surplus S(θ, δ) subject to rms’ and
consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints, rms’ participation constraints and the
resource requirement in (BC).
I will show that the solution to this problem fullls property iii) stated in Proposition
2.2.
Step 1. At the solution to the problem, the budget constraint (BC) has to be biding.
Otherwise, expected payments of consumers could be decreased and thereby increasing
expected surplus S(θ, δ). Expected surplus can be written as
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib
(
m∑
j=1
qj(θ, δ)
)
−
m∑
j=1
δjc(q(θ, δ))
]
,
and the optimal provision rule (qj(θ, δ))mj=1 maximizes this expression. The maximiza-
tion yields the Samuelson rule, property iii) in Proposition 2.2, when many rms reduce
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parts of the externality
n∑
i=1
θib
′
(
m∑
j=1
q∗j (θ, δ)
)
= δjc
′(q∗j (θ, δ)) .
Step 2. It is easily veried that externality reduction to the Samuelson rule implies that for
all i and all l, the monotonicity constraints Bi(θl) ≥ Bi(θl−1) are satised. This implies
that consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints are satised. Further, the Samuelson
rule implies that for all j, and all k, the monotonicity constraint Cj(δk−1) ≥ Cj(δk) is
satised. Therefore, (PCF ) and (ICF ) are satised, see Proposition 2.7 and 2.8.
i) Consumer surplus is
U(θ, δ) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(θib(Q
∗(θ, δ)))−
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ))
]
.
Consumers’ transfers need to cover rms’ expected payos, derived in Proposition 2.7
ii), so that
U(θ, δ) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(θib(Q
∗(θ, δ)))−
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c(q
∗
j (θ, δ))
]
−
m∑
j=1
pij .
ii) Expected rm prots are derived in Proposition 2.7 iii).
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Step 1. Externality reduction according to the rst order
condition
s− δjc′(qpj (δj, s)) ≤ 0
implies that for all j, and all k, the monotonicity constraint Cj(δk) ≤ Cj(δk−1) is satis-
ed. I know that (ICF ) and (PCF ) are satised, see Appendix 1.A.
Step 2. The mechanism designer has expectation about the amount every rm pro-
duces, given he announced s. The expected total amount of externality reduction is
determined as an increasing function of the sum of contributions:
E[Q(δ, s)] = E
[
m∑
j=1
qj(δj, s)
]
.
The expected resource costs of externality reduction areR(δ, s) = sE[Qp(δ, s)]+
∑m
j=1 pij .
Making use of (BC), expected surplus can be written as
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q(δ, s))
]
−R(δ, s) ,
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which establishes part i) of Proposition 2.3.
This implies as well that
R(δ, s)− E
[
m∑
j=1
δjc(qj(δj, s))
]
,
which is the expression for rm prots in part ii).
Expected budget balance implies that expected surplus can be written as
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q(δ, s))−
m∑
j=1
δjc(qj(δj, s))
]
and the optimal price s maximizes this expression. The solution s∗ to this problem is
such that the following rst order condition is satised:
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib
′ (Q(δ, s))
∂Q(δ, s)
∂s
−
m∑
j=1
δjc
′ (qj(δj, s))
∂qj(δj, s)
∂s
]
= 0
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib
′ (Q(δ, s))
∂Q(δ, s)
∂s
−
m∑
j=1
s
∂qj(δj, s)
∂s
]
= 0
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib
′ (Q(δ, s))
∂Q(δ, s)
∂s
− s∂Q(δ, s)
∂s
]
= 0
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib
′ (Q(δ, s))
]
= s
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The proof follows the proof in Proposition 2.2 i) and ii).
Proof of Proposition 2.5. I consider the problem of maximizing expected surplus
S(θ, δ, Qˆ) subject to (ICF ) (PCF ), (ICC), (BC) and additionally taking the constraint
Qˆ =
m∑
j=1
qj(δ, Qˆ) .
into account, i.e., the quantity goal needs to be met.
Step 1. At the solution to the auxiliary problem (BC) has to be biding. Otherwise,
expected payments of consumers could be decreased and with that surplus increased.
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Making use of (BC), expected surplus can be written as
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib
(
m∑
j=1
qj(δ, Qˆ)
)
−
m∑
j=1
δjc(qj(δ, Qˆ))
]
, (B)
and the optimal provision rule Qˆ =
∑m
j=1 qj(δ, Qˆ) maximizes this expression. This
implies that the objective in (B) can be rewritten as:
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Qˆ)−
m∑
j=1
δjc(qj(δ, Qˆ))
]
.
The maximization of expression (B) yields to a Samuelson rule that holds in expectation,
property iii) in Proposition 2.5, when many rms reduce parts of the externality
n∑
i=1
θib
′(Qˆ) = E
[
m∑
j=1
δj
∂c(q(δ, Qˆ))
∂qj(δ, Qˆ)
qj(δ, Qˆ)
Qˆ
]
.
Step 2. It is easily veried that externality reduction to the Samuelson rule implies that for
all i and all l, the monotonicity constraints Bi(θl) ≥ Bi(θl−1) are satised. This implies
that consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints are satised. Further, the Samuelson
rule implies that for all j, and all k, the monotonicity constraint Cj(δk−1) ≥ Cj(δk) is
satised. Therefore, (PCF ) and (ICF ) are satised.
Proof of Proposition 2.6.
i) It follows from Propositions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5 that the ex post ecient amount of
externality reduction under the unconstrained mechanism does neither coincide with
the introduced quantity nor the amount of externality reduction under the price mech-
anism. Further, under all mechanism marginal costs of emission reduction are equal,
so that emission reduction occurs at lowest costs. Hence, if more emission reduction is
optimal, then the costs of reduction need to increase as well.
Case 1 Consider the rst the case whereQ(θ, δ)∗ > Qˆ. As more externality reduction
is optimal under the unconstrained mechanism, rms’ need to receive higher revenues in
order to make at least as high prots as under the quantity mechanism. Otherwise rms
will not agree to switch from a quantity mechanism to the unconstrained mechanism.
Therefore, it needs to hold thatR(Q(θ, δ)∗) > R(Qˆ). The lump-sum component τ under
the unconstrained mechanism is therefore higher under the unconstrained mechanism
than under the quantity mechanism. But then, the consumer with the preference pa-
rameter θ0 will veto against the unconstrained mechanism, as u(θ0, Q(θ, δ)∗ < u(θ0, Qˆ).
Thus, the unconstrained mechanism cannot replace a quantity mechanism.
Case 2 Consider the next the case whereQ(θ, δ)∗ < Qˆ∗. The costs of reducing the op-
timal amount of externalities are therefore lower than the costs of reducing the amount
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that is xed by the quantity mechanism. The revenue requirement under the uncon-
strained mechanism is lower than the revenue requirement under the quantity mecha-
nism (R(Qˆ∗) > R(Q(θ, δ)∗). But rm j’s prot is increasing in the amount of emission
reduction pij(δlj, qj) > pij(δlj, q′j) for qj > q′j , so that rms prefer the quantity mechanism
to the unconstrained mechanism and would therefore veto against the unconstrained
mechanism. The arguments for the price mechanism are similar.
ii) Quantity: The optimal emission reduction is characterized in Proposition 2.2. In-
terim, a rm j expects to reduce
E(θ,δ−j)
[
qj(θ, δ−j, δj)|δj = δl
]
.
If l = r, the optimal amount of expected emission reduction is lower under the optimal
unconstrained mechanism than under the quantity mechanism that is characterized in
Proposition 2.5
E(θ,δ−j)
[
qj(θ, δ−j, δj)|δj = δl
]
< E(θ,δ−j)
[
qj(δ−j, δj, Qˆ)|δj = δl
]
.
Under the optimal unconstrained mechanism, as well as the quantity mechanism, rm
j’s expected prot Πj(δl) is increasing in Qj(δl). A rm with high costs of emission
reduction, l = r, vetoes the optimal unconstrained mechanism if
E(θ,δ−j)
[
rj(θ, δ−j, δj)|δj = δl
]
< E(θ,δ−j)
[
rj(δ−j, δj, Qˆ)|δj = δl
]
.
Increasing rms’ expected revenues is, however, not possible because a consumer with
low preferences, l = 0, vetoes the optimal unconstrained mechanism if transfers under
the optimal unconstrained mechanism are higher than under the quantity mechanism
E(θ−i,δ)
[
ti(θ−i, θi, δ)|θi = θl
]
< E(θ−i,δ)
[
ti(δ, Qˆ)|θi = θl
]
.
Price: In order to make the optimal unconstrained mechanism Pareto improve upon
the price mechanism, the expected prots under the unconstrained mechanism need to
be higher than the prots under the price mechanism
E(θ,δ−j)
[
pij(θ, δ−j, δj)|δj = δl
] ≥ s∗qj(δj, s∗)− δjc(qj(δj, s∗)) .
The unconstrained mechanism as well as the price mechanism achieve production ef-
ciency. Thus, expected rm prots under the unconstrained mechanism can only be
higher than under the price mechanism if
E(θ,δ−j)
[
m∑
j=1
[
qj(θ, δ−j, δj)|δj = δl
]]
> Q(δ, s∗) .
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Increasing rms’ expected revenues is, however, not possible because a consumer with
low preferences, l = 0, vetoes the unconstrained unconstrained mechanism if transfers
under the unconstrained mechanism are higher than under the price mechanism
E(θ−i,δ)
[
ti(θ−i, θi, δ)|θi = θl
]
< E(θ−i,δ)
[
ti(δ, s
∗)|θi = θl
]
.
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Externality regulation
and distributional concerns
3.1 Introduction
This chapter contributes to the theory of externality regulation. It looks at a model
in which rms can reduce environmental damages, which is benecial to consumers.
The chapter assumes that rms privately observe their reduction costs and consumers
privately observe their benets of environmental damage reduction.
A key question in the literature is to identify the conditions under which the regula-
tion via corrective taxation is preferable to quantity regulation, such as tradable permits.
In a world where all costs and benets are known with certainty, price and quantity
mechanisms are equally ecient to regulate the externality. Yet, for the question to be
meaningful, this literature focuses on situations in which the policy is chosen under un-
certainty about the reduction costs of rms and the benets of reduction to consumers.
Thus, there is uncertainty about the demand (as shaped by the distribution of prefer-
ences) and the supply (as shaped by the distribution of reduction costs) for externality
reduction. The chosen policy instrument will aect the total surplus, and the equiva-
lence argument does no longer apply.
Most of this literature, however, assumes that there is symmetric information; i.e.,
there is no explicit modeling of private information and no agent has better information
than others. By contrast, this chapter studies externality regulation under asymmetric
information. It is based on the assumption that such informational asymmetries are
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an impediment for the design of an optimal response to externalities. And information
asymmetries are present in the context of environmental externalities: A rm’s manager
or engineer can assess the avoidance costs that emissions will cause for the rm more
precisely than the regulatory agency. Further, consumers that are directly aected by
emissions can estimate, for example, their heath costs more accurately. This raises the
concern that an analysis which makes the assumption that information is symmetric
will suer from an inaccurate assessment of avoidance costs and benets.
This chapter formalizes a trade-o between the eciency of regulating externalities,
on the one hand, and the distribution of consumer surplus and rm surplus, on the other
hand. As a main result, it is shown that if the regulator maximizes the surplus of con-
sumers, who are harmed by the externality, less externality reduction takes place com-
pared to the case when the regulator maximizes total surplus. Further, this paper asks
under what circumstances a price mechanism leads to higher surplus than a quantity
mechanism and whether this comparative advantage measure is aected by the mecha-
nism designer’s surplus measure.
The formal analysis is based on the independent private values model of mechanism
design that I introduced in Chapter 1. It has the following features: There are many
rms that can reduce emissions; they dier with respect to their technology. On the
other side, there is a number of consumers that benet from the emission reduction,
but they dier in their preferences for externality regulation. Furthermore, consumers’
transfers need to cover rms’ revenues. I assume that the mechanism designer needs to
use either a price mechanism, or a quantity mechanism to regulate emissions. This stays
in contrast to the literature on the revelation of private information that avoids any a
priori assumption on the set of admissible policies. The mechanism designer needs to
introduce price and quantity mechanisms before private information is revealed. When
using a price mechanism, the mechanism designer introduces a subsidy that rms receive
per unit of emission reduction. The total amount of emission reduction is, however, still
responsive to changes in technologies because rms decide on their amount of emission
reduction after they have learned about their technology and the subsidy. On the other
hand, if a quantity mechanism is chosen for externality reduction, the total amount of
reduction is certain but uncertainty remains about the cost of reduction.
I impose incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints for rms.
The rst constraints assure that rms do not have an incentive to misreport their tech-
nologies. The latter constraints assure that no rm makes losses when reducing emis-
sions. I impose no participation constraints for consumers. I assume instead that the
regulator can make use of its coercive power and force consumers to pay transfers, even
if some consumers do benet only little from emission reduction. The rationale for this
assumption is twofold: First, it has been shown by the literature that emissions will
not be reduced if consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints and participation con-
straints need to be respected simultaneously and the number of consumers is large (see
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e.g. Chapter 1 and Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990). If no externality reduction takes place,
the question of whether to use prices or quantities becomes meaningless. And second,
it looks empirically plausible that the regulating agency rather forces consumers to pay
transfers for externality reduction than letting rms go out of business.
As a benchmark case, I derive the optimal unconstrained mechanism to regulate ex-
ternalities, i.e., a mechanism that does restrict the set of admissible policies, when the
mechanism designer’s objective is to maximize consumer surplus. I show that less ex-
ternality reduction takes place, compared to the case where the mechanism designer
maximizes total surplus that consists of consumer surplus and rm prots. Put dier-
ently, less emissions are reduced when the mechanism designer puts more weight on
the surplus of the harmed agents. When total surplus is maximized, the optimal amount
of externality regulation has to satisfy an eciency condition, which is known as the
Samuelson rule (Samuelson, 1954). Although consumers and rms have private infor-
mation, the unconstrained mechanism that maximizes total surplus reaches rst-best
eciency. When the mechanism designer puts all weight consumers in the surplus mea-
sure, the Samuelson rule no longer needs to be satised. Instead, an eciency condition
needs to hold where not only rms’ costs of emission reduction enter the optimality
condition but also rents they need to receive in order to communicate their private in-
formation truthfully. These rents are part of the mechanism designer’s surplus measure
when he is interested in maximizing total surplus. By contrast, these rents reduce sur-
plus when the mechanism designer maximizes consumer surplus because they increase
consumers’ transfers. Thus, the optimal reduction level under consumer surplus maxi-
mization is distorted downwards, and the unconstrained consumer surplus maximizing
mechanism only achieves second-best results.
Next, I introduce a price mechanism. The mechanism designer announces a subsidy
that rms receive per amount of emission reduction. When choosing the subsidy, the
regulator remains ignorant about the state of demand and supply for externality reduc-
tion. The mechanism designer, however, has probabilistic beliefs about demand and
supply and hence can assess the performance of a price mechanism. If he acts in the
interest of consumers, the emission reduction should occur at lowest costs. The mech-
anism designer demands externality reduction from many rms. A market structure
arises that resembles a monopsony. The subsidy that is paid when consumer surplus is
maximized is lower than the subsidy that is paid when total surplus is maximized. As
under the optimal mechanism, less externality reduction takes place under the rst sur-
plus measure. But as the subsidy is xed, only the amount of externality reduction can
adjust to changes in the economy. In comparison to the unconstrained mechanism that
maximizes consumer surplus, a surplus loss occurs when the mechanism designer uses a
price mechanism. Thus, a price mechanism that maximizes consumer surplus only leads
to third-best eciency, compared to the unconstrained consumer surplus maximizing
mechanism.
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Thereafter, I introduce a quantity mechanism that maximizes consumer surplus. The
mechanism designer sets the total amount of emission reduction before he knows con-
sumers’ preferences and rms’ costs. As he acts in the interest of consumers, the quan-
tity mechanism should achieve emission reduction at lowest costs. As rms have private
information about their costs, incentive problems can occur: A rm with a better tech-
nology tends to overstate its costs to reduce emissions because it prots more from an
increase in the revenue requirement. Because incentive constraints and rms’ volun-
tary participation needs to be assured, the optimality condition for emission reduction
accounts for rms’ rents. In comparison to the optimal consumer surplus maximizing
mechanism, the ex ante introduced quantity restriction appears in the optimality con-
dition. That is, the quantity regulation is less exible to react to changes in costs and
preferences. As the price mechanism above, the quantity mechanism that maximizes
consumer surplus only achieves third-best eciency.
While price and quantity mechanisms are often used in real-world applications, they
lead to a surplus loss in comparison to an unconstrained mechanism. This raises the
question how severe this surplus loss is, and which parameters inuence it. Further,
if only price and quantity mechanisms are considered, the question, which mechanism
leads to higher surplus, becomes important. I show that the mechanism designer’s sur-
plus measure aects the comparative advantage of the price mechanism over the quan-
tity mechanism. I present a numerical example to highlight that, in particular, the dis-
tribution of rms’ cost parameters is crucial to evaluate not only the eciency but also
the distribution of consumer and rm surplus.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The next section gives a more
detailed literature review. Section 3.3 species the economic environment. Section 3.4
describes, as a benchmark case, the optimal mechanism that maximizes consumer sur-
plus under the assumption that rms and consumers have private information. Further,
I describe the price and the quantity mechanism that maximize consumer surplus. Sec-
tion 3.5 compares price and quantity mechanisms under eciency and distributional
considerations. The last section contains concluding remarks.
3.2 Related Literature
My research lies at the intersection of two dierent strands of the literature: On the one
hand, the analysis of externality regulation under informational constraints; and on the
other hand, the traditional regulation of externalities by means of price and quantity
instruments.
Mechanism Design. This chapter builds on the independent private values model of
mechanism design theory that was introduced in Chapter 1. I apply this framework to
study externalities.
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Traditionally, the literature on externality regulation is related to the literature on
public good provision and assumes that consumers have private information about their
preferences for public good provision. In order to reach surplus-maximizing outcomes,
the mechanism designer needs access to consumers’ private information. Arrow (1979)
and D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) show that it is possible to get consumers to
reveal their preferences if the mechanism designer’s goal is to reach ecient outcomes.
If additionally consumers’ voluntary participation needs to be assured, then public good
provision goes to zero, as the number of consumers get large, see e.g. Rob (1989) and
Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). For the context of this chapter, this would mean that ex-
ternalities are not regulated if a consumer cannot be forced to contribute to the nancing
of externality reduction, in case that this makes him or her worse o.
I allow not only consumers but also the production sector to have private information
and thereby build on results of Baron and Myerson (1982), Bierbrauer (2011a) and Chap-
ter 1. The rst paper shows how to regulate a monopolist with unknown costs. The
second paper looks at a single rm providing an excludable public good. In contrast to
this chapter, these papers do not examine how high the share of public good provision
should be for a single rm when multiple rms can provide the public good.
To my knowledge, only one previous paper studies the eects of asymmetric infor-
mation on the regulation of externalities. Lewis (1996) reviews the literature on incen-
tive regulation and suggests strategies for dealing with asymmetric information in the
context of environmental regulation. He looks at a group of rms that dier in their
protability but are equal in the way they pollute the environment. He concludes that
rms’ private information leads to a pollution level that is dierent from the ecient
one and that taxes should be implemented that vary across rms.
Prices versus Quantities. Several papers in environmental, political and nancial
economics have described externality regulation and whether to employ price or quan-
tity instruments. My analysis is guided by this literature. The question of prices versus
quantities goes back to Weitzman (1974). He showed that both instruments dier in e-
ciency if information is incomplete but symmetric, i.e., when there is uncertainty about
the true demand and supply functions and all agents have the same information. As
Weitzman (1974), I analyze price and quantity instruments but assume that uncertainty
stems from private information. With that I provide an extension of Weitzman’s results
to an environment with asymmetric information.
The question of prices versus quantities has especially been applied in the context of
environmental economics, see Cropper and Oates (1992) for a survey1 and in political
1Many authors have expanded Weitzman’s framework. Yohe (1978) adds output uncertainty, Hoel and
Karp (2001) consider multiplicative uncertainties. Stavins (1996) shows that a positive correlation be-
tween benet shocks and environmental costs, favor quantity instruments in a setting with environ-
mental externalities. Goulder et al. (1999) and Pizer (2002) look if a combination of both instruments
leads to eciency improvements in comparison to either prices or quantities alone. Montero (2002)
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economy models.2 Recent papers analyze price and quantity instruments to deal with
externalities that arose with the nancial crises.3 As Weitzman (1974), most of these
papers assume that uncertainty is due to incomplete information. However, information
advantages of a single nancial institute with respect to the regulating agency have so
far not been examined. The setup of this chapter can be a starting point to investigate
incentive eects of bankers, who are better informed about the risk than the government.
Overall, the literature on price and quantity regulation uses total surplus as the e-
ciency criterion. In this chapter, I additionally consider consumer surplus as eciency
measure and thereby follow the literature on regulation, see Baron and Myerson (1982)
and Laont and Tirole (1993). I will show that the two surplus criteria will lead to dier-
ent levels of emission reduction and aect the comparison of prices versus quantities.
3.3 The economic environment
3.3.1 Firms
There is a set of rms, J = {1, ...,m} that can reduce emissions. The emission reduction
qj leads to costs δjc(qj), where δj is a cost characteristic of the rm that is unknown to
the mechanism designer. δj belongs to the nite ordered set ∆ = {δ1, ..., δr} of possible
cost parameters. I assume that δl < δl+1, ∀ l ∈ {1, ..., r − 1}, so that rms with a lower
index face lower costs. The prot of rm j is given by
pij(δj, tj, qj) = rj − δjc(qj) ,
where c(·) is an increasing and convex cost function, satisfying c(0) = 0 limq→0 c′(q) =
0 and limq→∞ c′(q) = ∞, where the Inada conditions avoid corner solutions. rj is rm
j’s revenue.
Each rm privately observes its type δj . For all other agents δj is a random vari-
able with support ∆ and probability distribution (p1, ..., pr). I denote by pl that δj = δl
compares both instruments when enforcement is incomplete and Kelly (2005) studies price and quan-
tity regulations in a general equilibrium model.
2Boyer and Laont (1999) recast the question of instrument choice in a formal political economy model
of environmental economics and examine the inuence of voting rules on the environmental policy.
There exists as well a strand of the policy literature that studies the instrument choice in environmental
settings. If rent seeking might occur, then taxes are rarely applied in environmental policies (see e.g.
Dijkstra, 1998). Damania (1999) shows that emission taxes are more likely when parties act in the
interest of the environment, whereas quantities are likelier when interest groups are present. And
Alesina and Passarelli (2014) show that a majority might prefer a dierent instrument than the social
planner.
3Keen (2011) considers failure externalities and bail-out externalities and evaluates price and quantity
instruments. Perotti and Suarez (2011) discuss both instruments when liquidity regulation generates
negative systemic risk externalities. Stein (2012) examines monetary policy instruments to regulate
negative externalities in the nancial sector in order to help assuring nancial stability. Acharya et al.
(2010) study Pigouvian taxation to internalize systemic risk-taking behavior of banks.
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and by P (δl) the probability that δj > δl. This distribution is assumed to be common
knowledge. The random variables (δj)j∈J are assumed to be independently and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.). The vector of all rms’ technology parameters is denoted by
δ = (δ1, ..., δm) and δ−j lists all technology parameters except δj . I impose a monotone
hazard rate assumption: The function
δj 7→ h(δj) := P (δj)
p(δj)
is assumed to be non-decreasing.
3.3.2 Consumers
There is a nite set of consumers, I = {1, ..., n}. The preferences of consumer i are
given by the utility function
ui(θi, Q, ti) = θib(Q)− ti ,
whereQ =
∑m
j=1 qj ∈ R+ denotes the overall emission reduction. The utility depends
on a taste parameter θi that describes consumer i’s marginal valuation for emission re-
duction. For each i, θi belongs to a nite ordered set Θ = {θ0, θ1, ..., θs}, with θ0 = 0. I
assume that θl < θl+1 ∀ l ∈ {0, ..., s − 1}, etc. The monetary transfer of consumer i is
denoted by ti.
Each consumer i privately observes his preference parameter θi. From the perspective
of all other agents it is a random variable with support Θ and probability distribution
(f 0, ..., f s). I denote by f l that θi = θL and by F (θli) the probability that θi > θl. The
random variables (θi)i∈I are i.i.d. The vector of all consumers valuation parameters is
denoted by θ = (θ1, ..., θn). θ−i lists all taste parameters except θi. I impose a monotone
hazard rate assumption, so that the function
θi 7→ g(θi) := 1− F (θi)
f(θi)
is assumed to be non-increasing.
3.3.3 Mechanism
I use a mechanism design approach to characterize the amount and the pricing of emis-
sion reduction. A social choice function or direct mechanism consists of a transfer and
production rule for each rm j and a level of externality reduction and transfer rule for
each consumer i. rj : Θn ×∆m 7→ R species j’s revenue as a function of the vector of
agents reports; analogously the function qj : Θn×∆m 7→ R+ characterizes j’s emission
reduction. ti : ∆n × ∆m 7→ R characterizes consumer i’s payment as a function of
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the vector of consumers’ preference parameters and rms’ cost parameters. Consumers
benet from the total emission reduction Q(θ, δ) =
∑m
j=1 qj(θ, δ).
By referring to the revelation principle (Myerson, 1985), I focus on direct mechanisms
so that the truthful revelation of preferences for externality reduction by consumers, and
technologies by rms, is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Incentive compatibility constraints. Truth-telling is a best response for rm j if for all
δl ∈ ∆ and all δk ∈ ∆
Rj(δ
l)− δlCj(δl) ≥ Rj(δk)− δlCj(δk), (ICF )
where Rj(δk) ≡ E(θ,δ−j)
[
rj(θ, δ−j, δkj )
]
is the expected transfer for rm j, in case of
reporting δk, given that all other rms and consumers reveal their preferences to the
mechanism designer. Analogously, Cj(δk) ≡ E(θ,δ−j)
[
c(qj(θ, δ−j, δkj ))
]
are the expected
production costs of rm j when announcing δk. The expectation operator E(θ,δ−j) indi-
cates that the realization of δj is known when deriving this expectation.
In the same way, truth-telling is a best response for consumer i if for all θl ∈ Θ and
all θk ∈ Θ
θlBi(θ
l)− Ti(θl) ≥ θlBi(θk)− Ti(θk), (ICC)
where Bi(θk) ≡ E(θ−i,δ)
[
b(Q(θ−i, θki , δ))
]
is the expected benet of emission reduction,
conditioning on consumer i reporting θk, given that all other consumers and rms reveal
their preferences to the mechanism designer and Ti(θk) ≡ E(θ−i,δ)
[
ti(θ−i, θki , δ)
]
are the
expected payments, in case of reporting a preference parameter of θk.
Participation constraints. A direct mechanism is individually rational if for each rm j
and for all δl ∈ ∆
Rj(δ
l)− δlCj(δl) ≥ pij, (PCF )
where pij denotes a lower bound for the prot of rm j. The interpretation of these par-
ticipation constraints is as follows: One can think of the direct mechanism as a mech-
anism that replaces a status quo outcome. The mechanism designer requires an unani-
mous consent of all rms. Hence, pij can be understood as rm j’s payo in the status
quo.
I assume that the mechanism designer can make use of its coercive power and force
consumers to pay a transfer for the externality reduction. Thus, voluntary participa-
tion for consumers is not required. I make this assumption because the literature has
shown that no externality reduction takes place if consumers’ incentive compatibility
constraints and participation constraints need to be respected simultaneously. Thus, the
question of which mechanism to use for externality regulation would become meaning-
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less without assuming coercive power.
Budget constraint. Furthermore, the mechanism designer’s budget constraint needs to
hold, where consumers expected transfers need to cover rms’ expected revenues
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
≥ E
[
m∑
j=1
rj(θ, δ)
]
. (BC)
The objective function. I will consider two alternatives in what follows. Expected total
surplus that is generated by a social choice function is given by
S((rj)j∈J , (qj)j∈J , (ti)i∈I) = Π((rj)j∈J , (qj)j∈J) + U(Q, (ti)i∈I) ,
where rms’ expected revenues are
Π((rj)j∈J , (qj)j∈J) = E
[
m∑
j=1
(rj(θ, δ)− δjc(qj(θ, δ)))
]
,
and expected consumer surplus is
U(Q, (ti)i∈I) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(θib(Q(θ, δ))− ti(θ, δ))
]
.
In Chapter 2, I derived results when the regulator is interested in maximizing total sur-
plus. This surplus measure is a target that is mostly used when comparing the eciency
of price and quantity mechanisms. Expected total surplus, however, does not account for
distributive consideration. The assumption that a consumer’s utility is linear in transfer
ti and a rm’s prot is linear in the revenue rj gives rise to an externality reduction
level that does not depend on which agent should be able to realize which surplus level.
The criterion of total surplus maximization pins down Q and (qj)j∈J . This criterion,
however, takes a particular stand on distributive concerns: Firm prots and consumer
surplus receive the same weight in the mechanism designer’s objective function, hence
distributive concerns are neglected.
A possibility to formalize distributive consideration is to look at an objective function
that maximizes the surplus of one group in the economy. A key question of this chapter
is to specify the mechanism that maximizes consumer surplus and comparing it to the
outcomes of expected total surplus maximization.4
4I do not consider the case of maximizing rm prot because it would no longer be desirable to restrict
rms revenues, and the regulation of externalities would become uninteresting. As consumers’ par-
ticipation constraints are neglected, rms’ revenues can be made arbitrarily high, such that a rm’s
prot maximization problem does not have a solution.
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3.4 Externality regulation under asymmetric
information
In response to the non-optimality of the market equilibrium in the presence of emissions,
various instruments have been proposed to correct for the distortions. In this section I
introduce an unconstrained mechanism and two specic mechanisms that are widely
used in real-world applications: A quantity mechanism; that is to say a mechanism that
achieves the same level of emission reduction, independently of the realized demand and
supply of emission reduction, and a price mechanism that achieves the same marginal
costs of emission reduction for any realization of supply and demand.
To evaluate the eciency of price and quantity mechanisms, an unconstrained mech-
anism to regulate emissions is derived. The advantage of that mechanism is that it spec-
ies the emission level for every realization of rms’ technologies and consumers’ pref-
erences. This makes the unconstrained mechanism more exible than price and quantity
mechanisms, that x either the price paid for emission reduction or the total emission
level before uncertainty is resolved.
In this section, I compare the outcome that is obtained if total surplus is maximized to
the outcome that is obtained if consumer surplus is maximized. As will become apparent,
with a regulator that is interested in maximizing consumer surplus less emissions are re-
duced than when he is interested in maximizing total surplus. This result is independent
of the mechanism being used.
3.4.1 Optimal mechanism design as a benchmark case
As a benchmark case, I rst introduce the unconstrained mechanism. There is an ex
ante stage. At this stage the mechanism designer wants to dene the mechanism for
emission reduction. The mechanism designer acts in the interest of consumers. He has
information about the distribution of preferences and technologies. He does, however,
not know the private information of a single rm or a single consumer. The designer
employs rms’ incentive compatibility and participation constraints, so as to truthfully
elicit rms’ private information. Additionally, he requires that the budget is balanced in
expectation, so that consumers’ expected transfers cover rms’ expected revenues.
Formally, I require that a social choice function is chosen with the objective to maxi-
mize consumer surplus subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (ICF ), rms’
participation constraints (PCF ) and the budget constraint in (BC). I rst consider the
problem to derive the mechanism that reaches the emission reduction at minimal costs,
and additionally respecting rms’ constraints. In a second step, I derive the emission
level that maximizes consumer surplus. Proposition 3.1 species the solution of the rst
problem.
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Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the monotone hazard rate assumption holds (h is a non-
decreasing function). The optimal mechanism that reaches emission reduction at minimal
costs and that satises (ICF ), (PCF ) and (BC), leads to the following resource require-
ment
R(θ, δ) = E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h (δj)) c (qj(θ, δ))
]
+
m∑
j=1
pij .
For a formal proof of this argument, see Chapter 1.5 As rms have private information
about how costly it is to reduce emissions, and as the expected prot of a single rm is
not allowed to be negative, rms can achieve information rents. These information rents
enter the resource requirement. The cost function of a complete information environ-
ment is replaced by rm j’s virtual cost function (δj + h (δj)) c (qj(θ, δ)) for emission
reduction. Virtual costs can be interpreted as the minimal revenue that type δj of rm
j needs to receive for the emission reduction in an environment where information is
asymmetrically distributed. The costs for emission reduction are increased by the hazard
rate h(δj) that accounts for rms’ private information.
After having solved the problem of reaching emission reduction at lowest costs for
consumers, I specify now the optimal level of emission reduction.
Proposition 3.2. For any reported preferences θ and technologies δ, the emission reduction
level of rm j, that maximizes consumer surplus U , which I denote by q∗∗j (θ, δ), has to
satisfy the following rst order condition, for all rms j
n∑
i=1
θib
′
(
m∑
j=1
q∗∗j (θ, δ)
)
= (δj + h(δj)) c
′ (q∗∗j (θ, δ)) .
Proposition 3.2 shows that in order to maximize consumer surplus, the sum of marginal
benets of emission reduction needs to be equal to the virtual marginal costs. For the
determination of the optimal emission reduction Q∗∗(θ, δ) =
∑m
j=1 q
∗∗
j (θ, δ), rms’ in-
formation rents play a major role. This is dierent when the regulator is interested in
maximizing total surplus, as the following Remark shows.6
Remark 3.1. For any reported preferences θ and technologies δ, the optimal emission
reduction, that maximizes total surplus S(θ, δ), which I denote by q∗j (θ, δ), has to satisfy
the following rst order condition, for all rms j
n∑
i=1
θib
′
(
m∑
j=1
q∗j (θ, δ)
)
= δjc
′ (q∗j (θ, δ)) .
5See Appendix 1.A, for a formal proof.
6See Appendix 2.A, for a formal proof.
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Under the total surplus maximizing mechanism, a condition needs to be satised that
is an adaption of the Samuelson rule, see Samuelson (1954), to my setup. It states that
the the Pareto-ecient emission reduction is reached when the sum of marginal bene-
ts equals the marginal costs of emission reduction. Although rms’ costs are private
information, rst-best eciency can be reached. The total surplus maximizing emission
level is undistorted.
Proposition 3.2 illustrates that under consumer surplus maximization, however, a
Samuelson rule no longer holds and rst-best results are out of reach. Firms’ information
rents are no longer part of the mechanism designer’s surplus measure. The consumer
surplus maximizing mechanism distorts the externality reduction level downwards, in
order to realize surplus gains for consumers from redistribution surplus from rms to
them. There is a trade-o between higher marginal benets if emission reduction is ex-
panded and higher costs that incorporate both marginal costs and information rents of
the production sector. Only second-best eciency can be reached.
3.4.2 Price regulation
One way to regulate externalities, in real-world applications, is to impose a subsidy to
correct the non-optimality of the market equilibrium. Under a price regulation, a subsidy
to reduce emissions is xed before uncertainty about preferences and costs is resolved.
I seek to determine the optimal subsidy that maximizes consumer surplus. The analysis
is divided into two parts. I begin by introducing the prot maximization problem of
a single rm. In a second step, I solve for the optimal consumer surplus maximizing
subsidy.
Optimal emission reduction. The regulator species a subsidy s and every rm j
maximizes its payos, that is
pij(δj, s) = sqj(δj, s)− δjc(qj(δj, s)) ,
where qj(δj, s) is the amount of emissions rm j reduces if subsidy s is announced and if
its technology parameter is δj . Firm j, therefore, chooses qj(δj, s) according to the rst
order condition s−δjc′(qj(δj, s)) ≤ 0, with equality for qj(δj, s) > 0, so that the subsidy
is equal to the marginal cost of emission reduction for all j. This shows, in particular,
that marginal costs of emission reduction are the same for all rms. This will be dierent
under the quantity mechanism, as we will see in the following subsection.
Note further, that participation and incentive constraints in (PCF ) and (ICF ), are sat-
ised. If rm j had deviated from reducing qj(δj, s), its prots would decrease. Further,
voluntary participation is fullled, as each rm can decide to not provide any emission
reduction if this leads to negative prots.
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With a price mechanism, the resource constraint takes the following form
R(δ, s) = sE [Q (δ, s)] +
m∑
j=1
pij ,
where E[Q (δ, s)] = E
[∑m
j=1 qj(δj, s)
]
denotes the total expected emission reduction,
when subsidy s is paid.
The production sector’s prots from emission reduction, when a price regulation is
used, are
Π(δ, s) = sE [Q (δ, s)]− E
[
m∑
j=1
δjc (qj (δj, s))
]
+
m∑
j=1
pij .
Derivation of the optimal price. The price mechanism needs to maximize consumer
surplus, subject to the revenue constraint. I denote the consumer surplus maximizing
subsidy by s∗∗.
Proposition 3.3. For any θ and δ, the optimal subsidy s∗∗, that maximizes consumer
surplus U(θ, δ, s), has to satisfy the following rst order condition
E
[{
n∑
i=1
θib
′ (Q (δ, s∗∗))− s∗∗
}
∂Q(δ, s∗∗)
∂s∗∗
]
= E[Q(δ, s∗∗)] .
The expression in the curly bracket of Proposition 3.3 is known from the total surplus
maximizing subsidy.7 If this expression is zero, the modied Samuelson rule is satis-
ed. Under consumer surplus maximization the rst order condition changes. Here, the
dierence between the expected sum of marginal benets and the subsidy has to be mul-
tiplied by the marginal change of total emission reduction at s∗∗ if the subsidy changes.
This expression has to be equal to the total level of emission reduction. The following
example introduces some further assumptions, so that a comparison to the total surplus
maximizing subsidy is simplied.
Example: Assume rms with a quadratic cost function, c(qj) = 12q
2
j , and consumers with
a concave benet function, b(Q) =
√
Q. Then, every rm j decides to reduce qj = sδj , so
that E[Q(δ, s)] = E
[∑m
j=1 qj(δj, s)
]
= sE
[∑m
j=1
1
δj
]
. Hence, ∂EQ(δ,s)
∂s
= E
[∑m
j=1
1
δj
]
.
The rst order condition in Proposition 3.3 then simplies to
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
b′ (Q (δ, s∗∗))
]
= 2s∗∗ .
7See Remark 3.2 below.
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It is instructive to look at an equivalent formulation in terms of quantity choices. A
rst order condition can be derived by thinking about the regulator as a monopsonist that
decides on the level of emissions it wants to reduce E[Q (δ, s)] ≥ 0, letting the subsidy
at which it can buy this amount be given by the inverse supply function s = (E[Q])−1.
Using the inverse supply function, the monopsonist’s demand function can be stated as
maxE[Q]E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q)
]
− s (E[Q])E[Q] .
The optimal emission level must hence satisfy the rst order condition
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
b′(Q)
]
= s′(E[Q])E[Q] + s(E[Q]) .
The left-hand side of the equation above is the marginal benet of a dierential in-
crease in emissions at E[Q], while the right-hand side is equal to the marginal resource
costs from a dierential increase in E[Q], which is equal to the derivative of the re-
source costs d[s(E[Q])E[Q]]
dE[Q]
. Thus, marginal resource costs must equal marginal benets
at the monopsonist’s optimal emission level. This implies rst, that we must have that
s(E[Q]) < c′(E[Q]), so that the subsidy under the monopsony is lower than the marginal
costs. And second, that the optimal emission level is below the total surplus maximiz-
ing emission level. The cause of that quantity distortion is the regulator’s monopsonistic
power and the recognition that a reduction in the bought quantities allows it to decrease
the subsidy paid on its remaining reductions. This subsidy decrease has an inuence on
costs and it is captured by the term s′(E[Q])E[Q] + s(E[Q]).
In order to compare this price with the consumer surplus maximizing subsidy in
Proposition 3.3,I show how the optimal price mechanism looks like if the regulator wants
to maximize total surplus.8
Remark 3.2. For any δ and θ, the optimal subsidy s∗ that maximizes total surplus
S(θ, δ, s) has to satisfy the following rst order condition
E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
b′ (Q (δ, s∗))
]
= s∗ .
This condition is a modied Samuelson rule, where the marginal cost of emission re-
duction s, need to equal the sum of expected marginal benets. Note that this condition
does not coincide with the optimal emission reduction in Remark 3.1. The modied
Samuelson rule, needs to be fullled only in expectation. The optimal price mechanism
8See Chapter 2, for a formal proof.
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does not lead to rst-best ecient outcomes whenever the regulator’s ex ante expecta-
tions about preferences and technologies do not coincide with the ex post realization.
The subsidy that is paid when the regulator maximizes consumer surplus is lower
than the subsidy paid when the regulator maximizes total surplus. Therefore, the ex-
pected total emission reduction is lower under the rst surplus measure. Proposition 3.2
highlights, that the regulator’s monopsony power has two eects. First, it redistributes
surplus away from rms to consumers. Second, it reduces the aggregate expected to-
tal surplus, consisting of expected rm prots and expected consumer surplus, as con-
sumers’ expected surplus gain is smaller than rms’ expected prot loss; a surplus loss
that can be understood as a dead weight loss of monopsony.
That is, under a consumer surplus maximizing price mechanism, expected consumer
surplus is even lower than under the second-best optimal mechanism, that was intro-
duced in Proposition 3.2. As the price mechanism xes the subsidy ex ante, it cannot
react to changes in preferences and costs by changing the price. The expected consumer
utility under a price mechanism is therefore lower than the expected consumer surplus
under the optimal mechanism. Thus, the subsidy that satises the condition in Proposi-
tion 3.3 only leads to ’third-best eciency’.
3.4.3 Q_uantity regulation
Instead of a price mechanism, the regulator can use a quantity mechanism to regulate
externalities. I think of the quantity mechanism that the regulator chooses the total
amount of emission reduction based on his probabilistic beliefs about demand and sup-
ply for externality reduction. After the regulator sets the quantity, every rm decides
how much it wants to contribute to the total emission reduction. At that point every
rm knows its cost parameter. I am interested in the quantity mechanism that maxi-
mizes consumer surplus. As consumers’ transfers need to cover the expected resource
requirement in expectation, and rm prots are not part of the surplus measure, the
regulator wants to reach the emission target at minimal resource costs.
Again, I proceed in two steps. First, I treat the optimal quantity as given and solve
for the optimal quantity mechanism reaching that aim. In a second step, I solve for the
optimal quantity.
Reaching a given target. A quantity mechanism species for each rm j a function
qj : δ × Qˆ 7→ qj(δ, Qˆ), which gives rm j’s contribution to the overall optimal emis-
sion reduction as a function of the vector δ of rms’ technology parameters and total
emission reduction Qˆ. In addition, a quantity mechanism species, for each rm j, a
revenue rj : δ× Qˆ 7→ rj(δ, Qˆ), which compensates rm j for its cost of emission reduc-
tion. Additional to the constraints that were employed under the optimal mechanism,
a quantity constraint needs to be satised, that comes from xing the emission level
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before uncertainty is resolved, i.e., for all δ,
m∑
j=1
qj(δ, Qˆ) = Qˆ . (QU)
The following Proposition characterizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that a monotone hazard rate assumption holds (h is a non-
decreasing function). The quantity mechanism, which reaches the emission target at mini-
mal resource costs to the regulator, has the following properties
i) Virtual marginal costs are equalized: For all δ, and for all rms j and j′,
(δj + h(δj)) c
′
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))
= (δj′ + h(δj′)) c
′
(
qj′
(
δ, Qˆ
))
.
ii) The resource requirement of the regulator equals
R(δ, Qˆ) = E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj)) c
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))]
+
m∑
j=1
pij .
iii) The production sectors’ expected payo are
Π(δ, Qˆ) = E
[
m∑
j=1
h(δj)c
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))]
+
m∑
j=1
pij .
The Proposition establishes the properties of an optimal quantity mechanism when
the emission reduction needs to be reached at lowest costs for consumers. Consumers’
transfers not only need to cover the costs of emission reduction but as well rms’ in-
formation rents. The resource requirement and rm prots depend not only on the cost
vector but also on the ex ante introduced quantity goal. Under the quantity mechanism,
the amount of emission reduction is xed ex ante and cannot adapt if preferences or
costs are dierent than ex ante expected. Therefore, the quantity mechanism is less ex-
ible than the optimal mechanism, introduced in Proposition 3.2, where the total amount
of emission reduction depends on the realization of preferences and costs.
The term (δj + h(δj))c′
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))
is rm j’s virtual marginal costs of emission re-
duction under the quantity mechanism, when the regulator decides to reduce emissions
by the amount Qˆ. Remember that the virtual marginal costs can be interpreted as the
minimal amount that rm j of type δ needs to receive as a transfer from the regulator
in order to reduce its emissions by the amount qj
(
δ, Qˆ
)
, in the presence of incentive
compatibility and participation constraints and the quantity constraint. The fact that
virtual costs are equalized among rms guarantees that rms with the same technology
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need to reduce emissions by the same amount but rms with better technology reduce
more emissions than rms with bad technology. The emission reduction is undistorted
for the rm with the best technology. But emissions are distorted downwards for rms
with bad technology due to the hazard rate. Firms with good technology can make use
of their information advantage, so that they need to reduce less emissions compared to
a case where the regulator had complete information about technologies. A regulator
that is interested in reaching the emission reduction at minimal costs for consumers
should therefore demand for equal virtual costs of rms. If instead marginal costs where
equated, expected costs would increase and with that consumers’ transfers.
The optimal target. I assume that the externality target is formulated before con-
sumers’ preferences are drawn. I also assume that any resource requirement, that the
regulator faces, has to be met by taxing consumers and abstracts from outside founding
options. The regulator has expectations about consumers preferences and denes the
optimal amount of emission reduction on basis of its expectation. The true position of
the benet function is, however, uncertain ex ante.
The regulator chooses a mechanism (qj, rj)mj=1 to maximize expected consumer sur-
plus subject to rms’ incentive compatibility (ICF ) and participation constraints (PCF ),
the quantity constraint (QU), and subject to the budget constraint (BC). The following
Proposition characterizes the solution to the problem.
Proposition 3.5. For any θ and any δ, the provision level Qˆ∗∗ that maximizesU , subject to
the constraints in (ICF ), (PCF ), (QU) and (BC) , has to satisfy the following rst order
condition
E
[
n∑
i=1
θi
]
b′
(
Qˆ∗∗
)
= E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj)) c
′
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ∗∗
))]
,
where c′(qj) =
∂c(qj(δ,Qˆ
∗∗)
∂qj(δ,Qˆ∗∗)
∂qj(δ,Qˆ
∗∗)
∂Qˆ
.
The rst order condition states that the sum of expected preferences times the marginal
benets of emission reduction needs to equal the sum of expected virtual costs when the
regulator uses a quantity mechanism to reduce emissions. As the regulator only xes
the quantity, there is still uncertainty about the realization of preferences and costs. For
a better comparison, the following Remark shows the rst order condition when the
regulator is interested in maximizing total surplus.9
Remark 3.3. For any θ and δ, the provision level Qˆ∗ that maximizes S(θ, δ, Qˆ), subject
to the constraints in (ICF ), (PCF ), (BC) and (QU), has to satisfy the following rst order
9See Chapter 2, for a proof.
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condition
E
[
n∑
i=1
θi
]
b′(Qˆ∗(δ, Qˆ∗)) = E
[
m∑
j=1
δjc
′(qj(δ, Qˆ∗))
]
,
where c′(qj) =
∂c(qj(δ,Qˆ
∗∗)
∂qj(δ,Qˆ∗∗)
∂qj(δ,Qˆ
∗∗)
∂Qˆ
.
As under the price mechanism that maximized total surplus, a modied Samuelson
rule holds. But now the sum of expected preferences times the marginal benets of
emission reduction needs to be equal to the expected marginal costs. Hence, under a
quantity mechanism marginal benets of emission reduction are certain, but marginal
costs and the realization of consumers’ preferences remain uncertain.
The amount Qˆ∗∗, that is implemented if consumer surplus is maximized, is lower than
Qˆ∗, the emission reduction under total surplus maximization because the sum of ex-
pected virtual costs in Proposition 3.5 exceeds the sum of expected marginal costs in
Remark 3.3. In contrast to the total surplus maximizing emission level, the consumer
surplus maximizing emission reduction Qˆ∗∗ fails to satisfy a Samuelson rule even in ex-
pectation. Under consumer surplus maximization rms’ information rents are no longer
part of the surplus measure and less emission reduction is optimal. As under the price
regulation, consumers prefer less emission reduction than the reduction that is opti-
mal from total surplus maximization. Thus, the consumer surplus maximizing quan-
tity mechanism only leads to ’third-best eciency’ as the consumer surplus maximizing
price mechanism above.
3.5 Prices versus qantities under asymmetric
information
With the results from the previous section, I can now compare the unconstrained mech-
anism with price and quantity mechanisms, when agents are privately informed about
their characteristics. First, I compare all mechanisms ex ante, that is before any un-
certainty is resolved and do comparative statics. Second, I compare price and quantity
mechanisms ex post, that is when all information is publicly known.
To establish functional forms, it provides helpful to introduce some further assump-
tions on the economy.
Assumption 3.1. There is one rm J = {1}. The cost parameter δ1 belongs to the binary
set ∆1 = {δL, δH}. The cost function is quadratic, c(q1) = 12q21 .
I denote by pL the probability of a low cost realization, pL := Prob{δ1 = δL} and
pH = 1− pL for a high cost realization, accordingly.
Assumption 3.2. There is one consumer I = {1}. The preference parameter θ1 belongs to
the binary set Θ1 = {θL, θH}. The benet function is assumed to be concave, b(Q) =
√
Q.
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I denote by fL the probability of a low preference realization, fL := Prob{θ1 = θL}
and fH = 1−fL for a high preference realization, accordingly. These assumptions help
to illustrate important aspects of the model. In the following, I skip the index 1, for ease
of notation.
Optimal mechanism. The given assumptions yield a model for externality regula-
tion that can be solved analytically. Using Proposition 3.2 and Remark 3.1, the follow-
ing Corollary derives optimal emission reduction levels when rst, consumer surplus is
maximized and second, total surplus is maximized, for a given state of the economy, or
equivalently, for given values of θ and δ. It also gives explicit formulas for the expected
consumer surplus and the expected total surplus.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. The regulator uses an uncon-
strained mechanism to regulate externalities.
i) If U is maximized, the optimal emission reduction, for a given state of the economy,
is given by
Q∗∗(θ, δ) =
(
1
2
θ
δ + h(δ)
) 2
3
.
If S is maximized, the optimal emission reduction, for a given state of the economy,
is given by
Q∗(θ, δ) =
(
1
2
θ
δ
) 2
3
.
ii) If U is maximized, the expected consumer surplus is
U(θ, δ) =
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
4
3
][
fLpL
(
(θL)4
δL + h(δL)
) 1
3
+ fHpL
(
(θH)4
δL + h(δL)
) 1
3
+ fLpH
(
(θL)4
δH + h(δH)
) 1
3
+ fHpH
(
(θH)4
δH + h(δH)
) 1
3
]
− pij .
iii) If S is maximized, the expected total surplus is
S(θ, δ) =
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
7
3
][
fLpL
(
(θL)4
δL
) 1
3
+ fHpL
(
(θH)4
δL
) 1
3
+ fLpH
(
(θL)4
δH
) 1
3
+ fHpH
(
(θH)4
δH
) 1
3
]
.
Part i) of Corollary 3.1 shows that for a given state of the economy, emission reduction
under total surplus maximization is higher than under consumer surplus maximization,
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whenever the hazard rate h(δ) is dierent from zero. Emissions are distorted down-
wards under consumer surplus maximization. When the regulator puts all weight on
the consumers in the surplus function, rms’ information rents are no longer part of the
surplus measure. The requirement that emission reduction needs to be obtained with
lowest transfers for consumers leads to losses in total surplus. The dierence between
S(θ, δ) and U(θ, δ) can hence be interpreted as eciency loss that occurs due to dis-
tributive considerations.
Price mechanism. The following Corollary derives the optimal subsidies for both
surplus measures. It also gives explicit formulas for expected consumer surplus and
expected total surplus.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Suppose further that the regu-
lator uses a price mechanism to regulate externalities.
i) The subsidy under consumer surplus maximization and total surplus maximization
are, respectively
s∗∗ =
(
1
4
(fLθL + fHθH)
) 2
3(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
3
, and s∗ =
(
1
2
(fLθL + fHθH)
) 2
3(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
3
.
ii) If U is maximized, then expected consumer surplus is
U(θ, δ, s∗∗) =
(
fLθL + fHθH
) [
pL
(
s∗∗
δL
) 1
2 + pH
(
s∗∗
δH
) 1
2
]
− s∗∗2
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
)
− pij .
iii) If S is maximized, the expected total surplus is
S(θ, δ, s∗) =
(
fLθL + fHθH
) [
pL
(
s∗
δL
) 1
2 + pH
(
s∗
δH
) 1
2
]
− 1
2
s∗2
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
)
.
Similar to the unconstrained mechanism in Corollary 3.1, if consumer surplus is maxi-
mized, less emissions are reduced than when total surplus is maximized because the paid
subsidy is lower under consumer surplus maximization. The monopsonistic power of the
mechanism designer leads to an increase of expected consumer surplus and a reduction
of expected rm prots. The imposition of the price constraint, makes the consumer
surplus maximizing price mechanism achieve ’third-best’ ecient results.
Quantitymechanism. Analogously, I derive functional forms for the quantity mech-
anism, using Proposition 3.5 and Remark 3.3.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Suppose further that the regu-
lator uses a quantity mechanism regulate externalities.
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i) The externality reduction under consumer surplus maximization and total surplus
maximization are, respectively
Qˆ∗∗ =
[
1
2
(fLθL + fHθH)
(
pL
δL+h(δL)
+ p
H
δH+h(δH)
)] 2
3
,
and
Qˆ∗ =
[
1
2
(fLθL + fHθH)
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
)] 2
3
.
ii) If U is maximized, the expected consumer surplus is
U(θ, δ, Qˆ∗∗) =(fLθL + fHθH)
(
Qˆ∗∗
) 1
2
− 1
2
(
pL(δL + h(δL)) + pH(δH + h(δH))
) (
Qˆ∗∗
)2
− pij .
iii) If S is maximized, the expected total surplus is
S(θ, δ, Qˆ∗) = (fLθL + fHθH)
(
Qˆ∗
) 1
2 − 1
2
(
pL(δL) + pH(δH)
) (
Qˆ∗
)2
.
As rms information rents are no longer part of the surplus measure and as these in-
formation rents render emission reduction costly for consumers, the emission reduction
under expected consumer surplus maximization is distorted downwards in comparison
to expected total surplus maximization. If a quantity constraint is introduced, the ex-
pected consumer surplus falls short compared to the expected consumer surplus that
can be generated under the unconstrained mechanism. The dierence between the ex-
pected consumer surplus under the second-best unconstrained mechanism U(θ, δ) and
the third-best quantity mechanismU(θ, δ, Qˆ∗∗) can hence be interpreted as the eciency
loss from imposing a quantity constraint.
3.5.1 Ex ante comparison
I now turn to the question, which mechanism leads to highest expected total surplus.
First, I derive comparative static properties of externality regulation under the three
mechanisms, before I clarify conditions under which the price mechanism is better than
the quantity mechanism, in the sense that it yields higher expected total surplus. This
comparison is in the spirit of Weitzman (1974). He compares price and quantity mecha-
nisms under uncertainty. Contrary to Weitzman, I assume that uncertainty stems from
private information, whereas he assumes that uncertainty is driven from incomplete
information.10 I analyze the eects of changing the technology parameter and the pref-
10For a comparison of price and quantity mechanisms under incomplete information, see Chapter 2.7.
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erence parameter, on the comparative advantage measure. Further, I clarify how the
analysis changes if expected consumer surplus is maximized, opposed to total surplus.
Total surplusmaximization. The following Proposition derives how the three mech-
anisms are aected by changes in expected preferences and costs for emission reduction.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold.
i) E [Q(θ, δ)] 6= E [Q(θ, δ, s∗)] = Qˆ∗ .
ii) S(θ, δ) > S(θ, δ, s∗) and S(θ, δ) > S(θ, δ, Qˆ∗) .
iii) An increase of fH has the following implications
∂S(θ, δ)
∂fH
> 0 ,
∂S(θ, δ, s∗)
∂fH
> 0 and
∂S(θ, δ, Qˆ∗)
∂fH
> 0 .
iv) An increase of pL has the following implications
∂S(θ, δ)
∂pL
> 0 ,
∂S(θ, δ, s∗)
∂pL
>< 0 and
∂S(θ, δ, Qˆ∗)
∂pL
>< 0 .
The Proposition has several implications that are worth to mention: First, the expected
total emission reduction under the price mechanism and the quantity mechanism are
equivalent. Since both mechanism account for consumer i’s expected preferences and
rm j’s costs ex ante, the expected reduction levels coincide. However, ex post, less
emissions are reduced under the price mechanism than under the quantity mechanism
if rm j has high costs (δ = δH ) and accordingly, more emissions are reduced when rm
j has low costs. The total reduction level does, however, not coincide with the expected
emission reduction under the unconstrained mechanism.11
Second, there is a measure for how severe the eciency loss is under the constrained
price and quantity mechanisms, compared to the unconstrained mechanism. I can eval-
uate the impact of price and quantity constraints by comparing the dierence between
expected total surplus under price and quantity mechanism with the expected surplus
under the unconstrained unconstrained mechanism.
Third, I can analyze how an increase of expected preferences and expected costs aects
the expected total surplus under the three mechanisms. If one focuses on an increase
of consumer’s expected preference, this leads to higher expected total surplus under
all three mechanisms. If a reduction in expected costs is considered (pL increases), the
11 Whenever
(
fL(θL)
2
3 + fH(θH)
2
3
)(
pL
(
1
δL
) 2
3 + pH
(
1
δH
) 2
3
)
> Qˆ∗ = E [Q(θ, δ, s∗)], the uncon-
strained mechanism leads to more emission reduction ex ante than the price and the quantity mecha-
nism.
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expected total surplus is aected dierently under the three mechanisms. Under the
unconstrained mechanism a decrease in expected costs leads to higher expected total
surplus. By contrast, if a quantity mechanism is used, expected total surplus is lower
when the cost parameters are uniformly distributed, compared to the case where the
probabilities are distributed unevenly between the two possible realization of the cost
parameter. If rm j has high costs, ex post, it needs to reduce more emissions than
the ecient amount. Contrary, if rm j has low costs, it reduces less than the ecient
amount. As costs of emission reduction are convex, this misspecication is more costly
when cost parameters are equally distributed than when they are distributed unequally.
The impact of an increase of pL on expected total surplus when a price mechanism is used
is as follows: If pL is increased, the expected amount of emission reduction is increased
and the expected costs of emission reduction are increased. If pL is marginally increased
from 0, then the second eect dominated the rst under some parameter constellations.
If pL is increased even further, the rst eect dominates the latter.
The following Figure depicts a numerical example for how a change in pL aects the
expected total surplus.
Figure 3.1: Expected total surplus under the three mechanisms
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The parameter choices are: θL = 5, θH = 15, fL = fH = 0.5, δL = 1 and δH = 10. The blue
linear curve is the expected surplus when the unconstrained mechanism is used, the red dotted
curve is the expected surplus when a price mechanism is used and the green dashed curve depicts
the expected surplus when a quantity mechanism is used.
Figure 3.1 shows that the unconstrained mechanism leads to higher expected total
surplus than the price and quantity mechanism, for all possible values of pL. When
pL = 0 or when pH = 1 − pL = 0 (so that there is certainty on rm j’s expected
total costs), the price mechanism and the quantity mechanism lead to the same expected
total surplus. As there is still uncertainty about consumer i’s preferences for emission
133
Chapter 3 Externality regulation and distributional concerns
reduction, price and quantity mechanisms lead to less expected total surplus than the
unconstrained mechanism. For the given numerical values, an inspection of Figure 3.1
reveals that under the given functional forms and the given numerical values, the price
mechanism leads to higher expected total surplus than the quantity mechanism.
I now turn to the question how the variance of the preference and cost variable aects
the expected surplus under the three mechanisms. The following Figures illustrate a
change in the variance for a numerical example.
Figure 3.2: Changing the variance of the
preference parameter
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Figure 3.3: Changing the variance of the
cost parameter
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Numerical examples: The parameter choices are fL = fH = pL = pH = 0.5. In Figure 3.2, on the
left, δL = 5 and δH = 15 and E[θ] = 10. In Figure 3.3, on the right, θL = 5, θH = 15 and E[δ] =
5.5. The blue solid curve is the expected total surplus function when the unconstrained mechanism
is used, the red dotted curve is the expected total surplus function when a price mechanism is used
and the green dashed curve depicts the expected total surplus function when a quantity mechanism
is used.
A change in the variance of preferences does not have an inuence on expected sur-
plus when either the price mechanism or the quantity mechanism is used by the regu-
lator, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The reason is that the preferences enter in such way
into the expected surplus function that only the expected value but not the variance
aects surplus (see Corollaries 3.2 iii) and 3.3 iii)). The expected surplus under the un-
constrained mechanism increases in the dierence of θH and θL, keeping the expected
preferences constant. The preference parameters enter the expected surplus function in
a convex way, so that the higher the variance of θ, the higher is the expected surplus.
Figure 3.3 illustrates that an increase in the variance of the cost parameter aects
price and quantity mechanisms in dierent ways. The higher the variance of the cost
parameter, the lower is the expected surplus under the quantity mechanism. As the
quantity level is xed, the emission reduction is very costly if rm j has high costs ex
post. Due to the convexity of the cost function this increase in costs is more severe than
the lower costs in case where rm j has low costs. The price mechanism allows for an
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adaption of the quantity, so that an increase in the variance does lead to an increase in
the expected total surplus.
Prices versus quantities. I now turn to the question whether the price mechanism or
the quantity mechanism leads to higher expected total surplus. I dene the dierence be-
tween expected total surplus between the price mechanism and the quantity mechanism
as
γS = S(θ, δ, s
∗)− S(θ, δ, Qˆ∗) .
Corollary 3.4. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Then γS > 0 if
4
pL ( 1δL ) 12 + pH ( 1δH ) 12(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
2
− 1
 > (1− (pLδL + pHδH)(pL
δL
+
pH
δH
))
.
Corollary 3.4 provides a condition for the price mechanism to lead to higher expected
total surplus than the quantity mechanism. As the price mechanism leads in expecta-
tion to the same emission reduction than the quantity mechanism, the ex ante benets
of emission reduction are equal; hence, consumer i’s preferences do not inuence the
comparative advantage measure γS . From Proposition 3.4 it is know that γS = 0 for
pL = 0 and for pL = 1. For the given functional forms of Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2,
the marginal benet curve is relatively at compared to the marginal cost curve. It is
therefore not surprising that the price mechanism leads to higher expected surplus than
the quantity mechanism, for all numerical values in Figure 3.1.
Consumer surplus maximization. I now turn to the question how the mechanism
respond to changes in parameters when consumer surplus is maximized.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. The regulator wants to max-
imize U .
i) E [Q∗∗(θ, δ)] 6= E [Q(θ, δ, s∗∗)] 6= Qˆ∗∗ .
ii) U(θ, δ)∗∗ > U(θ, δ, s∗∗) and U(θ, δ)∗∗ > U(θ, δ, Qˆ∗∗) .
iii) An increase of fH has the following implications
∂U(θ, δ)
∂fH
> 0 ,
∂U(θ, δ, s∗)
∂fH
> 0 and
∂U(θ, δ, Qˆ∗)
∂fH
> 0 .
iv) An increase of pL has the following implications
∂U(θ, δ)
∂pL
> 0 ,
∂U(θ, δ, s∗)
∂pL
>< 0 and
∂U(θ, δ, Qˆ∗)
∂pL
>< 0 .
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When expected consumer surplus is maximized, the emission reduction under the
quantity mechanism and the price mechanism do no longer coincide. When the mech-
anism designer uses a quantity mechanism, virtual costs of rms are equal. Contrary,
under a price mechanism, marginal costs are equal. When consumer surplus is maxi-
mized, both mechanisms account dierently for rms private information, so that the
expected emission reduction diers.
As in Proposition 3.6, the unconstrained mechanism is more ecient than the price
and the quantity mechanism. Further, an increase of fH leads to an increase of expected
consumer surplus under all three mechanisms. And again, an increase of pL leads to an
increase of expected consumer surplus under the unconstrained mechanism, whereas
under the price and quantity mechanism, this relation is not linear, as the following
Figure illustrates.
Figure 3.4: Expected consumer surplus under the three mechanisms
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The parameter choices are: θL = 5, θH = 15, fL = fH = 0.5, δL = 1 and δH = 10. The
blue continuous curve is the expected surplus when the unconstrained mechanism is used, the red
dotted curve is the expected surplus when a price mechanism is used and the green dashed curve
depicts the expected surplus when a quantity mechanism is used.
Prices versus quantities. I now turn to the question whether the price or the quantity
mechanism leads to higher expected consumer surplus. Similar to the case above, I dene
the dierence between expected consumer surplus between the price mechanism and the
quantity mechanism as
γU = U(θ, δ, s
∗∗)− U(θ, δ, Qˆ∗∗) .
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Corollary 3.5. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. γU > 0 if
1
4
1
3
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
) 1
3
pL ( 1δL ) 12 + pH ( 1δH ) 12(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
2
− 1
4
4
 >
(
pL
δL + h(δL)
+
pH
δH + h(δH)
) 1
3
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
7
3
(
pL(δL + h(δL)) + pH(δH + h(δH))
)(
pL
δL+h(δL)
+ p
H
δH+h(δH)
)−1
 .
The Corollary establishes under which parameter constellations the price mechanism
leads to higher expected consumer surplus than the quantity mechanism. The distri-
bution of rm j’s technology is decisive to evaluate whether the price or the quantity
mechanisms leads to higher expected consumer surplus because it aects not only the
expected reduction costs but also expected information rents under the quantity mech-
anism. If high information rents need to be paid when a quantity mechanism is used,
in comparison to subsidy payments, the price mechanism is likely to lead to higher ex-
pected consumer surplus than the quantity mechanism. The Corollary shows that when
there is certainty on the costs (pL = 0 or pL = 1), the comparative advantage is dierent
from zero (γU 6= 0).
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate the implications of a change in pL on the comparative
advantage measure when either expected consumer surplus is maximized or expected
total surplus is maximized. The numerical parameter values are identical for both cases.
Figure 3.5: Comparative advantage under
total surplus maximization
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Figure 3.6: Comparative advantage under
consumer surplus maximization
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The parameter choices are: θL = 5, θH = 15, δL = 1, δH = 10 and fL = fH = 0.5. The
gures show that for the given functional forms and numerical values, the price mechanism leads
to higher expected total surplus than the quantity mechanism. Under expected consumer surplus
maximization, however, the quantity mechanism is better if the probability on the low cost rm is
low.
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When expected total surplus is maximized, the price mechanism is better than the
quantity mechanism. This unambiguousness vanishes if instead expected consumer sur-
plus is maximized. Here, for low values of pL, the quantity mechanism leads to higher
expected consumer surplus than the price mechanism. Hence, if more weight is put on
consumer surplus, having certainty on the amount of emission reduction becomes more
important and the price mechanism leads to higher surplus for less situations.
3.5.2 Ex post comparison
Price and quantity mechanisms not only dier under the employed surplus measure but
also whether the comparison takes place ex ante or ex post. I denote in the following
the ex post realization of consumer i’s preference parameter with θˆ, and the ex post
realization of rm j’s cost parameter with δˆ.
Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Under the price mechanism, ex post total
surplus is
s(θˆ, δˆ, s∗) = θˆ
(
s∗
δˆ
) 1
2
− 1
2
s∗2
δˆ
.
Under the quantity mechanism, ex post total surplus is
s(θˆ, δˆ, Qˆ∗) = θˆ(Qˆ∗)
1
2 − 1
2
(
δˆ
)
(Qˆ∗)2 .
I dene the ex post dierence in total surplus as γPS , so that
γPS = s(θˆ, δˆ, s
∗)− s(θˆ, δˆ, Q∗) .
Whenever γPS is positive, the price mechanism leads to higher total surplus than the
quantity mechanism.
Example: Suppose that θL = 5, θH = 12, δL = 1 and δH = 3. Also assume that
fL = fH = pL = pH = 0.5 . For these numerical values, the unconstrained quantity
mechanism xes an emission level Qˆ∗ = 2.00 , the unconstrained price mechanism xes
a subsidy s∗ = 3.00 . When the price mechanism is used, total surplus is given by
s(θL, δL, s∗) = 4.15, s(θH , δL, s∗) = 16.29, s(θL, δH , s∗) = 3.49, s(θH , δH , s∗) = 10.50 .
When the regulator uses the quantity mechanism, total surplus is given by
s(θL, δL, Qˆ∗) = 5.07, s(θH , δL, Qˆ∗) = 14.98, s(θL, δH , Qˆ∗) = 1.06, s(θH , δH , Qˆ∗) = 10.97 .
This leads to a comparative advantage of
γPS (θ
L, δL) = −0.92, γPS (θH , δL) = 1.31, γPS (θL, δH) = 2.43, γPS (θH , δH) = −0.47 .
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Ex ante, the price mechanism leads to higher expected total surplus than the quantity
mechanism.12 Nevertheless, ex post, the quantity mechanism can lead to higher total
surplus than the price mechanism. An inspection of these numbers reveals that there
are two states of the economy, (θL, δL) and (θH , δH), where the quantity mechanism
leads to higher total surplus than the price mechanism, for pL = 0.5 . For the two other
states, (θH , δL) and (θH , δH), the price mechanism leads to higher total surplus.
The comparative advantage is, among other things, driven by the distribution of rm
j’s cost parameter. The following Figure illustrates the impact of a change in the distri-
bution of costs on the comparative advantage measure. I focus on a change in pL because
this change inuences price and quantity mechanisms in dierent ways. In particular, it
demonstrates that the comparative advantage measure, for the four states, is dierently
aected by a change of the technology distribution. Based on the numerical values, for
all values of pL, there is at least one state of the economy where the quantity mechanism
leads to higher ex post surplus, although the price mechanism leads to higher expected
surplus ex ante.
Figure 3.7: Comparative advantage – ex post
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The parameter choices are as in the Example above. The black decreasing curve, is the comparative
advantage function for the state where the consumer has a high valuation for emission reduction
and the rm has low costs, γPS (θH , δL). The blue dotted curve is the comparative advantage mea-
sure for the state γPS (θL, δL), and γPS (θL, δH) is represented by the red dashed function. The green
dashed-dotted function represents γPS (θH , δH).
12γS =
1
4
(
γPS (θ
L, δL) + γPS (θ
L, δH) + γPS (θ
H , δL) + γPS (θ
H , δH)
)
> 0.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has provided a way to deal with asymmetric information in models of ex-
ternality regulation, in which the restriction to price and quantity mechanisms makes it
impossible to reach ecient outcomes. Looking at the case of emission reduction where
rms have private information about their technology, conditions have been shown to
see whether the price or the quantity mechanism leads to higher eciency. Dierent
surplus notions have been compared. The analysis has established a link between the
surplus measure and the level of emission reduction. An interesting insight of this anal-
ysis was that the regulator should reduce less emissions if consumer surplus had been
maximized, compared to the case where total surplus maximization was the regulator’s
target. I have argued that this result is independent from the mechanism being used.
I have demonstrated that distributive considerations have a great signicance for the
regulator’s choice between price and quantity mechanisms. This observation suggests
that when regulatory agencies decide on externality regulation, they rst need to ad-
dress, which distributive goals they want to achieve, before comparing both mechanisms
with respect to eciency.
The analysis has abstracted from the origin of the externality and assumed that only
rms respond to regulation. Another important extension of my research would study
a rm sector that not only reduces externalities but also engages in a prot maximiz-
ing activity. This would require a good understanding of how dierent sectors can deal
with higher environmental standards. Further, the model could be extended so that con-
sumers can as well reduce externalities. This considerations are of obvious importance.
However, I think that my framework is suited to combine the independent private values
model of mechanism design with externality regulation by means of price and quantity
mechanisms.
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Appendix 3.A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
The regulator needs to maximize the consumer surplus subject to the condition that
consumers transfers need to cover the resource requirement.
max E
[
n∑
i=1
(θib (Q(θ, δ))− ti(θ, δ))
]
,
subject to a budget constraint
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
≥ R(θ, δ) .
The budget constraint is fullled with equality, as otherwise the aggregated expected
consumer surplus could be increased by reducing consumers’ transfers, without violat-
ing the constraint. Using the result of Proposition 3.1, the regulator’s objective function
can be written as
max E
[
n∑
i=1
(θib
(
m∑
j=1
qj(θ, δ)
)]
−
m∑
j=1
pij − E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h (δj)) c (qj(θ, δ))
]
.
If the surplus function is maximized with respect to qj(θ, δ), this yields the following
rst order condition, for all rms j = {1, ...,m}
n∑
i=1
θib
′
(
m∑
j=1
q∗∗j (θ, δ)
)
= (δj + h(δj)) c
′ (q∗∗j (θ, δ)) .
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
The regulator needs to maximize the consumer surplus subject to the condition that total
costs need to be covered .
max E
[
n∑
i=1
(θib (Q(θ, δ, s))− ti(θ, δ, s))
]
,
subject to a budget constraint
E
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ, s)
]
≥ R(θ, δ, s) .
141
Chapter 3 Externality regulation and distributional concerns
The budget condition needs to hold with equality, as otherwise the aggregated expected
consumer surplus could be maximized by reducing the consumers’ transfers without
violating the constraint. The surplus function can therefore be simplied such that
max E
[
n∑
i=1
θib(Q(θ, δ, s))− sQ(θ, δ, s)
]
−
m∑
j=1
pij .
If the surplus function is maximized with respect to s, the following rst order condition
needs to hold
E
[
n∑
i=1
θib
′ (Q(θ, δ, s∗∗))
∂Q(θ, δ, s∗∗)
∂s
∗∗]
= E[Q(θ, δ, s∗∗)] + s∗∗E
[
∂Q(θ, δ, s∗∗)
∂s∗∗
]
.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
ii) Suppose there is some exogenously given amountR(δ, Qˆ) coming from the regulator
in order to nance the externality reduction, R(δ, Qˆ) ≥ E
[∑m
j=1 rj(δ, Qˆ)
]
.
The objective is to choose qj : δ × Qˆ 7→ qj(δ, Qˆ) and rj : δ × Qˆ 7→ rj(δ, Qˆ) so as to
minimize
min E
[
m∑
j=1
rj(δ, Qˆ)
]
=
r∑
l=1
plRj(δ
l) ,
subject to the constraints (ICF ), (PCF ) and (QU).
I work with interim participation constraints; these depend on the parameter pij . I will
argue later that this model is exible enough to cover the case of ex ante participation
constraints, which will be satised if the parameter pij takes appropriate values.
Step 1: I treat the provision rule (qj)j∈J as exogenously given and solve the cost mini-
mizing transfer scheme that implements this provision rule.
By Proposition 3.1, I can derive
R(δ, Qˆ) =
r∑
l=1
plRj(δ
l)
=
m∑
j=1
pij + E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj)) c
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ∗∗
))]
.
Step 2: To complete the proof, I need to show that the solution to the cost minimizing
problem in Step 1 satises all the participation constraints in (PCF ) and all locally-
downward binding incentive compatibility conditions.
Suppose that emission reduction is such that the following monotonicity constraint
holds: for all l, Cj(δl) ≥ Cj(δl+1). I show that under this assumption there is a mecha-
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nism such that R(δ, Qˆ) = E
[∑m
j=1(δj + h(δj))cj
(
qj(δ, Qˆ
∗∗)
)]
+
∑m
j=1 pij , satises all
the participation constraints in (PCF ) and all incentive compatibility conditions.
With the help of Lemma 1.11 in Chapter 1, I nd that if the rms’ participation con-
straints holds for δ = δr, then it holds for all δ 6= δr.
Justication of interim participation constraints.
To justify interim participation constraints, I want to state the following on the ex ante
participation constraint: Under the cost-minimizing mechanism the expected interim
payo of a lowest technology rm equals pi and the expected interim payos of rms
with better technology equal (due to the binding incentive compatibility constraint)
Rj(δ
l)− δlCj(δl) = pij +
P (δl)
p(δl)
Cj(δ
l) .
Ex ante expected payos are
m∑
j=1
pij +
r∑
l=2
P (δl)Cj(δ
j) =
m∑
j=1
pij + E
[
m∑
j=1
h (δj) c
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))]
.
Ex ante participation constraints are satised if
m∑
j=1
pij + E
[
m∑
j=1
h(δj)c
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))]
≥ pij ,
where pij is the minimal ex ante payo. This constraint ensures that the provision of the
emission reduction by the rms leads to an Pareto-improvement if considered behind a
’veil of ignorance’ where rms can form an expectation about how costly the provision
will be, but they are not yet fully informed about their technologies.
iii) As I have shown, the resource requirement of the regulator is
R(δ, Qˆ) =
m∑
j=1
pij + E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj)) c
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))]
,
whereas the costs that the production sector face are equal to
K(δ, Qˆ) = E
[
m∑
j=1
δjc
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))]
.
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The dierence is the production sectors’ expected payos
Π(δ, Qˆ) = R(δ, Qˆ)−K(δ, Qˆ) =
m∑
j=1
pij + E
[
m∑
j=1
h(δj)c
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))]
.
i) It remains to be shown that marginal virtual costs are equalized. The regulator needs
to decide how much of the emission reduction is done by rms that dier in their tech-
nology. Therefore, the mechanism designer needs to look at rm j’s virtual marginal
costs. The intersection of the virtual marginal transfer curve for rm j with technology
δl with the expected marginal benet curve
(
E[MB(Q)]
)
of total emission reduction
leads to amount qj(δl) rm j needs to reduce. The emission reduction qj(δl) needs to
satisfy the following condition, for all l
E [MB(Q)] = E
[
(δl + h(δl))
∂c(qj(δ, Qˆ))
∂qj(δ, Qˆ))
∂qj(δ, Qˆ))
∂Qˆ
]
.
For ease of notation, I write: c′(qj(δ, Qˆ)) := ∂c(qj(δ,Qˆ))∂qj(δ,Qˆ)
∂qj(δ,Qˆ)
∂Qˆ
.
When the regulator decides on the emission reduction of each rm, the marginal benet
curve stays xed and hence, the virtual marginal cost curves all face the same marginal
benet curve. Therefore, virtual marginal costs need to be equalized, for all δ, and for
all rms j and all j′
(δj + h(δj)) c
′
(
qj
(
δ, Qˆ
))
= (δj′ + h(δj′)) c
′
(
qj′
(
δ, Qˆ
))
.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
As consumers’ transfers are used to pay rms’ transfers, the surplus maximization prob-
lem can be stated as follows
Choose a provision rule Q(δQˆ) =
∑m
j=1 qj(δ, Qˆ) in order to maximize
U(θ, δ, Qˆ) = E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)]
b
(
m∑
j=1
qj(δ, Qˆ)
)
− E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c(qj(δ, Qˆ))
]
= E
[(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
b(Qˆ)
]
− E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c(qj(δ, Qˆ))
]
.
The solution to this problem is such that, for every (δ, Qˆ), the following rst order con-
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dition is satised
E
[
n∑
i=1
θi
]
b′(Qˆ∗∗) = E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))
∂c(qj(δ, Qˆ))
∂qj(δ, Qˆ)
m∑
j=1
∂qj(δ, Qˆ)
∂Qˆ∗∗(δ, Qˆ)
]
E
[
n∑
i=1
θi
]
b′(Qˆ∗∗(δ, Qˆ)) = E
[
m∑
j=1
(δj + h(δj))c
′(qj(δ, Qˆ))
]
.
The rst order condition implies that, for every θ, Qˆ∗∗(δk, Qˆ) ≥ Q∗∗(δl, Qˆ), for k 6= l.
This implies that the monotonicity constraint Cj(δl) ≥ Cj(δl+1), for all l, is satised.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
i) When subsidy s∗ is introduced, then every rm j reduces qj = s
∗
δj
. Making use of the
expression derived in Corollary 3.2 i), the expected amount of emission reduction under
the price mechanism is
E[Q(δ, s∗)] =
[
(fLθL + fHθH)
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
)] 2
3
= Qˆ∗ .
The expected emission reduction under the price and quantity mechanism coincide. To
derive the expected emission reduction under the unconstrained mechanism, the pos-
sible states of the economy need to be weighted. Using Corollary 3.1 i), the expected
emission reduction under the unconstrained mechanism is
E[Q(θ, δ)] = (1
2
)1/3(fL(θL)
2
3 + fH(θH)
2
3 )
(
pL
(
1
δL
) 2
3 + pH
(
1
δH
) 2
3
)
.
ii) The expected total surplus under the unconstrained mechanism is
S(θ, δ) =
[
1
2
1/3
− 1
2
7
3
]
(
fLpL
(
(θL)4
δL
) 1
3
+ fHpL
(
(θH)4
δL
) 1
3
+ fLpH
(
(θL)4
δH
) 1
3
+ fHpH
(
(θH)4
δH
) 1
3
)
.
The expected total surplus under the price mechanism is
S(θ, δ, s∗) =
[
1
2
1
3
pL( 1
δL
)
1
2 +pH( 1
δH
)
1
2(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
2
− 1
2
7
3
] (
fLθL + fHθH
) 4
3
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
3
.
The expressions in the rst brackets is bigger under the unconstrained mechanism than
under the price mechanism because p
L( 1
δL
)
1
2 +pH( 1
δH
)
1
2(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
2
< 1. Further, the expressions in
the latter brackets is bigger for the unconstrained mechanism than for the price mech-
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anism.
Under the quantity mechanism, the expected total surplus is
S(θ, δ, Qˆ∗) =
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
7
3
(pLδL + pHδH)
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)]
(fLθL + fHθH)
4
3
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
) 1
3
.
The expression in the rst bracket is bigger under the unconstrained mechanism than
under the quantity mechanism as (pLδL + pHδH)
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
)
> 1. Due to Jansen’s
inequality the expressions in the latter brackets is lower than under the unconstrained
mechanism, so that expected total surplus under the quantity mechanism is lower than
under the unconstrained mechanism.
iii)
∂S(θ, δ)
∂fH
= pL
((
(θH)4
(δL)
) 1
3
−
(
(θL)4
(δL)
) 1
3
)
+ pH
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(θH)4
(δH)
) 1
3
−
(
(θL)4
(δH)
) 1
3
)
> 0 .
∂S(θ, δ, s∗)
∂fH
=
1
2
1/3pL
(
1
δL
) 1
2 + pH
(
1
δH
) 1
2(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
2
− 1
2
7
3

(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
) 1
3 4
3
((1− fH)θL + fHθH) 13 (θH − θL) > 0 .
∂S(θ, δ, Qˆ∗)
∂fH
=
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
7
3
(pLδL + pHδH)
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)]
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
) 1
3 4
3
((1− fH)θL + fHθH) 13 (θH − θL) > 0 .
iv)
∂S(θ, δ)
∂pL
= fL
((
(θL)4
(δL)
) 1
3
−
(
(θL)4
(δH)
) 1
3
)
+ fH
((
(θH)4
(δL)
) 1
3
−
(
(θH)4
(δH)
) 1
3
)
> 0 .
Price and the quantity mechanism are not monotonically increasing in pL, see numerical
Example in Figure 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
i) When the subsidy s∗∗ is introduced, the expected emission reduction under a price
mechanism is s∗∗
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
)
. The emission reduction under the quantity mechanism is
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higher than under the price mechanism if[
1
2
(
pL
δL + h(δL)
+
pH
δH + h(δH)
)] 2
3
≥
[
1
4
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)] 2
3
pL
δL + h(δL)
+
pH
δH + h(δH)
≥ 1
2
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)
Using Corollary 3.1 i), the expected emission reduction under the unconstrained con-
sumer surplus maximizing mechanism is
E[Q(θ, δ)] = (1
2
)
1
3 (fL(θL)
2
3 + fH(θH)
2
3 )
(
pL
(
1
δL+h(δL)
) 2
3
+ pH
(
1
δH+h(δH)
) 2
3
)
.
ii) The expected consumer surplus under the unconstrained consumer surplus maximiz-
ing mechanism is
U(θ, δ) =
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
4
3
](
fLpL
(
(θL)4
δL + h(δL)
) 1
3
+ fHpL
(
(θH)4
δL + h(δL)
) 1
3
+ fLpH
(
(θL)4
δH + h(δH)
) 1
3
+ fHpH
(
(θH)4
δH + h(δH)
) 1
3
)
.
The expected consumer surplus under the price mechanism is
U(θ, δ, s∗∗) =
[
1
4
1
3
pL( 1
δL
)
1
2 +pH( 1
δH
)
1
2(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
2
− 1
4
4
3
] (
fLθL + fHθH
)4/3 (pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
3
.
The expressions in the rst brackets is bigger under the unconstrained mechanism than
under the price mechanism because 1
4
1
3
pL( 1
δL
)
1
2 +pH( 1
δH
)
1
2(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
2
− 1
4
4
3 < 1. Further, the expres-
sions in the latter brackets is bigger for the unconstrained mechanism than for the price
mechanism. The expected consumer surplus under the quantity mechanism is
U(θ, δ, Qˆ∗∗) = (fLθL + fHθH)
4
3
(
pL
δL + h(δL)
+
pH
δH + h(δH)
) 1
3
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
4
3 (
pL(δL + (h(δL))) + pH(δH + (h(δH)))
)( pL
δL + h(δL)
+
pH
δH + h(δH)
)]
.
The expression in the rst bracket is bigger under the unconstrained mechanism than
under the quantity mechanism as
(
pL
δL+h(δL)
+ p
H
δH+h(δH)
)
> 1. Due to Jansen’s inequality
the expressions in the latter brackets is lower than under the unconstrained mechanism,
so that expected total surplus under the quantity mechanism is lower than under the
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unconstrained mechanism.
iii) By Assumption 3.2, 1 − fH = fL. An increase of the expected valuation therefore
leads to an increase of expected consumer surplus under all three mechanisms.
iv)
∂U(θ, δ)
∂pL
=fL
((
(θL)4
(δL + h(δL))
) 1
3
−
(
(θL)4
(δH + h(δH))
) 1
3
)
+fH
((
(θH)4
(δL + h(δL))
) 1
3
−
(
(θH)4
(δH + h(δH))
) 1
3
)
> 0 .
Price and the quantity mechanism are not monotonically increasing in pL, see numer-
ical Example in Figure 3.4.
148
3.B Proofs of Corollaries
Appendix 3.B Proofs of Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 3.1
i) The optimal emission level under consumer surplus maximization needs to satisfy
the condition in Proposition 3.2. Using Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 gives the following
expression
Q∗∗(θ, δ) =
(
1
2
θ
δ + h(δ)
) 2
3
.
The optimal emission reduction under total surplus maximization needs to satisfy the
condition in Remark 3.1. Making use of Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, yields the following
expression
Q∗(θ, δ) =
(
1
2
θ
δ
) 2
3
.
ii) Using Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, together with the expressions derived in part i), lead
to the expected consumer surplus stated in the body of the text.
iii) Using Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, together with the expressions derived in part i), lead
to the expected total surplus stated in the body of the text.
Proof of Corollary 3.2.
i) The expected emission reduction is E[Q(δ, s)] = s
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
)
. In case of consumer
surplus maximization, emission reduction is given by(
1
2
(fLθL + fHθH)E[Q(δ, s∗∗)]−0.5 − s∗∗
)
∂E[Q(δ, s∗∗)]
∂s∗∗
= E[Q(δ, s∗∗)] .
Hence,
s∗∗ =
(
1
4
(fLθL + fHθH)
) 2
3(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
3
.
In case of total surplus maximization, emission reduction is given by
1
2
(fLθL + fHθH)E[Q(δ, s∗)]−0.5 = s∗ .
Hence,
s∗ =
(
1
2
(fLθL + fHθH)
) 2
3(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
3
.
149
Chapter 3 Externality regulation and distributional concerns
ii) The expected emission reduction is given by
E[Q(δ, s∗∗)] = s∗∗
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)
.
Expected consumer surplus is therefore
U(θ, δ, s∗∗) =
(
fLθL + fHθH
) [
pL
(
s∗∗
δL
) 1
2 + pH
(
s∗∗
δH
) 1
2
]
− s∗∗2
(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
)
− pij .
iii) Expected total emission reduction is
E[Q(δ, s∗)] =
(
1
2
(fLθL + fHθH)
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)) 2
3
.
Expected total surplus is given by
S(θ, δ) =
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
7
3
][
fLpL
(
(θL)4
δL
) 1
3
+ fHpL
(
(θH)4
δL
) 1
3
+ fLpH
(
(θL)4
δH
) 1
3
+ fHpH
(
(θH)4
δH
) 1
3
]
.
Proof of Corollary 3.3.
Expected consumer surplus is
U(θ, δ, Qˆ) =(fLθL + fHθH)Qˆ
1
2 − 1
2
pL(δL + h(δL))q(δL, Qˆ)2
− 1
2
pH(δH + h(δH))qH(δ, Qˆ)2 − pij .
Making use of the fact that expected virtual marginal costs need to be equal, this can be
expressed as
U(θ, δ, Qˆ) = (fLθL + fHθH)Qˆ
1
2 − 1
2
Qˆ2 − pij .
The rst order condition is
Qˆ∗∗ =
[
(fLθL + fHθH)
(
pL
δL + h(δL)
+
pH
δH + h(δH)
)] 2
3
.
Expected total surplus is
S(θ, δ, Qˆ) = (fLθL + fHθH)Qˆ
1
2 − 1
2
pLδLq(δL, Qˆ)2 − 1
2
pHδHq(δH , Qˆ)2 .
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Making use of the fact that expected marginal costs need to be equal, this can be ex-
pressed as
S(θ, δ, Qˆ) = (fLθL + fHθH)Qˆ
1
2 − 1
2
Qˆ2
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)
.
The rst order condition is
Qˆ∗ =
[
1
2
(fLθL + fHθH)
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)] 2
3
.
Proof of Corollary 3.4 If the subsidy s∗ that maximizes total surplus is plugged in
the expression in Corollary 3.2 iii), this yields
S(θ, δ, s∗) = (fLθL + fHθH)
4
3
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
) 1
3
1
2
1
3 pL
(
1
δL
) 1
2 + pH
(
1
δH
) 1
2(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
2
− 1
2
7
3
 .
If the subsidy Qˆ∗ that maximizes total surplus is plugged in the expression in Corollary
3.3 iii), this yields
S(θ, δ, Qˆ∗) = (fLθL + fHθH)
4
3
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
) 1
3
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
7
3
(pLδL + pHδH)
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
)]
.
Comparing these expressions and rearranging terms yield the expression for the com-
parative advantage measure when total surplus is maximized.
Proof of Corollary 3.5 If the subsidy s∗∗ that maximizes total surplus is plugged in
the expression in Corollary 3.2 ii), this yields
U(θ, δ, s∗∗) = (fLθL + fHθH)
4
3
1
4
1
3 pL
(
1
δL
) 1
2 + pH
(
1
δH
) 1
2(
pL
δL
+ p
H
δH
) 1
6
− 1
4
4
3
(
pL
δL
+
pH
δH
) 1
3
 .
If the subsidy Qˆ∗∗ that maximizes total surplus is plugged in the expression in Corollary
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3.3 ii) yields
U(θ, δ, Qˆ∗∗) = (fLθL + fHθH)
4
3
(
pL
δL + h(δL)
+
pH
δH + h(δH)
) 1
3
[
1
2
1
3 − 1
2
4
3
(pL(δL + h(δL)) + pH(δH + h(δH))
(
pL
δL + h(δL)
+
pH
δH + h(δH)
)]
.
Comparing these expressions and rearranging terms yield the expression for the com-
parative advantage measure when consumer surplus is maximized.
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4
Robust Mechanism Design
and Social Preferences
4.1 Introduction
Inspired by Wilson (1987), Bergemann and Morris (2005) have provided a formalization
of mechanisms that are robust in the sense that they do not rely on a common prior
distribution of material payos. We add another dimension in which we seek robust-
ness. A mechanism that works well under selsh preferences might fail under social
preferences. Indeed, behavioral economics has shown that many agents behave socially.
One challenge is, though, that social preferences can dier with respect to their nature
and intensity, leading to dierent kinds of social preference models, including altru-
ism, inequity-aversion, and intentionality (Cooper and Kagel, 2013). Because we want
a mechanism to work not only for selsh preferences but also for a large set of social
preferences, we introduce the notion of social-preference-robust mechanism: a mecha-
nism must not depend on specic assumptions about the nature and intensity of selsh
and social preferences. The following quote of Wilson (1987), which can also be found
in Bergemann and Morris (2005), suggests that our approach is a natural next step:
"Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences
of trading rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is decient
to the extent it assumes other features to be common knowledge, such as one
player’s probability assessment about another’s preferences or information
(Emphasis added). I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on suc-
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cessive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful
analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common knowl-
edge assumptions will the theory approximate reality."
While Bergemann and Morris (2005) have focused on common knowledge assumptions
regarding the information structure, we seek robustness with respect to common knowl-
edge assumptions on the content of preferences. To this end, we study two classic ap-
plications of mechanism design theory, the bilateral-trade problem due to Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) and a specic version of the optimal income tax problem due to Mir-
rlees (1971). We show, and provide complementary laboratory evidence, that solutions
to these problems, which are derived under the assumption of selsh preferences, are not
robust to the possibility that individuals are motivated by social preferences. We then
introduce the notion of a social-preference-robust mechanism, and derive mechanisms
that are optimal in this class. Finally, we use laboratory experiments to compare the
optimal mechanisms under selsh preferences and the optimal social-preference-robust
mechanisms.
The bilateral trade problem. The bilateral-trade problem provides us with a simple,
and stylized setup that facilitates a clear exposition of our approach. Moreover, it admits
interpretations that are of interest in public economics, environmental economics, or
contract theory. The basics are as follows: A buyer either has a high or low valuation
of a good produced by a seller. The seller either has a high or a low cost of producing
the good. An economic outcome species, for each possible combination of the buyer’s
valuation and the seller’s cost, the quantity to be exchanged, the price paid by the buyer
and the revenue received by the seller. Both the buyer and the seller have private infor-
mation. Thus, an allocation mechanism has to ensure that the buyer does not understate
his valuation so as to get a desired quantity at a lower price. Analogously, the seller has
to be incentivized so that she does not exaggerate her cost in order to receive a larger
compensation. This environment can be reinterpreted as a problem of voluntary public-
goods provision in which one party benets from larger provision levels, relative to some
status quo outcome, and the other party is harmed. By how much the rst party benets
and the second party loses is private information. The allocation problem then is to de-
termine the public-goods provision level and how the provision costs should be divided
between the two parties. It can also be reinterpreted as a problem to control externali-
ties. One party can invest so as to avoid emissions which harm the other party. The cost
of the investment to one party and the benet of reduced emissions to the other party
are private information. In a principal-agent-framework, we may think of one party as
beneting from eort that is exerted by the other party. The size of the benet and the
disutility of eort are, respectively, private information of the principal and the agent.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: We rst characterize an optimal direct mechanism
for the bilateral trade problem under the standard assumption of selsh preferences,
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i.e. both, the buyer and the seller, are assumed to maximize their own payo, respec-
tively, and this is common knowledge. We solve for the mechanism that maximizes the
seller’s expected prots subject to incentive constraints, participation constraints, and
a resource constraint. We work with ex post incentive and participation constraints, i.e.
we insist that after the outcome of the mechanism and the other party’s private infor-
mation have become known, no party regrets to have participated and to have revealed
its own information.
Our reason for imposing these constraints is twofold: First, as has been shown by
Bergemann and Morris (2005), they imply that a mechanism is robust in the sense that
its outcome does not depend on the individual’s probabilistic beliefs about the other
party’s private information. Second, we use the arguments in Bergemann and Morris
(2005) for our experimental testing strategy. In their characterization of robust mecha-
nisms complete information environments play a key role. In such an environment, the
buyer knows the seller’s cost and the seller knows the buyer’s valuation, and, more-
over, this is commonly known among them. The mechanism designer, however, lacks
this information and therefore still has to provide incentives for a revelation of privately
held information. Bergemann and Morris provide conditions so that the requirement of
robustness is equivalent to the requirement that a mechanism generates the intended
outcome in every complete information environment, which in turn is equivalent to the
requirement that incentive and participation constraints hold in an ex post sense.1
In our laboratory approach, we investigate the performance of an optimally designed
robust mechanism in all complete information environments. This approach is useful be-
cause it allows us to isolate the role of social preferences in a highly controlled setting,
which eliminates complications that are related to decision-making under uncertainty.
For instance, it is well-known that, even in one-person decision tasks, people often do
not maximize expected utility (see Camerer, 1995), and that moreover, in social contexts,
social and risk preferences may interact in non-trivial ways (see, e.g., Bolton and Ock-
enfels, 2010, and the references therein). The complete information environments in our
study avoid such complicating factors.2
The robust mechanism which maximizes the seller’s expected prots under selsh
preferences has the following properties: (i) The trading surplus is allocated in an asym-
1Throughout we focus on social choice functions, as opposed to social choice correspondences. Conse-
quently, by Corollary 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2005), ex post implementability is both necessary
and sucient for robust implementability. Moreover, if agents are selsh, then our environment gives
rise to private values so that incentive compatibility in an ex post sense is equivalent to the require-
ment that truth-telling is a dominant strategy under a direct mechanism for the given social choice
function.
2Thus, for our experimental testing strategy, we take for granted the equivalence between imple-
mentability in all complete information environments and implementability in all incomplete infor-
mation environments. We explicitly investigate the former and draw conclusions for the latter. We
also take for granted the validity of the revelation principle. That is, we only check whether individ-
uals behave truthfully under a direct mechanism for a given social choice function. We discuss the
advantages and limits of this approach in our concluding section.
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metric way, i.e. the seller gets a larger fraction than the buyer; (ii) Whenever the buyer’s
valuation is low, his participation constraint binds, so that he does not realize any gains
from trade; (iii) Whenever the buyer’s valuation is high, his incentive constraint binds,
so that he is indierent between revealing his valuation and understating it. Experimen-
tally, we nd that under this mechanism, a non-negligible fraction of high valuation
buyers understates their valuation. In all other situations, deviations — if they occur at
all — are signicantly less frequent.
We argue that this pattern is consistent with models of social preferences such as Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006), among others. The basic idea is the
following. A buyer with a high valuation can understate his valuation at a very small
personal cost since the relevant incentive constraint binds. The benet of this strategy
is that this reduces the seller’s payo and therefore brings the seller’s payo closer to
his own, thereby reducing inequality. In fact, as we will demonstrate later, many social
preference models would predict this behavior.
We then introduce a class of direct mechanisms that “work” if the possibility of social
preferences is acknowledged. Specically, we introduce the notion of a direct mechanism
that is externality-free. Under such a mechanism, the buyer’s equilibrium payo does
not depend on the seller’s type and vice versa; i.e. if, say, the buyer reveals his valuation,
his payo no longer depends on whether the seller communicates a high or a low cost
to the mechanism designer. Hence, the seller cannot inuence the buyer’s payo.
Almost all widely-used models of social preferences satisfy a property of selshness in
the absence of externalities, i.e. if a player considers a choice between two actions a and
b, and moreover, if the monetary payos of everybody else are unaected by this choice,
then the player will choose a over b if her own payo under a is higher than her own
payo under b. Now, suppose that a direct mechanism is ex post incentive-compatible
and externality-free. Then truth-telling will be an equilibrium for any social preference
model in which individuals are selsh in the absence of externalities.
We impose externality-freeness as an additional constraint on our problem of robust
mechanism design, i.e. we have to design the mechanism so that it has the following
property: Suppose that the traded quantity goes up because we move from a state of
the world in which the seller’s cost is high to a state in which the seller’s cost is low.
Then, there has to be an accompanying change in the price the buyer has to pay. This
change needs to be calibrated in such a way that the buyer’s trading surplus remains
unaected. We then characterize the optimal robust and externality-free mechanism and
investigate its performance in an experiment. We nd that there are no longer deviations
from truth-telling. We interpret this nding as providing evidence for the relevance of
social preferences in mechanism design: If there are externalities a signicant fraction of
individuals deviates from truth-telling. If those externalities are shut down, individuals
behave truthfully.
Externality-freeness is an additional constraint. While it makes sure that individu-
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als behave in a predictable way it reduces expected prots relative to the theoretical
benchmark of a model with selsh preferences. This raises the question whether the
seller makes more money if she uses an externality-free mechanism. We answer this
both theoretically and empirically: The externality-free mechanism makes more money
if the number of individuals whose behavior is motivated by social preferences exceeds
a threshold. In our laboratory context, this number was below the threshold, so that the
“conventional” mechanism made more money than the externality-free mechanism.
Based on these observations, we nally engineer a mechanism that satises the prop-
erty of externality-freeness only locally. Specically, we impose externality-freeness for
those action-proles where deviations from selsh behavior were frequently observed
in our experiment data. We show theoretically that local externality-freeness is a con-
straint that can be satised without having to sacrice performance: If all agents are
selsh then there is an optimal mechanism that is locally externality-free. In our ex-
periment data, however, an optimal mechanism that is locally externality-free performs
signicantly better than an optimal mechanism that is not externality-free. Hence, if one
knows precisely which deviations from selsh behavior are tempting, one can design a
mechanism that performs strictly better than both the optimal mechanism for selsh
agents and the optimal globally externality-free mechanism.
Redistributive Income Taxation. The bilateral trade setup is one in which external-
ities are at the center of the allocation problem. Therefore, the requirement of externality
-freeness may appear demanding. In settings dierent from the bilateral trade problem,
externality-freeness may arise naturally. E.g., price-taking behavior in markets with
a large number of participants gives rise to externality-freeness. If a single individual
changes her demand, this leaves prices unaected and so remain the options available
to all other agents.3 Another setting in which externality-freeness may appear natural is
the design of tax systems. Here, ex- ternality-freeness requires that income taxes paid by
one individual depend only on this individual’s income, and not on the income earned
by other individuals. Thus, when formalizing the modern approach to optimal income
taxation, Mirrlees (1971) and his followers have looked exclusively at externality-free
allocations.
However, as has been shown by Piketty (1993), for an economy with nitely many
individuals and a commonly known cross-section distribution of types, an optimal Mir-
rleesian income tax system can be outperformed by one that is not externality-free.
Specically, Piketty shows that rst-best utilitarian redistribution from high-skilled in-
dividuals to low-skilled individuals can be reached, while this is impossible with a Mir-
rleesian approach. A crucial feature of Piketty’s approach is that types are assumed to
be correlated in a particular way. For instance, if there are two individuals and it is com-
monly known that one of them is high-skilled and one is low-skilled, then the individu-
3Market behavior is therefore unaected by social preferences, see Dufwenberg et al. (2011).
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als’ types are perfectly negatively correlated: If person 1 is of high ability, then person 2
is of low ability and vice versa. Piketty’s construction of a mechanism that reaches the
rst-best utilitarian outcome heavily exploits this feature of the environment.4
Piketty’s analysis resembles the possibility results by Crèmer and McLean (1985, 1988)
in auction theory. Crèmer and McLean have shown that, with correlated values and
selsh agents, there exist Bayes-Nash equilibria that achieve rst-best outcomes. These
ndings have then be generalized to other types of allocation problems, see e.g., Kosenok
and Severinov (2008). Importantly, the mechanisms that achieve rst-best outcomes in
the presence of correlated types give rise to payo interdependencies or externalities
among the players. Therefore, they raise the question whether social preferences might
interfere with the possibility to achieve rst-best outcomes. Piketty’s treatment of the
income tax problem is an example that allows us to get at this more general question in
a particular context.
We run an experiment and show that Piketty’s mechanism indeed provokes deviations
from the intended behavior, and again, we argue that these deviations can be explained
by models of social preferences. We then compare Piketty’s mechanism to an optimal
Mirrleesian mechanism. The latter is externality-free and we nd that it successfully
controls behavior; there are no longer signicant deviations from truth-telling. We also
nd that the level of welfare that is generated by the Mirrleesian mechanism is sig-
nicantly larger than the level of welfare generated by Piketty’s mechanism. This last
observation makes an interesting dierence to our ndings for the bilateral trade prob-
lem. Remember that, for the bilateral problem, imposing externality-freeness helped to
control behavior, while the optimal mechanism for selsh agents still outperformed the
optimal externality-free mechanism because, in our experiment data, the deviations from
selsh behavior were not frequent enough. With the income tax problem, by contrast,
imposing externality-freeness is also good for the performance of the mechanism.
Outlook. The next section discusses related literature. Section 4.3 describes the eco-
nomic environment. Section 4.4 contains a detailed description of the bilateral trade
problem that we study. In addition, we elaborate on why models of social preferences
are consistent with the observation that individuals deviate from truth-telling under a
mechanism that would be optimal if all individuals were selsh, and with the observa-
tion that they do not deviate under a mechanism that is externality-free. Section 4.5
describes our laboratory ndings for the bilateral trade problem, and in Section 4.6, we
clarify the conditions under which an optimal externality-free mechanism outperforms
an optimal mechanism for selsh agents and relate them to our experiment data. Section
4.7 looks at an engineering approach that does impose externality-freeness only locally.
Section 4.8 contains our analysis of the income tax problem. The last section concludes.
4If individual types are the realizations of independent random variables, then the optimal mechanism
is externality-free, see Bierbrauer, 2011b.
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4.2 Related literature
Our work is related to dierent strands of the literature. The main part of our analysis
builds on the model of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). They establish an impossibility
result for ecient trade in a setting with two privately informed parties.5 We embed this
problem into a model of robust mechanism design, see Bergemann and Morris (2005).
Other contributions to the literature on robust mechanism design include Ledyard (1978),
Gershkov et al. (2013) and Börgers (2015).
We also consider a problem of income taxation. The classical reference is Mirrlees
(1971). We relate the Mirrleesian treatment to an alternative one that has been proposed
by Piketty (1993). The mechanism design approach to the problem of optimal income
taxation is also discussed in Hammond (1979), Stiglitz (1982), Dierker and Haller (1990),
Guesnerie (1995), and Bierbrauer (2011b).
There is a large experimental economics literature testing mechanisms. Most labo-
ratory studies deal with mechanisms to overcome free-riding in public goods environ-
ments (Chen, 2008), auction design (e.g., Ariely, Ockenfels, and Roth, 2005, Kagel, Lien,
and Milgrom, 2010), and the eectiveness of various matching markets (e.g., Kagel and
Roth, 2000, Chen and Sönmez, 2006). Roth (2012) provides a survey. Some studies take
into account social preferences when engineering mechanisms. For instance, it has been
shown that feedback about others’ behavior or outcomes, which would be irrelevant if
agents were selsh, can strongly aect social comparison processes and reciprocal in-
teraction, and thus the eectiveness of mechanisms to promote eciency and resolve
conicts (e.g., Chen et al., 2010, Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels, 2013, Ockenfels, Sliwka,
and Werner, 2014; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2012 provide a survey). Social preferences are
also important in bilateral bargaining with complete information, most notably in ul-
timatum bargaining (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982; Güth and Kocher, 2014
provide a survey). In fact, this literature has been a starting point for various social
preference models that we are considering in this chapter — yet the observed patterns
of behavior have generally not been related to the mechanism design literature. This
is dierent with laboratory studies of bilateral trade with incomplete information, such
as Radner and Schotter (1989), Valley et al. (2002) and Kittsteiner, Ockenfels, and Trhal
(2012). One major nding in this literature is, for instance, that cheap talk communica-
tion among bargainers can signicantly improve eciency. These ndings are generally
not related to social preference models, though.
There is a large literature on mechanism design with interdependent valuations, see
e.g. the survey in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006). In principle, models of outcomes-based
social preferences such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) can
be viewed as specic models with interdependent valuations.6 By contrast, models with
5Related impossibility results hold for problems of public-goods provision, see Güth and Hellwig, 1986
and Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990.
6When it comes to frequently used functional forms there is a dierence though. The literature in mech-
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intentions-based social preferences such as Rabin (1993) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006)
cannot be viewed as models with interdependent valuations. In these models, prefer-
ences are menu-dependent, see Sobel (2005) for a discussion. Such a menu dependence
does not arise in the literature on mechanism design with interdependent valuations.
Thus, there are both similarities and important dierences between these literatures.
Our approach ensures that the social choice functions can be implemented irrespectively
of the nature and the intensity of the individual’s social preferences. It is not meant to
take account of all the allocative and informational externalities that have been the focus
of the literature on mechanism design with interdependent valuations.
Our study contributes to the literature by linking prominent models of social prefer-
ences with the mechanism design literature mentioned above. Bierbrauer and Netzer
(2012) explore the implications of a specic model of social preferences, namely the one
by Rabin (1993), for a Bayesian mechanism design problem — as opposed to a problem of
robust mechanism design. They show that, to any mechanism that is incentive compat-
ible, one can construct an “essentially” equivalent version which is externality-free and
therefore should generate the intended behavior even if individuals have social prefer-
ences. Bartling and Netzer (2014) use this observation to construct an externality-free
version of the second-price auction. They show experimentally that there is signi-
cant overbidding in a standard second-price auction. Overbidding disappears with the
externality-free version. The work of Bartling and Netzer is related to this chapter in
that it also makes use of externality-freeness. There is, however, an important dier-
ence. Since we work with ex post — as opposed to Bayesian — incentive and participa-
tion constraints, the equivalence result in Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012) no longer holds,
i.e. externality-freeness becomes a substantive constraint. A contribution of this chap-
ter is the characterization of a mechanism that is optimal in the set of those which are
externality-free and ex post incentive-compatible.
4.3 The bilateral trade problem
There are two agents, referred to as the buyer and the seller. An economic outcome is
a triple (q, ps, pb), where q ∈ R+ is the quantity that is traded, pb ∈ R is a payment
made by the buyer, and ps ∈ R is a payment received by the seller. Monetary payos are
pib = θbq−pb, for the buyer and pis = −θsk(q)+ps, for the seller where k is an increasing
and convex cost function. The buyer’s valuation θb either takes a high or a low value,
θb ∈ Θb = {θb, θ¯b}. Similarly, the seller’s cost parameter θs can take a high or a low
value so that θs ∈ Θs = {θs, θ¯s}. A pair (θb, θs) ∈ Θb × Θs is referred to as a state of
anism design often focuses on preferences that are quasi-linear in money and models interdependence
as arising solely through the valuations of the allocated objects. Consequently, the individuals’ mon-
etary payments do not give rise to an interdependence. By contrast, the literature on outcomes-based
social preferences focuses on inequity concerns that take account of the individuals’ monetary pay-
ments.
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the economy. A social choice function or direct mechanism f : Θb×Θs → R+×R×R
species an economic outcome for each state of the economy. Occasionally, we write
f = (qf , pfb , p
f
s ) to distinguish the dierent components of f .7
We denote by
pib(θb, f(θ
′
b, θ
′
s)) := θbq
f (θ′b, θ
′
s)− pfb (θ′b, θ′s)
the payo that is realized by a buyer with type θb if he announces a type θ′b and the
seller announces a type θ′s under direct mechanism f . The expression pis(θs, f(θ′b, θ′s)) is
dened analogously.
We assume that the buyer has private information on whether his valuation θb is high
or low. Analogously, the seller privately observes whether θs takes a high or a low value.
Hence, a direct mechanism induces a game of incomplete information. Our analysis in
the following focuses on a very specic and articial class of incomplete information
environments, namely the ones in which the types are commonly known among the
players but unknown to the mechanism designer. In total there are four such complete
information environments, one for each state of the economy.8 It has been shown by
Bergemann and Morris (2005) that the implementability of a social choice function in
all such complete information environments is not only necessary but also sucient for
the robust implementability of a social choice function, i.e. for its implementability in all
conceivable incomplete information environments. Thus, our focus on complete infor-
mation environments is not only useful to cleanly isolate the eect of social preferences,
but also justied by the robustness criterion.
Suppose that individuals are only interested in their own payo. Then truth-telling is
an equilibrium in all complete information environments if and only if the following ex
post incentive compatibility constraints are satised: For all (θb, θs) ∈ Θb ×Θs,
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) ≥ pib(θb, f(θ′b, θs)) for all θ′b ∈ Θb , (4.1)
and
pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) ≥ pis(θs, f(θb, θ′s)) for all θ′s ∈ Θs . (4.2)
Moreover, individuals prefer to play the mechanism over a status quo outcome with no
trade if and only if the following ex post participation constraints are satised: For all
(θb, θs) ∈ Θb ×Θs,
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) ≥ p¯ib and pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) ≥ p¯is , (4.3)
7Our setting diers from the one originally studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in that we have
a convex cost function for the seller and allow for quantities in R. In the original paper, the seller’s
cost function is linear and quantities are in [0, 1].
8“Complete information” refers to a situation in which the players’ monetary payos are commonly
known. Information may still be incomplete in other dimensions, e.g., regarding the weight of fairness
considerations in the other player’s utility function.
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where p¯ib and p¯is are, respectively, the buyer’s and the seller’s payos in the absence of
trade.
Throughout, we limit attention to direct mechanisms and to truth-telling equilibria.
For models with selsh individuals, or more generally, for models with outcome-based
preferences – which possibly include a concern for an equitable distribution of payos –
this is without loss of generality by the revelation principle. For models with intention-
based social preferences, such as Rabin (1993) or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004),
the revelation principle does not generally hold, see Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012) for a
proof. Still, it is a sucient condition for the implementability of a social choice function
that it can be implemented as the truth-telling equilibrium of a direct mechanism. We
focus on this sucient condition, and note that it is also necessary if preferences are
outcome-based.
Another property of interest to us is the externality-freeness of a social choice function
f . This property holds if, for all θb ∈ Θb,
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θ¯s)),
and if, for all θs ∈ Θs,
pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) = pis(θs, f(θ¯b, θs)).
If these properties hold, then the buyer, say, cannot inuence the seller’s payo, provided
that the latter tells the truth. I.e. the buyer’s report does not come with an externality
on the seller. As we will argue later in more detail, many models of social preferences
give rise to the prediction that externality-freeness in conjunction with ex post incentive
compatibility is a sucient condition for the implementability of a social choice function.
4.4 Mechanism design with and without social
preferences
This section contains theoretical results which relate mechanism design theory to mod-
els of social preferences. Throughout, we use the bilateral trade problem to illustrate
the conceptual questions that arise. We begin with the benchmark of optimal mecha-
nism design under the assumption that individuals are purely selsh. We then show
that many models of social preferences give rise to the prediction that such mechanisms
will not generate truthful behavior. However, while maximizing expected payos is a
well-dened goal, there are many ways to be socially motivated. In fact, one of the most
robust insights from behavioral economics and psychology is the large variance of social
behaviors across individuals (e.g., Camerer, 2003). As a result, there is now a plethora of
social preference models, and almost all models permit individual heterogeneity by al-
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lowing dierent parameter values for dierent individuals (e.g., Cooper and Kagel, 2013).
This poses a problem for mechanism design, because optimal mechanisms depend on the
nature of the agents’ preferences. Our approach to deal with this problem is neither to
just select one of those models, nor are we even attempting to identify the best model.
We will also not assume that idiosyncratic social preferences are commonly known. All
these approaches would violate the spirit of robust mechanism design and the Wilson
doctrine. Rather, we restrict our attention to a property of social preferences which is
shared by almost all widely-used social preference models and which is independent of
the exact parameter values: individuals are selsh if there is no possibility to aect the
payos of others. As we will show, this general property of social behavior is already
sucient to construct "externality-free" mechanisms which generate truthful behavior,
regardless of what is known about the specic type and parameters of the agents’ social
preferences.
Our approach may come at a cost. While we will be able to better control behavior
than when we assume selsh preferences, not knowing the exact details of preferences
may impair the protability of the mechanism. As we show in Section 4.6, for the bi-
lateral trade problem, the optimal robust and externality-free mechanism outperforms
the optimal robust mechanisms only if the probability of behavior that is motivated by
social concerns is suciently high.
4.4.1 Optimal mechanism design under selfish preferences
A mechanism designer wishes to come up with a mechanism for bilateral trade. Design
takes place at the ex ante stage, i.e. before the state of the economy is realized. The
designer acts in the interest of one of the parties, here the seller. The designer does not
know what information the buyer and the seller have about each other at the moment
where trade takes place. Hence, he seeks robustness with respect to the information
structure and employs ex post incentive and participation constraints. The designer as-
sumes that individuals are selsh so that these constraints are sucient to ensure that
individuals are willing to play the corresponding direct mechanism and to reveal their
types. Finally, he requires budget balance only in an average sense. (Possibly, the mecha-
nism is executed frequently, so that the designer expects to break even if budget balance
holds on average.) The exibility provided by the requirement of expected budget bal-
ance is important for some of the results that follow. With a requirement of ex post
budget balance there would be less scope for adjusting the traded quantities and the
corresponding payments to the privately held information of the buyer and the seller.9
9We do not wish to argue that the requirement of expected budget balance is, for practical purposes,
more relevant than the requirement of ex post budget balance. This will depend on the application.
The mechanisms that we study in this paper are primarily meant as diagnostic tools for the relevance
of social preferences in mechanism design. In this respect, the requirement of expected budget balance
proved useful.
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Formally, we assume that a social choice function f is chosen with the objective to
maximize expected seller prots,
∑
Θb×Θs g(θb, θs)pis(θ, f(θb, θs)) , where g is a proba-
bility mass function that gives the mechanism designer’s subjective beliefs on the likeli-
hood of the dierent states of the economy. The incentive and participation constraints
in (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) have to be respected. In addition, the following resource constraint
has to hold ∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
b (θb, θs) ≥
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
s (θb, θs) . (4.4)
To solve this full problem, we rst study a relaxed problem which leaves out the incen-
tive and participation constraints for the seller. Proposition 1 characterizes its solution.
This solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to the full problem if it satises
all constraints of the full problem. For reasons of brevity, we do not present another
Proposition that claries the conditions under which this is the case. Instead, Exam-
ple 4.1 below provides an illustration that is based on particular functional forms and
parameter values.
Proposition 4.1. A social choice function f solves the relaxed problem of robust mecha-
nism design if and only if it has the following properties:
(a) For any one θs ∈ Θs, the participation constraint of a low type buyer is binding:
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = p¯ib .
(b) For any one θs ∈ Θs, the incentive constraint of a high type buyer is binding:
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) .
(c) The trading rule is such that, for any one θs ∈ Θs, there is a downward distortion at
the bottom
qf (θb, θs) ∈ argmaxq
(
θb −
g(θb, θs)
g(θb, θs)
(θb − θb)
)
q − θsk(q) ,
and no distortion at the top
qf (θb, θs) ∈ argmaxq θbq − θsk(q) .
(d) The payment rule for the buyer is such that, for any one θs,
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs) ,
and
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf (θb, θs) .
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(e) The revenue for the seller is such that∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
b (θb, θs) =
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
s (θb, θs) .
A formal proof of Proposition 4.1 is in part 4.B of the Appendix. Here, we provide a
sketch of the main argument: Since we leave out the seller’s incentive constraint, we
can treat the seller’s cost parameter as a known quantity. Hence, we think of the relaxed
problem as consisting of two separate prot-maximization problems, one for a high-cost
seller and one for a low-cost seller, which are linked only via the resource constraint.
In each of these problems, however, the buyer’s incentive and participation constraints
remain relevant. Therefore, we have two prot-maximization problems. The formal
structure of any one of those problems is the same as the structure of a non-linear pricing
problem with two buyer types. This problem is well-known so that standard arguments
can be used to derive properties (a)-(e) above.10
The solution to the relaxed problem leaves degrees of freedom for the specication of
the payments to the seller. Consequently, any specication of the seller’s revenues, so
that the expected revenue is equal to the buyer’s expected payment, is part of a solution
to the relaxed problem. If there is one such specication that satises the seller’s ex post
incentive and participation constraints, then this solution to the relaxed problem is also
a solution to the full problem. In the following we provide a specic example in which
these payments are specied in such a way that they satisfy not only these constraints,
but also give rise to ex post budget balance, i.e. in every state (θb, θs), the price paid by
the buyer equals the revenue obtained by the seller,
pfb (θb, θs) = p
f
s (θb, θs) . (4.5)
Example 4.1: An optimal robust social choice function. Suppose that θb = 1,
θb = 1.30, θs = 0.20, and θs = 0.65. Also assume that the seller has a quadratic cost
function k(q) = 1
2
q2. Finally, assume that the reservation utility levels of both the buyer
and the seller are given by p¯ib = p¯is = 2.68. For these parameters, an optimal robust
social choice function f looks as follows: The traded quantities are given by
qf (θb, θs) = 3.50, q
f (θb, θ¯s) = 1.08, q
f (θ¯b, θs) = 6.50 and qf (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.00 .
The buyer’s payments are
pfb (θb, θs) = 3.50, p
f
b (θb, θ¯s) = 1.08, p
f
b (θ¯b, θs) = 7.40 and p
f
b (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.28 .
10A classical reference is Mussa and Rosen (1978), see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a textbook
treatment.
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Finally, the seller’s revenues are
pfs (θb, θs) = 3.50, p
f
s (θb, θ¯s) = 1.08, p
f
s (θ¯b, θs) = 7.40 and pfs (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.28 .
By construction, f is ex post incentive compatible and satises the ex post participation
constraints. However, it is not externality-free. These properties can be veried by
looking at the games which are induced by this social choice function on the various
complete information environments. For instance, the following matrix represents the
normal form game that is induced by f in a complete information environment so that
the buyer has a low valuation and the seller has a low cost.11
Table 4.1: Low valuation buyer and low cost seller
The game induced by f for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pifb , pi
f
s ) θs θ¯s
θb (2.68, 5.52) (2.68, 3.88)
θb (1.56, 6.65) (2.33, 5.03)
The rst entry in each cell is the buyer’s payo, the second entry in the cell is the seller’s payo.
If both individuals truthfully reveal their types, the payos in the upper left corner are realized.
Note that under truth-telling both payos are weakly larger than the reservation utility of 2.68 so
that the relevant ex post participation constraints are satised. Also note that the seller does not
benet from an exaggeration of her cost, if the buyer communicates his low valuation truthfully.
Likewise, the buyer does not benet from an exaggeration of his willingness to pay, given that
the seller communicates her low cost truthfully. Hence, the relevant ex post incentive constraints
are satised. Finally, note that externality-freeness is violated: If the seller behaves truthfully, her
payo is higher if the buyer communicates a high willingness to pay.
For later reference, we also describe the normal form games that are induced in the
remaining complete information environments.
11More precisely, this and the following normal form games are generated by an approximation fx of f
which is such that, whenever an incentive constraint is binding under f , a deviation from truth-telling
has a small cost of two cents under fx. Our laboratory experiments used fx rather than f . Thus, under
fx it is less tempting to deviate from truth-telling and we can be more condent that the deviations
from truth-telling that we observe reect social preferences, as opposed to an arbitrary selection from
a set of best responses.
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Table 4.2: Low valuation buyer and high cost seller
(pib, pis) θs θ¯s
θb (2.68, 2.08) (2.68, 3.56)
θb (1.56,−5.23) (2.33, 3.90)
Table 4.3: High valuation buyer and low cost seller
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (3.97, 5.52) (3.06, 3.88)
θb (3.99, 6.65) (3.08, 5.03)
Table 4.4: High valuation buyer and high cost seller
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (3.97, 2.08) (3.06, 3.56)
θb (3.99,−5.23) (3.08, 3.90)
An inspection of Tables 4.1 trough 4.4 reveals the following properties of f : (i) Under
truth-telling the seller’s payo exceeds the buyer’s payo in all states of the economy,
(ii) if the buyer’s type is low (Tables 4.1 and 4.2), then his payo under truth-telling is
equal to his reservation utility level of 2.68, i.e. the participation constraint of a low type
buyer binds, (iii) if the buyer’s type is high (Tables 4.3 and 4.4), then the buyer’s incentive
constraint is binding in the sense that understating comes at a very small personal cost
(the payo drops from 3.99 to of 3.97).
4.4.2 An observation on models of social preferences
We now show that the social choice function in Proposition 4.1 is not robust in the fol-
lowing sense: It provokes deviations from truth-telling if individuals are motivated by
social preferences. To formalize a possibility of social preferences, we assume that any
one individual i ∈ {b, s} has a utility function Ui(θi, ri, rbi , rbbi ) which depends in a para-
metric way on the individual’s true type θi and, in addition, on the following three argu-
ments: the individual’s own report ri, the individual’s (rst order) belief about the other
player’s report, rbi , and the individuals’ (second order) belief about the other player’s
rst-order belief, rbbi . Dierent models of social preferences make dierent assumptions
about these utility functions.
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Intention-based social preferences. Second-order beliefs play a role in models with
intention-based social preferences such as Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006). In these models, the utility function takes the
following form
Ui(θi, ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pii(θi, f(ri, r
b
i )) + yi κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i )κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) . (4.6)
The interpretation is that the players’ interaction gives rise to sensations of kindness or
unkindness, as captured by yi κi(ri, rbi , rbbi )κj(rbi , rbbi ). In this expression, yi ≥ 0 is an
exogenous parameter, interpreted as the weight that agent i places on kindness consid-
erations. The term κi(ri, rbi , rbbi ) is a measure of how kindly i intends to treat the other
agent j. While the models of Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk
and Fischbacher (2006) dier in some respects, they all make the following assumption:
Given rbi and rbbi , for any two reports r′i and r′′i , pij(θj, f(r′i, rbi )) ≥ pij(θj, f(r′′i , rbi )) im-
plies that κi(r′i, rbi , rbbi ) ≥ κi(r′′i , rbi , rbbi ), i.e. the kindness intended by i is larger if her
report yields a larger payo for j. Second-order beliefs are relevant here if player i ex-
presses kindness by increasing j’s payo relative to the payo that, according to the
beliefs of i, j expects to be realizing. The latter payo depends on the beliefs of i about
the beliefs of j about i’s behavior.
Whether or not i’s utility is increasing in κi depends on i’s belief about the kindness
that is intended by player j and which is denoted by κj . If κj > 0, then i believes that j is
kind and her utility increases, ceteris paribus, if j’s payo goes up. By contrast, if κj < 0,
then i believes that j is unkind and her utility goes up if j is made worse o. Rabin (1993),
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) all assume that the
function κj is such that, for given second-order beliefs rbbi , κj(rbi
′
, rbbi ) ≥ κi(rbi ′′, rbbi )
whenever pii(θi, f(rbi
′
, rbbi )) ≥ pii(θi, f(rbi ′′, rbbi )). Second-order beliefs play a role here
because, in order to assess the kindness that is intended by j, i has to form a belief about
j’s belief about i’s report.
Outcome-based social preferences. In models with outcome-based social prefer-
ences such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), or Charness and
Rabin (2002) second order beliefs play no role and individuals are assumed to care about
their own payo and the distribution of payos among the players. For instance, with
Fehr-Schmidt-preferences, the utility function of individual i reads as
Ui(θi, ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pii(θi, f(ri, r
b
i ))
−αi max{pij(θj, f(ri, rbi ))− pii(θi, f(ri, rbi )), 0}
−βi max{pii(θi, f(ri, rbi ))− pij(θj, f(ri, rbi )), 0} ,
(4.7)
where it is assumed that αi ≥ βi and that 0 ≤ βi < 1.
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Implications for the social choice function in Proposition 4.1. Many models
of social preferences give rise to the prediction that a social choice function that would
be optimal if individual were selsh will trigger deviations from truth-telling. Speci-
cally, for our bilateral trade problem, high valuation buyers will understate their valua-
tion. Models of outcome-based and intention-based social preferences provide dierent
explanations for this: With outcome-based social preferences, the buyer may wish to
harm the seller so as to make their expected payos more equal. The reasoning for
intention-based models, such as Rabin (1993), would have a dierent logic. For the game
in Table 4.4, the buyer would argue as follows: My expected payo would be higher if
the seller deviated from truth-telling and communicated a low cost. Since the seller does
not make use of this opportunity to increase my payo, he is unkind. I therefore wish
to reciprocally reduce his expected payo.
Whatever the source of the desire to reduce the seller’s payo, a high valuation buyer
can reduce the seller’s payo by understating his valuation. Since the relevant incentive
constraint binds, such an understatement is costless for the buyer, i.e. he does not have
to sacrice own payo if he wishes to reduce the seller’s payo.
The following observation states this more formally for the case of Fehr-Schmidt-
preferences. In Appendix 4.A, we present analogous results for other models of social
preferences.
Observation 4.1. Consider a complete information types space for state (θb, θs) and sup-
pose that θb = θ¯b. Suppose that f is such that
pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) > pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) > pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) (4.8)
Suppose that the seller behaves truthfully. Also suppose that the buyer has Fehr-Schmidt-
preferences as in (4.7) with αb 6= 0. Then the buyer’s best response is to understate his
valuation.
The social choice function in Example 4.1 fullls Condition (4.8). Consider Tables
4.3 and 4.4. The buyer’s incentive constraint binds. Moreover, if the buyer understates
his valuation, this harms the seller. The harm is, however, limited in the sense that the
seller’s reduced payo still exceeds the buyer’s payo. For such a situation the Fehr-
Schmidt model of social preferences predicts that the buyer will deviate from truth-
telling, for any pair of parameters (αb, βb) so that αb 6= 0. Put dierently, truth-telling is
a best response for the buyer only if αb = 0, i.e. only if the buyer is selsh.
4.4.3 Social-preference-robust mechanisms
The models of social preferences mentioned so far dier in many respects. They are,
however, all consistent with the following assumption of selshness in the absence of
externalities.
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Assumption 4.1. Given rbi and rbbi , if r′i and r′′i are such that pij(θj, f(r′i, rbi )) =
pij(θj, f(r
′′
i , r
b
i )) and pii(θi, f(r
′
i, r
b
i )) > pii(θi, f(r
′′
i , r
b
i )), then Ui(θi, r
′
i, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) ≥
Ui(θi, r
′′
i , r
b
i , r
bb
i ).
Assumption 4.1 holds provided that individuals prefer to choose strategies that in-
crease their own payo, whenever they can do so without aecting others. This does
not preclude a willingness to sacrice own payo so as to either increase or reduce the
payo of others. It is a ceteris paribus assumption: In the set of strategies that have
the same implications for player j, player i weakly prefers the ones that yield a higher
payo for herself. Assumption 4.1 has the following implication: In situations where
players do not have the possibility to aect the payos of others, social preferences will
be behaviorally irrelevant, and the players act as if they were selsh payo maximizers.
The following observation illustrates that the utility function underlying the Fehr
and Schmidt (1999)-model of social preferences satises Assumption 4.1 for all possi-
ble parametrization of the model. Appendix 4.A. conrms this observation for other
models of social preferences.12
Observation 4.2. Suppose the buyer and the seller have preferences as in (4.7) with param-
eters (αb, βb) and (αs, βs), respectively. The utility functions Ub and Us satisfy Assumption
4.1, for all (αb, βb) so that αb ≥ βb and 0 ≤ βb < 1 and for all (αs, βs) so that αs ≥ βs
and 0 ≤ βs < 1.
We now dene a mechanism that is robust in the following sense: For any individual
i, given correct rst- and second-order beliefs, a truthful report maximizes Ui, for all
utility functions satisfying Assumption 4.1.
Denition 4.1. A direct mechanism for social choice function f is said to be social-prefer-
ence-robust if it satises the following property: On any complete information environment,
given correct rst- and second-order beliefs, truth-telling by any player i ∈ {b, s} is a best
response to truth-telling by player j 6= i, for all utility functions Ui satisfying Assumption
4.1.
Social-preference-robustness of a mechanism is an attractive property. It is robust
against widely varying beliefs of the mechanism designer about what is the appropriate
specication and intensity of social preferences across individuals. As long as prefer-
ences satisfy Assumption 4.1, we can be assured that individuals behave truthfully under
such a mechanism.
12Assumption 4.1 is also satised in models of pure altruism, see Becker (1974). All parameterized versions
that Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) propose for their model are consistent with Assumption 4.1, too,
although we note that it is theoretically possible to construct preferences that are consistent with
their general assumptions and may still violate Assumption 4.1. Such preferences would be the only
possible exception that we encountered among prominent social preference models.
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The following Proposition justies our interest in externality-free mechanisms. If we
add externality-freeness to the requirement of incentive compatibility, we arrive at a
social-preference-robust mechanism.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that f is ex post incentive-compatible and externality-free. Then
f is social-preference-robust.
Proof. Consider a complete information environment for types (θi, θj). Suppose that
player i believes that player j acts truthfully so that rbi = θj and that he believes that
player j believes that he acts truthfully so that rbbi = θi. By ex post incentive com-
patibility, pii(θi, f(ri, rbi )) is maximized by choosing ri = θi. By externality-freeness,
pij(θj, f(r
′
i, r
b
i )) = pij(θj, f(r
′′
i , r
b
i )) for any pair r′i, r′′i ∈ Θi. Hence, by Assumption 4.1,
ri = θi solves maxri∈Θi Ui(θi, ri, rbi , rbbi ). 
4.4.4 Optimal robust and externality-free mechanism design
We now add the requirement of externality-freeness to our mechanism design problem.
To characterize the solution of this mechanism design problem it is instructive to begin,
again, with a relaxed problem in which only a subset of all constraints is taken into
account. Specically, the relevant constraints are: the resource constraint in (4.4), the
participation constraints for a low valuation buyer,
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) ≥ p¯ib, for all θs ∈ Θs ,
the incentive constraint for a high type buyer who faces a low cost seller,
pib(θ¯b, f(θ¯b, θs)) ≥ pib(θ¯b, f(θb, θs)) ,
and, nally, the externality-freeness condition for a high valuation buyer
pib(θ¯b, f(θ¯b, θs)) = pib(θ¯b, f(θ¯b, θ¯s)) .
Again, we do not provide a complete characterization of the conditions under which the
solution to the relaxed problem and the solution to the full problem coincide. Example
4.2 below provides an illustration of such a case.
Proposition 4.3. A social choice function f ′ solves the relaxed problem of robust and
externality-free mechanism design if and only if it has the following properties:
(a)’ For any one θs ∈ Θs, the participation constraint of a low type buyer is binding:
pib(θb, f
′(θb, θs)) = p¯ib .
(b)’ For θs = θs, the incentive constraint of a high type buyer is binding.
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(c)’ The trading rule is such that there is a downward distortion only for state (θb, θs);
qf
′
(θb, θs) ∈ argmaxq
(
θb −
gm(θb)
g(θb, θs)
(θb − θb)
)
q − θsk(q) ,
where gm(θb) := g(θb, θs) + g(θb, θs). Otherwise, there is no distortion.
(d)’ The payment rule for the buyer is such that, for any one θs,
pf
′
b (θb, θs) = θbq
f ′(θb, θs) .
In addition
pf
′
b (θb, θs) = θbq
f ′(θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf
′
(θb, θs) ,
and
pf
′
b (θb, θs) = θbq
f ′(θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf
′
(θb, θs) ,
(e)’ The revenue for the seller is such that∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f ′
b (θb, θs) =
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f ′
s (θb, θs) .
A formal proof of the Proposition is relegated to part 4.B of the Appendix. It proceeds
as follows: The rst step is to show that all inequality constraints of the relaxed problem
have to be binding. Otherwise, it would be possible to implement the given trading rule
qf
′ with higher payments of the buyer. This establishes (a)′ and (b)′. Second, we solve
explicitly for the payments of the buyer as a function of the trading rule qf ′ — this yields
(d)′ — and substitute the resulting expressions into the objective function. This resulting
unconstrained optimization problem has rst order conditions which characterize the
optimal trading rule, see the optimality conditions in (c)′.
After having obtained the solution to the relaxed problem, we need to make sure that
it is also a solution to the full problem. For the buyer, it can be shown that the neglected
participation, incentive and externality-freeness constraints are satised provided that
the solution to the relaxed problem is such that the traded quantity increases in the
buyer’s valuation and decreases in the seller’s cost. If there is a solution to the relaxed
problem that satises the seller’s incentive, participation and externality-freeness con-
straints, then this solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to the full problem.
The social choice function f ′ in Example 4.2 below has all these properties.
The substantive dierence between the optimal robust mechanism in Proposition 4.1
and the optimal robust and externality-free mechanism in Proposition 4.3 is in the pat-
tern of distortions. The optimal robust mechanism has downward distortions whenever
the buyer has a low valuation. The optimal robust and externality-free mechanism has
a downward distortion in only one state, namely the state in which the buyer’s valua-
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tion is low and the seller’s cost is low. This distortion, however, is more severe than the
distortion that arises for this state with the optimal robust mechanism.
Example 4.2: An optimal robust and externality-free social choice function.
Suppose the parameters of the model are as in Example 4.1. The social choice function
f ′, specied in Proposition 4.3, solves the problem of optimal robust and externality-free
mechanism design formally dened in the previous paragraph: The traded quantities are
given by
qf
′
(θb, θs) = 2, q
f ′(θb, θ¯s) = 1.54, q
f ′(θ¯b, θs) = 6.5 and qf
′
(θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2 .
The buyer’s payments are
pf
′
b (θb, θs) = 2, p
f ′
b (θb, θ¯s) = 1.54, p
f ′
b (θ¯b, θs) = 7.85 and p
f ′
b (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2 .
Finally, the seller’s revenues are
pf
′
s (θb, θs) = 2.52, p
f ′
s (θb, θ¯s) = 1.99, p
f ′
s (θ¯b, θs) = 6.35 and pf
′
s (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.52 .
To illustrate the property of externality-freeness, we consider, once more, the various
complete information games which are associated with this social choice function.
Table 4.1’: The game induced by f ′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (2.68, 5.33) (2.68, 4.86)
θb (0.97, 5.33) (2.66, 5.31)
Along the same lines as for Table 4.1, one may verify that the relevant ex post incentive and partic-
ipation constraints are satised. In addition, externality-freeness holds: If the seller communicates
her low cost truthfully, then she gets a payo of 5.33 irrespectively of whether the buyer com-
municates a high or a low valuation. Also, if the buyer reveals his low valuation, he gets 2.68
irrespectively of whether the seller communicates a high or a low cost.
Again, we also describe the normal form games that are induced by f ′ in the remaining
complete information environments.
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Table 4.2’: The game induced by f ′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (2.68, 4.19) (2.68, 4.21)
θb (0.97,−6.57) (2.66, 4.21)
Table 4.3’: The game induced by f ′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (3.41, 5.33) (3.24, 4.86)
θb (3.43, 5.33) (3.43, 5.31)
Table 4.4’: The game induced by f ′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (3.41, 4.19) (3.24, 4.21)
θb (3.43,−6.57) (3.43, 4.21)
On top of externality-freeness, the social choice function f ′ in Tables 4.1’ to 4.4’ has
the following properties: (i) The seller’s payo under truth-telling is higher than the
buyer’s payo under truth-telling, (ii) a low type buyer realizes his reservation utility
(see Tables 4.1’ and 4.2’), and (iii) the buyer’s incentive constraint binds if the seller’s
cost is low, but not if the seller’s cost is high (see Tables 4.3’ and 4.4’).
4.5 A laboratory experiment
We conducted a laboratory experiment with ve treatments. The rst treatment is based
on the optimal mechanism f under selsh preferences in Example 4.1 (T1), and the sec-
ond treatment is based on the optimal externality-free mechanism f ′ under social pref-
erences in Example 4.2 (T2). The three additional treatment variations (T3-5) will be
described in subsequent sections. All treatments were conducted employing exactly the
same laboratory procedures which are described below.
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Laboratory Procedures. The experiments were conducted in the Cologne Laboratory
for Economic Research at the University of Cologne. They had been programmed with
z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007), and participants were recruited with the on-
line recruitment system ORSEE developed by Greiner (2004). In total, we recruited 632
subjects who participated in twenty sessions, four for each of the ve treatments. Each
subject was allowed to participate in one session and in one treatment only (between-
subject design). We collected at least 63 independent observations for each treatment
and player role. Subjects were students from all faculties of the University of Cologne,
mostly female (380 subjects), with an average age of 24 years. A session lasted 45-60
minutes. Average payments to subjects, including the show-up fee, was 10.76 Euro.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to computer-terminals and received
identical written instructions, which informed them about all general rules and proce-
dures of the experiment. All treatment- and role-specic information was given on the
computer-screen (see Appendix 4.C for instructions and screenshot). We used neutral
terms to describe the game; e.g., player-roles were labeled Participant A (B) and strate-
gies were labeled Top (Left) and Bottom (Right) respectively. 13
Subjects then went through a learning stage, with no interaction among subjects and
no decision-dependent payments. In the learning stage, subjects had to choose actions
for each player role in each complete information game and then to state the resulting
payos for the corresponding self-selected strategy combination. Subjects had to give
the right answer before proceeding to the decision stage. This way we assured that all
subjects were able to correctly read the payo tables, without suggesting specic actions
which might create anchoring or experimenter demand eects.
Then subjects entered the decision stage and were informed about their role in their
matching group. The matching into groups and roles was anonymous, random and held
constant over the course of the experiment. Within the decision stage, subjects had to
choose one action for each of the four complete information games of their specic treat-
ment.14 The order of the four games was identical to the order in Table 4.5. Only after
all subjects submitted their choices, feedback was given to each subject on all choices
and resulting outcomes in their group. Finally, one of the four games was randomly
determined for being paid in addition to a 2.50 Euro show-up fee.
Results. Table 4.5 (on page 163) summarizes the decisions made in the experiment.
Sellers report their true valuation in almost all cases. Buyers with a low type also make
truthful reports in both treatments. This is dierent for high type buyers in T1, though.
Here, 13% (16%) of the buyers understate their true valuation when facing a seller with
13In the following we refer to the specic roles within the experiment as buyers and sellers, to make this
section consistent with previous ones.
14As mentioned before, our experimental testing strategy takes for granted the equivalence between im-
plementability in all complete information environments and implementability in all incomplete in-
formation environments; see Section 4.9 for discussion.
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a low (high) valuation.
This pattern of buyer and seller behavior is in line with models of social preferences.
In particular, for T1, which is based on an optimal mechanism for selsh agents, these
models imply that high type buyers cannot be expected to always make truthful reports.
By contrast, for T2, which is based on an optimal externality-free mechanism, these
models unambiguously predict truthful behavior. We observe signicantly higher shares
of truthful high type buyer reports in T2 in comparison to T1 (two-sided Fisher’s exact
test, p = 0.017 for the games with a low type seller and p = 0.014 for the games with a
high type seller).
Table 4.5: Choice Data T1 and T2
Buyer Seller
Game induced by θb θb θs θs
T1 f for (θb, θs) 63 0 63 0
optimal mechanism under f for (θb, θs) 63 0 0 63
selsh preferences f for (θb, θs) 8 55 63 0
f for (θb, θs) 10 53 1 62
T2 f
′ for (θb, θs) 64 0 62 2
externality-free f
′ for (θb, θs) 64 0 0 64
mechanism f
′ for (θb, θs) 1 63 64 0
f ′ for (θb, θs) 2 62 0 64
4.6 Which mechanism is more profitable?
We now turn to the question which of the two mechanisms the designer would prefer.
We rst clarify the conditions under which the optimal mechanism for selsh agents
outperforms the optimal externality-free mechanism in the sense that it yields a higher
value of the designer’s objective, here, maximal expected prots for the seller. We then
check whether these conditions are satised in our experiment data.
Based on our experiment results, we introduce a distinction between dierent behav-
ioral types of buyers. There is the “truthful type” and the “understatement type”.15 The
former communicates his valuation truthfully in all the complete information games in-
duced by the optimal robust mechanism f . The latter communicates a low valuation in
15We refer to behavioral types because we wish to remain agnostic with respect to the social preference
model that generates this behavior. Truthful behavior, for instance, can be rationalized both by selsh
preferences and by preferences that include a concern for welfare. In the latter case, understatement
is not attractive because it is Pareto-damaging.
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all such games. We assume throughout that the seller always behaves truthfully, which
is also what we observed in the experiment. We denote the probability that a buyer is of
the “truthful type” by σ. We denote by Πf (σ) the expected prots that are realized under
f . We denote by Πf ′ the expected prots that are realized under the optimal externality-
free social choice function f ′, under the assumption that the buyer and the seller behave
truthfully in all complete information games.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that Πf (0) < Πf ′ . Then there is a critical value σˆ so that
Πf (σ) ≥ Πf ′ if and only if σ ≥ σˆ.
Proof. We rst note that
Πf (σ) =
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
{
σ(pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))
+(1− σ)(pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))
}
= σΠf (1) + (1− σ)Πf (0) .
We also note that Πf (1) > Πf ′ since Πf (1) gives expected prots if there are only
truthful buyer types, which is the situation in which f is the optimal mechanism. The
term σΠf (1) + (1− σ)Πf (0) is a continuous function of σ. It exceeds Πf ′ for σ close to
one. If Πf (0) < Πf ′ , it falls short of Πf ′ for σ close to zero. Hence, there is σˆ ∈ (0, 1) so
that Πf (σ) = σΠf (1) + (1− σ)Πf (0) exceeds Πf ′ if and only if σ exceeds σˆ. 
Our experiment data revisited. For the Examples 4.1 and 4.2 on which our experi-
ments were based, the premise of Proposition 4.4 that Πf (0) < Πf ′ is fullled. Speci-
cally,
Πf (0) = 4.54 , Πf (1) = 4.91 , Πf (σ) = 4.91− 0.37σ , Πf ′ = 4.77 and σˆ = 0.622
Thus, the fraction of deviating buyers must rise above 0.38 if the optimal external- ity-
free mechanism is to outperform the optimal robust mechanism. In our experiment data,
however, the fraction of deviating buyer types was only 0.14. As a consequence, actual
average seller prots are smaller under the externality-free mechanism (4.77) than under
the optimal robust mechanism (4.82). This dierence was not found to be statistically
signicant, though (two-sided t-test based on independent average prots, p = 0.143).16
One might have expected more deviations from truth-telling. For instance, the social
preference model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is consistent with truthful buyers only for
16Intuitively, the sellers matched with the low valuation buyers dampen the eect of the deviant high
valuation buyers on the performance measure.
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one special case, namely the case in which buyers are completely selsh so that αb = 0,
and Fehr and Schmidt estimate that often roughly 50% of subjects behave in a fair way.
This would have been more than enough to make the externality-free mechanism more
protable. However, the degree of selshness may vary with the framing of the context,
size of payments, etc., and moreover not all social preference models predict deviations.
For instance, according to the model of Charness and Rabin (2002), individuals have a
concern for welfare, so that an eciency-damaging action such as communicating a low
valuation instead of high valuation seems less attractive. This uncontrolled uncertainty
about the mix of preferences among negotiators in a specic context justies our ap-
proach to not further specify (beliefs about) social preferences.
That said, an important insight is that the ability to control behavior is not the same as
the ability to reach a given objective, here maximal seller prots. Under an externality-
free mechanism deviations from truth-telling are no longer tempting, i.e. this mechanism
successfully controls behavior. One may, however, still prefer to use a mechanism under
which some agents deviate if the complimentary set of agents who do not deviate is
suciently large.
4.7 Finding a superior mechanism: An engineering
approach
Our laboratory ndings suggest that the requirement of externality-freeness is more
than what is really needed to control behavior. Under the optimal mechanism for self-
ish agents only particular deviations from truth-telling were observed frequently: Some
of the high valuation buyers understated their valuation. However, when we impose
externality-freeness we also ensure that low valuation buyers do not overstate their val-
uation, that high cost sellers do not understate their costs, and that low cost sellers do not
exaggerate their costs. While such deviations could possibly be rationalized by models
of social preferences, they seem empirically less likely.
In the following, we therefore consider a mechanism design problem in which the
requirement of externality-freenes is imposed only locally, namely such that the buyer
is unable to inuence the seller’s payo. Formally, we require that, for all θs ∈ Θs,
pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) = pis(θs, f(θ¯b, θs)) . (4.9)
We do not attempt to provide an axiomatic foundation for these constraints. The moti-
vation for imposing them comes exclusively from the behavior that we observed in our
laboratory tests of the mechanisms in Examples 4.1 and 4.2. This is why refer to this
approach as “engineering” (see Roth, 2002 and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2012).
Remember that the optimal social choice function that we characterize in Proposi-
tion 4.1 leaves degrees of freedom for the specication of the payments to the seller.
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For instance, these payments can be chosen so that, in each state, the payment of the
buyer equals the seller’s revenue, as stipulated by (4.5). Alternatively, the payments can
be chosen so that the local externality-freeness condition (4.9) is satised; i.e. there is
an optimal mechanism that satises (4.9). Hence, local externality-freeness can be en-
sured without having to sacrice performance. This is stated formally in the following
Proposition that we prove in part 4.B of the Appendix.
Proposition 4.5. There is a solution to the relaxed problem of robust mechanism design,
characterized in Proposition 4.1, that satises (4.9).
Proposition 4.5 shows that if everybody is selsh then an optimal mechanism that sat-
ises ex post budget balance (as in Example 4.1 above) and an optimal mechanism that
satises local externality-freeness (as in Example 4.3 below) are equivalent in terms of
the expected prots that they generate. However, if the locally externality-free mech-
anism eliminates deviations that occur under ex post budget balance, it will perform
strictly better. To see whether this is indeed the case we ran another laboratory treat-
ment (T3), employing the same procedures as outlined in Section 4.5, yet based on the
following Example.
Example 4.3: An optimal robust and locally externality-free social choice func-
tion. We illustrate Proposition 4.5 in the context of our numerical example. The payo
functions, parameter values, and traded quantities are as in Example 4.1. We denote the
optimal mechanism that is locally externality-free by f ′′. Under f ′′, payments to the
seller are given by
pf
′′
s (θb, θs) = 4.065, p
f ′′
s (θb, θ¯s) = 1.250, p
f ′′
s (θ¯b, θs) = 6.985 , p
f ′′
s (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.110 .
Part 4.D of the Appendix contains a detailed description of the normal form games
that f ′′ induces on the four dierent complete information type spaces. It also contains
a detailed description of the experiment results. They can be summarized as follows:
As predicted, all low valuation buyers communicated their types truthfully, just as in
T1. For the states with high valuation buyers the locally externality-free mechanism has
less deviations from truth-telling than the mechanism in Example 4.1. The dierence is
signicantly dierent from zero for the states with a low type seller (two-sided Fisher’s
exact test, p = 0.033). It therefore also generates higher expected seller prots (Πf ′′ =
4.90) than both the mechanism in Example 4.1 (Πf = 4.82) and the globally externality-
free mechanism in Example 4.2 (Πf ′ = 4.77). Both welfare comparisons are statistically
signicant (two-sided t-test, p
T1 vs. T3
= 0.037 and p
T2 vs. T3
< 0.001).
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4.8 Redistributive income taxation
As in our analysis of the bilateral trade problem, we consider an economy with two
individuals, I = {1, 2}. Individual i derives utility from private goods consumption,
or after-tax-income, ci, and dislikes productive eort. Individual i’s productive eort is
measured by yi
ωi
, where yi denotes the individual’s contribution to the economy’s output,
or pre-tax-income, and ωi is a measure of the individual’s productive abilities. Thus,
an individual with high productive abilities can generate a given level of output with
less eort than an individual with low productive abilities. We assume that individual
preferences can be represented by an additively separable utility function
u(ci)− v
(
yi
ωi
)
,
where u is an increasing and concave function, and v is an increasing and convex func-
tion. Both functions are assumed to satisfy the usual Inada conditions. Note that the
individuals’ preferences satisfy the single-crossing property: For any point in a (y, c)-
diagram the indierence curve of an individual with low abilities through this point is
steeper than the indierence curve of an individual with high abilities.
We assume that ωi is the realization of a random variable that is privately observed by
individual i. This random variable either takes a high value, ωh, or a low value, ωl. A state
of the economy is a pair ω = (ω1, ω2) which species the productive ability of individual
1 and the productive ability of individual 2. The set of states is equal to {ωl, ωh}2. A
social choice function or direct mechanism consists of functions ci : {ωl, ωh}2 → R+
and yi : {ωl, ωh}2 → R+ which specify, for each state of the economy, and for each
individual, a consumption and an output level.
An important benchmark is the rst-best utilitarian welfare optimum. This is the
social choice function which is obtained by choosing, separately for each state ω, c1(ω),
c2(ω), y1(ω) and y2(ω) so as to maximize the sum of utilities,
u(c1(ω))− v
(
y1(ω)
ω1
)
+ u(c2(ω))− v
(
y2(ω)
ω2
)
,
subject to the economy’s resource constraint,
c1(ω) + c2(ω) ≤ y1(ω) + y2(ω) .
For a state where one individual is high-skilled and one is low-skilled this has the fol-
lowing implication: Both individuals get the same consumption level because marginal
consumption utilities ought to be equalized. However, the high-skilled individual has
to deliver more output than the low-skilled individual because marginal costs of eort
ought to be equalized as well.
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It will prove useful to have specic notation which refers to the rst-best utilitarian
welfare maximum for an economy with one highly productive and one less productive
individual. The former is assigned an income requirement of y∗h and a consumption level
of c∗h. The latter gets a lower income requirement, denoted by y∗l , but receives the same
consumption level c∗l = c∗h.
This social choice function raises questions of incentive compatibility. Clearly, the
high-skilled individual would prefer the outcome intended for the low-skilled individual
since the latter has the same consumption level but a smaller workload. As we will
describe in the following, whether or not the rst-best utilitarian welfare optimum can
be reached in the presence of private information on productive abilities depends on
the economy’s information structure and on whether or not we impose a condition of
externality-freeness.
Information structure. We assume that it is commonly known that, with probability
1, one individual is high-skilled and one individual is low-skilled.17 I.e. only the states
(ωl, ωh) and (ωh, ωl) have positive probability, whereas the states (ωl, ωl) and (ωh, ωh)
have probability zero. This implies that any one individual knows the other individual’s
type: If individual 1 observes that the own productive ability is high, then she can infer
that the productive ability of individual 2 is low and vice versa. Put dierently, each
possible state of the economy gives rise to a complete information type space, with the
mechanism designer as the only uninformed party.
The Mirrleesian approach. A Mirrleesian analysis imposes externality-free- ness
and anonymity. Externality-freeness requires that the outcome for any one individual
depends only on that individual’s productive ability and not on the productive ability
of the other person. Anonymity requires that these outcomes are identical across in-
dividuals, so that e.g., the outcome specied for person 1 in case that ω1 = ωl, equals
the outcome specied for person 2 in case that ω2 = ωl. Consequently, a social choice
function can be represented by two bundles (yl, cl) and (yh, ch) so that, for all i,
(yi(ω), ci(ω)) =
{
(yl, cl) whenever ωi = ωl ,
(yh, ch) whenever ωi = ωh .
Incentive compatibility then requires that an individual with low productive ability
prefers (yl, cl) over (yh, ch), and that an individual with high productive ability prefers
17This setup is due to Piketty (1993). We investigate the Mirrleesian approach under the same information
structure.
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(yh, ch) over (yl, cl).18 Formally,
u(cl)−v
(
yl
wl
)
≥ u(ch)−v
(
yh
wl
)
and u(ch)−v
(
yh
wh
)
≥ u(cl)−v
(
yl
wh
)
. (4.10)
Obviously, these Mirrleesian incentive constraints are violated by the rst-best util-
itarian welfare maximum. An optimal Mirrleesian allocation is obtained by choosing
(cl, yl) and (ch, yh) so as to maximize the sum of utilities
u(cl)− v
(
yl
ωl
)
+ u(ch)− v
(
yh
wh
)
,
subject to the incentive constraints in (4.10) and the resource constraint cl+ch ≤ yl+yh.
Piketty’s approach. Piketty (1993) constructs a mechanism which achieves the rst-
best utilitarian outcome in dominant strategies. This mechanism is anonymous, but not
externality-free. The construction is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: First-best utilitarian welfare maximum
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The Figure illustrates how the rst-best utilitarian welfare maximum can be achieved with a mech-
anism that is not externality-free. I∗l is the less able individual’s indierence curve through A =
(y∗l , c
∗
l ). Analogously, I∗h is the more able individual’s indierence curve troughB = (y∗h, c∗h). The
less able individual’s indierence curve throughB is denoted by Iˆl, and the more able individual’s
indierence curve through A is denoted by Iˆh.
In this Figure, pointA is the outcome for any one individual if it reports ωl and the other
individual reports ωh. Point B is the outcome for an individual that reports ωh if the
18According to the Taxation Principle, see Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995), these incentive con-
straints are equivalent to the possibility to reach a social choice function by specifying a tax schedule
T : y 7→ T (y) so that any one individual i chooses ci and yi so as to maximize utility subject to the
constraint that ci ≤ yi − T (yi).
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other individual reports ωl. Point C is the outcome for an individual that reports ωh if
the other individual also reports ωh. Analogously, D is the outcome for an individual
that reports ωl if the other individual also reports ωl. It can easily be veried that truth-
telling is a dominant strategy for selsh individuals if (i) point C lies above point A and
between the two individuals’ indierence curves through A, and (ii) point D lies below
point B and between the two individuals’ indierence curves through B. Also note
that this is incompatible with externality-freeness which would require that A = D and
B = C .
Social preferences. Models of social preferences can rationalize deviations from this
dominant strategy equilibrium. Consider rst a model with intentions, such as Rabin
(1993). The high-skilled individual might reason in the following way: The other indi-
vidual could have reported a high ability type, in which case I would have gotten point
C . This would have been good for me. So, the other individual is unkind since she did
not make use of this possibility to increase my payo. I am therefore willing to give up
own payo, so as to reciprocally harm the other individual. So, I should declare to be of
the low ability type. In this case we both get D. This clearly harms myself and the other
person. However, the point D is not that much worse for me, so the possibility to harm
the other person is worse the sacrice. Alternatively, we may consider a model with in-
equity aversion such as the Fehr-Schmidt-model. In this case, the same deviation could
be rationalized by the observation that if both get D, their outcomes are equal, whereas
they are very unequal in the dominant strategy equilibrium. Again, if point D is su-
ciently close to B achieving this gain in equity is not too costly for an individual with
high ability. With the Mirrleesian approach, by contrast, models of social preferences
would predict truthful behavior. Since the Mirrleesian mechanism is externality-free,
Proposition 4.2 implies that it is social-preference-robust.
An experiment. In the following we report on a laboratory experiment so as to check
whether Piketty’s approach does indeed provoke more deviations from truth-telling,
and, if, yes, what this implies for the levels of utilitarian welfare that are generated by
the two mechanisms. The experiment was based on functional form assumptions and
parameter choices that are detailed in the following example.
Example 4.4. We impose the following functional form assumption on preferences:
Ui = u(ci)− v
(
yi
ωi
)
=
√
ci − 1
2
(
yi
wi
)2
.
In addition, we let ωl = 4 and ωh = 6. Under these assumptions, the optimal Mirrleesian
allocation is given by (cMl , yMl ) = (3.45, 2.47) and (cMh , yMh ) = (6.23, 7.21). The normal
form game that is induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism on a complete information type
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space so that individual 1 is of low ability and individual 2 is of high ability is summarized
in the following table. The entries in the matrix are the players’ utility levels under the
assumption of selsh preferences.
Table 4.6: The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.26, 3.70) (3.26, 3.72)
ωh (1.99, 3.70) (1.99, 3.72)
To see that incentive compatibility holds note that rst that player 1 does not benet from claim-
ing to be of high ability if player 2 behaves truthfully. His payo would drop from 3.26 to 1.99.
Analogously, if player 1 behaves truthfully, player 2 does not benet from understating her abil-
ity, her payo would drop from 3.72 to 3.70. In addition, externality-freeness holds: If player 1
communicates her low type truthfully, then she gets a payo of 3.26 irrespectively of whether
player 2 communicates a high or a low type. Also, if player 2 reveals his high type, he gets 3.72
irrespectively of whether player 1 communicates a high or a low valuation.
Piketty’s mechanism is characterized by four points A, B, C and D, as illustrated in
Figure 4.2. Points A and B coincide with the rst-best utilitarian welfare maximum, so
that
A = (c∗l , y
∗
l ) = (5.53, 3.40) and B = (c∗h, y∗h) = (5.53, 7.66) .
There is a degree of freedom for the location of the pointsC andD. To have a completely
specied example we need to determine these points in a specic way. We do this so as
to capture the desire for welfare-maximizing redistribution which is the basic premise
of an analysis of optimal income tax systems. In particular, suppose that there is a small
probability, possibly zero, that both types have low abilities. In this case truth-telling of
both individuals yields point D. Also suppose that there is an equally small probability
that both types have high abilities, which would yield point C . We now allow for the
possibility to redistribute resources away from the lucky state in which everybody is
of high ability to the unlucky state in which everybody is of low ability. Moreover, we
maximize this level of redistribution subject to the constraint of satisfying the principles
of Piketty’s construction. More formally, we choose point C = (yC , cC) so that we
extract a maximal tax payment subject to the constraint that C lies above point A and
between the two relevant indierence curves through A.19 We then choose point D =
19Formally, it is obtained as a solution to the following problem: Maximize yC − cC , s.t.
u(cC)− v
(
yC
wh
)
≥ u(cA)− v
(
yA
wh
)
and u(cC)− v
(
yC
wl
)
≤ u(cA)− v
(
yA
wl
)
.
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(yD, cD) so as to maximize u(cD) − v
(
yD
wl
)
subject to the constraint that cD − yD =
yC−cC and subject to the requirement that pointD lies below pointB and between the
two relevant indierence curves through B. This construction is illustrated in Figure
4.2. It yields the following numerical values
C = (yC , cC) = (6.45, 7.77) and D = (yD, cD) = (4.62, 3.30) .
Figure 4.2: Piketty mechanism
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The Figure illustrates a specic Piketty mechanism. Point C is chosen so as to extract maximal tax
revenues which yields the tangency condition that is shown in the Figure. These tax revenues are
then used to make point D as attractive as possible, so that D is determined by the intersection of
indierence curve I∗h and a line with slope 1 and intercept yC − cC .
The normal form game that is induced by this version of a Piketty mechanism on a
complete information type space, so that individual 1 is of low ability and individual 2
is of high ability, is summarized in Table 4.7. Again, the entries in the matrix are the
players utility levels under the assumption of selsh preferences.
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Table 4.7: The game induced by the Piketty mechanism in Figure 4.2 for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (2.32, 3.06) (3.98, 3.08)
ωh (1.04, 4.38) (2.94, 4.40)
Truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium under the assumption of selsh preferences. Exter-
nality-freeness is violated: If player 1 truthfully communicates a low ability type, his payo de-
pends on what player 2 communicates. Likewise, if player 2 communicates her high ability type
truthfully, then her payo depends on the type declared by player 1.
We conducted two laboratory treatments, one for the Mirrleesian approach and one
for Piketty’s approach.20 As expected, we nd hardly any deviations from truth-telling
with the Mirrleesian approach: 124 of 126 low skilled individuals and 122 of 126 high
skilled individuals truthfully report their ability. With Piketty’s approach we also nd
almost no deviations from truth-telling for low skilled individuals, 121 of 126 reports
are truthful. This changes with high skilled individuals in Piketty’s approach where we
observed 21 of 126 individuals to understate their skill level. This is a signicantly larger
proportion of deviations than with the Mirrleesian approach (two-sided Fisher’s exact
test, p<0.001). As a result, the Mirrleesian approach reaches an average welfare level
that is with 6.93 signicantly larger than the average welfare level of 6.78 which results
from Piketty’s approach (two-sided t-test, p = 0.014).
4.9 Concluding remarks
This paper shows how social preferences can be taken into account in robust mechanism
design. We have rst characterized optimal mechanisms for a bilateral trade problem and
a problem of redistributive income taxation under selsh preferences. We have argued
theoretically that such a mechanism will not generally produce the desired behavior if
individuals have social preferences, and we have illustrated in a laboratory experiment
that deviations from the intended behavior indeed occur. We have then introduced an
additional constraint on mechanism design, which we termed externality-freeness. We
have shown theoretically that such a mechanism does generate the intended behavior if
individuals are motivated by social preferences, without a need to specify (beliefs about)
the nature and intensity of social preferences. We have nally conrmed in a series of
experiments, taking other assumptions in mechanism design for granted (see below),
that an externality-free mechanism does indeed generate the intended behavior.
20In Piketty’s approach only states with a low and a high skilled individual have a positive probability in
theory. Despite this, we asked subjects to report actions for all four skill combinations in order to use
the same procedures as in our other treatments. The results reported in this section are based on the
two states with positive probability. The full experiment data can be found in Appendix 4.D.
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These observations raise the question whether externality-freeness is a desirable prop-
erty. In our analysis of the bilateral trade problem mechanisms were designed with
an objective of prot-maximization. In our experiment data, prots were higher with
the mechanism that was derived on the assumption that individuals are selsh. The
externality-free mechanism would have been more protable only if more individuals
had deviated from truth-telling. This shows, the ability to make money is not necessarily
the same as the ability to predict behavior. For a problem of welfare-maximizing income
taxation, by contrast, an externality-free Mirrleesian income tax system not only con-
trolled behavior better but also generated more welfare than an alternative mechanism,
proposed by Piketty (1993), that would give rise to rst-best outcomes if all individuals
were selsh.
These observations reect that externality-freeness is a sucient but not a necessary
condition for the ability to predict behavior. Its advantage is that it successfully controls
the underlying motivations across a wide variety of social preferences discussed in the
literature, as well as the frequently observed large heterogeneity in parameter values
across individuals. A fully edged mechanism design exercise would require to elicit
not only the monetary payos of individuals but also the precise functional form of their
social preferences. We conjecture that with such a more ne-tuned mechanism design
approach, there would no longer be a tension between the ability to predict behavior
and the ability to reach a given objective. However, a need to specify the details of the
nature and intensity of social preferences, which typically dier across individuals and
contexts, would work against our goal to develop robust mechanisms in the spirit of the
Wilson doctrine. We leave the question what can and what cannot be reached with a
ne-tuned approach to future research.
As an alternative to such an axiomatic approach one might simply try to identify the
relevant deviations from selsh behavior empirically, e.g., with a laboratory experiment,
and then impose externality-freeness conditions only locally so as to eliminate the spe-
cic deviations that pose problems for the mechanism design problem at hand. This
approach has the advantage that it does not impose as many additional constraints on
the mechanism design problem. The disadvantage is that it does not eliminate all the de-
viations from selsh behavior that can be rationalized by models of social preferences.
Thus, it is not as robust as an externality-free mechanism. We demonstrated the attrac-
tiveness of such an engineering approach in the context of the bilateral trade problem.
Imposing externality-freeness only locally enabled us to nd a mechanism that outper-
formed both an optimal mechanism for selsh agents and an optimal externality-free
mechanism.
Adding behavioral aspects to the mechanism design literature is a promising line of
research. That said, we caution that our study cannot, of course, capture all behavioral
aspects that seem relevant. For instance, our experiments do not shed light on social
preference robustness with incomplete information about monetary payos. As a rst
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step, we rather take the theoretically predicted equivalence of implementability in all
complete information environments and implementability in all incomplete informa-
tion environments, as well as the revelation principle, for granted. This way, we can
focus on the role of social preferences under certainty in mechanism design, abstracting
away from other potential inuencing behavioral factors which may arise in cognitively
and socially more demanding environments. For instance, recent evidence and theory
suggest that some patterns of risk-taking in social context are not easily explained by
either standard models of decision making under uncertainty nor standard models of
social preferences (e.g., Bohnet, Hermann, and Zeckhauser, 2008, Bolton, Ockenfels, and
Stauf, 2015, Saito, 2013, Ockenfels, Sliwka, and Werner, 2014). The implications of such
ndings for robust mechanism design need further attention. By the same token, our
approach leaves open the question whether we can generate the behavior that is needed
to implement a given social choice function also with an indirect mechanism, which
may be empirically more plausible, than a direct revelation mechanism, e.g. one that
simply asks individuals whether they are willing to trade at particular prices. These are
fundamental questions, and their answers likely generate more important insights on
how motivational and cognitive forces aect the behavioral eectiveness and eciency
of economic mechanisms. We are planning to check robustness along those lines in
separate studies.
188
4.A Other models of social preferences
Appendix 4.A Other models of social preferences
In the body of the text, we have shown that the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) pre-
dicts deviations from truth-telling in certain situations (see Observation 4.1). Below, we
present analogous ndings for two other models of social preferences, Rabin (1993) and
Falk and Fischbacher (2006). The Rabin (1993)-model is an example of intention-based
social preferences, as opposed to the outcome-based model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
The model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) is a hybrid that combines considerations that
are outcome-based with considerations that are intention-based. We show that these
models also satisfy Assumption 4.1, i.e. selshness in the absence of externalities.
Similar exercises could be undertaken for other models, such as Charness and Rabin
(2002), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Whether or not these models would
predict deviations from truth-telling under the optimal mechanism for selsh agents
depends on the values of specic parameters in these models. To avoid a lengthy ex-
position, we do not present these details here. The preferences in Charness and Rabin
(2002), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) do, however satisfy the assumption of
selshness in the absence of externalities (Assumption 4.1).
Rabin (1993). The utility function of any one player i utility takes the form in (4.6). Ra-
bin models the kindness terms in this expression in a particular way. Kindness intended
by i towards j is the dierence between j’s actual material payo and an equitable ref-
erence payo,
κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pij(ri, r
b
i )− pieij (rbi ).
The equitable payo pieij (rbi ) is to be interpreted as a norm, or a payo that j deserves
from i’s perspective. According to Rabin (1993), this reference point is the average of
the best and the worst player i could do to player j, i.e.
pieij (r
b
i ) =
1
2
(
maxri∈Eij(ri)pij(θj, f(ri, r
b
i )) +minri∈Eij(ri)pij(θj, f(ri, r
b
i ))
)
,
where Eij(ri) is the set of Pareto-ecient reports: A report ri belongs to Eij(ri) if and
only if there is no alternative report r′i so that pii(r′i, rbi ) ≥ pii(ri, rbi ) and pij(r′i, rbi ) ≥
pij(ri, r
b
i ), with at least one inequality being strict. Rabin models the beliefs of player i
about the kindness intended by j in a symmetric way. Thus,
κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pii(r
b
i , r
bb
i )− pieji (rbbi ).
Observation 4.3. Let f be a social choice function that solves a problem of optimal robust
mechanism design as dened in Section 4.4.1. Consider a complete information types space
for state (θb, θs) and suppose that θb = θ¯b. Suppose that f is such that
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) > pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) . (4.11)
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Suppose that the buyer’s and the seller’s rst and second order beliefs are as in a truth-
telling equilibrium. Also suppose that the buyer has Rabin (1993)-preferences with yb 6= 0.
Then the buyer’s best response is to truthfully reveal his valuation.
The social choice function in Example 4.1 fullls Condition (4.11). Consider Table 4.3.
The buyer’s incentive constraint binds. Moreover, if the buyer understates his valuation
this harms the seller. Since the seller’s intention, when truthfully reporting his type,
is perceived as kind, the buyer maximizes utility by rewarding the seller. By (4.8), the
buyer will therefore announce his type truth-fully for all yb.
Observation 4.4. Let f be a social choice function that solves a problem of optimal robust
mechanism design as dened in Section 4.4.1. Consider a complete information types space
for state (θb, θs) and suppose that θb = θ¯b. Suppose that f is such that (4.11) holds. Sup-
pose that the buyer’s and the seller’s rst and second order beliefs are as in a truth-telling
equilibrium. Also suppose that the buyer has Rabin (1993)-preferences with yb 6= 0. Then
the buyer’s best response is to understate his valuation.
The social choice function in Example 4.1 fullls Condition (4.11). Consider Table 4.4.
We hypothesize that truth-telling is an equilibrium and show that this leads to a con-
tradiction unless the buyer is selsh: The buyer’s incentive constraint binds. Moreover,
if the buyer understates his valuation this harms the seller. Since the seller’s intention,
when truthfully reporting his type, is perceived as unkind, the buyer maximizes util-
ity by punishing the seller. By (4.8), the buyer will therefore understate his type for all
yb 6= 0. Hence, the Rabin model predicts that the buyer will deviate from truth-telling,
for all yb 6= 0. Put dierently, truth-telling is a best response for the buyer only if yb = 0,
i.e. only if the buyer is selsh.
Finally, we note that the utility function in the Rabin (1993)-model satises Assump-
tion 4.1 for all possible parametrization of the model. The reason is that two actions
which have the same implications for the other player generate the same kindness. The
one that is better for the own payo is thus weakly preferred.
Observation 4.5. Suppose the buyer and the seller have preferences as in (4.6) with pa-
rameters yb and ys, respectively. The utility functions Ub and Us satisfy Assumption 4.1, for
all yb 6= 0 and for all ys 6= 0,
Falk and Fischbacher (2006). We present a version of the Falk-Fischbacher model
that is adapted to the two player simultaneous move games that we study. The utility
function takes again the general form in (4.6). The kindness intended by player i is now
given as
κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pij(ri, r
b
i , )− pij(rbi , rbbi ) ,
Moreover, κj(rbi , rbbi ) is modeled by Falk and Fischbacher in such a way that
κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) ≤ 0 , (4.12)
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whenever pii(rbi , rbbi )− pij(rbi , rbbi ) ≤ 0. More specically, the following assumptions are
imposed:
(a) If pii(rbi , rbbi )− pij(rbi , rbbi ) = 0, then κj(rbi , rbbi ) = 0.
(b) The inequality in (4.12) is strict whenever pii(rbi , rbbi ) − pij(rbi , rbbi ) < 0 and there
exists rj so that pii(rj, rbbi ) > pii(rbi , rbbi ).
(c) If pii(rbi , rbbi ) − pij(rbi , rbbi ) < 0 and there is no rj so that pii(rj, rbbi ) > pii(rbi , rbbi ),
then κj(rbi , rbbi ) may be zero or positive.
The case distinction in (c) is decisive for the predictions of the Falk-Fischbacher model. If
κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) > 0, then Observation 4.1 for the Fehr-Schmidt-model also holds for the Falk-
Fischbacher model. If, by contrast, κj(rbi , rbbi ) = 0, then Observations 4.3 and 4.4 for the
Rabin-model also hold for the Falk-Fischbacher model. In any case, the Falk-Fischbacher
satises Assumption 4.1, the assumption of selshness in the absence of externalities.
Observation 4.6. Suppose the buyer and the seller have preferences as in the model of
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) with parameters yb and ys, respectively. The utility functions
Ub and Us satisfy Assumption 4.1, for all yb 6= 0 and for all ys 6= 0.
This follows since pij(ri, rbi ) = pij(r′i, rbi ) implies that κi(ri, rbi , rbbi ) = κi(r′i, rbi , rbbi ).
Consequently, two actions that yield the same payo for the other player generate the
same value of κi(ri, rbi , rbbi )κj(rbi , rbbi ).
Appendix 4.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The relaxed problem imposes only the buyer’s ex post par-
ticipation and incentive constraints, as well as the constraint that the expected payments
to the seller are equal to the expected payments of the buyer, with expectations com-
puted using the designer’s subjective beliefs. Thus, the problem is to choose, for every
state (θb, θs) ∈ Θb ×Θs, qf (θb, θs), pfb (θb, θs) and pfs (θb, θs) so as to maximize∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
(
pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
subject to the following constraints: (i) the resource constraint∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
b (θb, θs) ≥
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
s (θb, θs) , (4.13)
(ii) the incentive and participation constraints for the buyer that are relevant if the seller
is of the high cost type,
θb q
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ 0 , (4.14)
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θb q
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ 0 , (4.15)
θb q
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ θb qf (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) , (4.16)
and
θb q
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ θb qf (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) , (4.17)
and nally (iii) the incentive and participation constraints for the buyer that are relevant
if the seller is of the low cost type. These constraints have the same structure as those
in (4.14)-(4.17), except that θs is everywhere replaced by θs.
Obviously, the resource constraint will be binding, so that the objective becomes to
maximize ∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
(
pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
subject to the constraints in (ii) and (iii). The solution can be obtained by solving a sepa-
rate optimization problem for each seller type. Thus, optimality requires that qf (θb, θs),
qf (θb, θs), pfb (θb, θs), and p
f
f (θb, θs) are chosen so as to maximize∑
Θb
g(θb, θs)
(
pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
subject to the constraints in (ii); likewise qf (θb, θs), qf (θb, θs), p
f
b (θb, θs), and p
f
f (θb, θs)
are chosen so as to maximize∑
Θb
g(θb, θs)
(
pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
subject to the constraints in (iii).
The solution to these problems is well-known, see e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
Thus, at a solution, the high-valuation buyer’s incentive constraint and the low-valuation
buyer’s participation constraints bind and the other constraints are slack. E.g., if θs = θs,
then (4.14) and (4.17) bind, and (4.15) and (4.16) are not binding. The optimal quantities
are then obtained by substituting
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)
and
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf (θb, θs)
into the objective function which yields
g(θb, θs)
((
θb − g(θb,θs)g(θb,θs)(θb − θb)
)
qf (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
+g(θb, θs)
(
θbq
f (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
.
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Choosing qf (θb, θs) and qf (θb, θs) to maximize this expression yields the optimality con-
ditions that are stated in Proposition 4.1 in the body of the text. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. For the relaxed problem of optimal externality-free mech-
anism design the objective is, again, the maximization of∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
(
pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
.
The resource constraint in (4.13) is binding at a solution to this problem, so that the
objective can be equivalently written as∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
(
pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
The constraints are the low valuation buyer’s ex post participation constraints,
θbq
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ 0 , (4.18)
and
θbq
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ 0 ; (4.19)
the incentive constraint for a high type buyer who faces a low cost seller,
θbq
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ θbqf (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) , (4.20)
and the constraint, that the seller must not be able to inuence the high valuation buyer’s
payo,
θbq
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) = θbqf (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) . (4.21)
Note rst that the constraint in (4.19) has to bind at a solution to this problem. The
payment pfb (θb, θs) enters only in this constraint. Hence, if we hypothesize a solution to
the optimization problem with slack in (4.19), we can raise pfb (θb, θs) without violating
any constraint, thereby arriving at a contradiction to the assumption that the initial
situation has been an optimum.
Second, the constraint in (4.18) binds as well. Suppose otherwise, then it is possible
to raise pfb (θb, θs) by some small ε > 0, without violating this constraints. If at the same
time, pfb (θb, θs) and p
f
b (θb, θs) are also raised by ε, then also the constraints in (4.20)
and (4.21) remain satised. These increases of the buyer’s payments raise the objective
function, again contradicting the assumption that the initial situation has been optimal.
Third, the constraint in (4.20) has to be binding. Otherwise, it would be possible to
raise pfb (θb, θs) without violating this constraint. If at the same time, p
f
b (θb, θs) is raised
by ε, then also (4.21) remains satised. One more time, this contradicts the assumption
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that the initial situation has been optimal.
These observations enables to express the buyer’s payments as functions of the traded
quantities, so that
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs) ,
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs) ,
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf (θb, θs) ,
and
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf (θb, θs) .
Substituting these payments into the objective function yields
g(θb, θs)
((
θb − g(θb,θs)+g(θb,θs)g(θb,θs) (θb − θb)
)
qf (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
+g(θb, θs)(θbq
f (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))
+g(θb, θs)(θbq
f (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))
+g(θb, θs)(θbq
f (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))) .
Choosing qf (θb, θs), qf (θb, θs), qf (θb, θs) and qf (θb, θs) so as to maximize this expression
yields the optimality conditions stated in Proposition 4.3. 
Proof of Proposition 4.5. We need to show that there is a solution to the optimization
problem in Proposition 4.1 that satises
pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) = pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) ,
and
pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) = pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) ,
or, equivalently,
pfs (θb, θs)− pfs (θb, θs) = θsk(qf (θb, θs))− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) , (4.22)
and
pfs (θb, θs)− pfs (θb, θs) = θsk(qf (θb, θs))− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) . (4.23)
The right-hand-side of equations (4.22) and (4.23) is pinned down by the characterization
in Proposition 4.1. However, this solution leaves degrees of freedom with respect to the
specication of the seller’s payments. It only requires that the resource constraint binds
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which implies that∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
s (θb, θs) =
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
b (θb, θs) . (4.24)
Again the right-hand side of this equation is is pinned down by the characterization in
Proposition 4.1. Thus, the four payments to the seller pfs (θb, θs), pfs (θb, θs), pfs (θb, θs) and
pfs (θb, θs) need to satisfy the three linear equations in (4.22), (4.23) and (4.24). Obviously,
there will be more than one combination of payments to the seller that satisfy all of these
conditions. 
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Appendix 4.C Instructions
The instructions are a translation of the German instructions used in the experiment, and
are identical for all participants. The original instructions are available upon request.
Instructions — General Part
Welcome to the experiment!
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you will earn, depends on your de-
cisions and the decisions of another anonymous participant, who is matched with you.
Independent of the decisions made during the experiment you will receive 7.00 e as a
lump sum payment. At the end of the experiment, positive and negative amounts earned
will be added to or subtracted from these 7.00 e. The resulting total will be paid out in
cash at the end of the experiment. All payments will be treated condentially.
All decisions made during the experiment are anonymous.
From now on, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any ques-
tions now or during the experiment, please raise your hand. We will then come to you
and answer your question.
Please switch o your mobile phone during the experiment. Documents (such as books,
lecture notes etc.) that do not deal with the experiment are not allowed. In case of vio-
lation of these rules you can be excluded from the experiment and all payments.
On the following page you will nd the instructions concerning the course of the exper-
iment. After reading these, we ask you to wait at your seat until the experiment starts.
First Part — Presentation of decision settings, reading of payos
The purpose of this part of the experiment is to familiarize all participants with the de-
cision settings. This ensures that every participant understands the presentation of the
decision settings and can correctly infer the resulting payos of specic decision com-
binations. None of the choices in the rst part are payo-relevant.
In the course of this part, eight dierent decision settings will be presented to you. In all
of them two participants have to make a decision without knowing the decision made by
the other participant. The combination of the decisions determines the payos of both
participants. [These eight decision settings refer to the four complete information games of
the respective social choice function of their specic treatment. Each game was presented
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twice: First in the original form and then in a strategically identical form where the payos
of Participant A and B were switched. This explanation is, of course, not part of the original
instructions.]
Figure 4.3: Exemplary Decision Setting
Participant A, highlighted in green, can decide between Top or Bottom. Participant B,
highlighted in blue, can decide between Left and Right. The decision of Participant A
determines whether the payment results from the upper or lower row in the table. Ac-
cordingly, the decision of Participant B determines whether the payment results from
the left or right column. Both decisions combined unambiguously determine the cell of
the payo pair.
Each cell contains a payo pair for both participants. Which payo is relevant for which
participant, is highlighted through their respective color. The green value, which can be
found in the lower left corner of every cell, shows the payo for Participant A. The blue
value, which can be found in the upper right corner of every cell, shows the payo for
Participant B.
Please familiarize yourself with the payo table. Put yourself in the position of both
participants and consider possible decisions each participant would make. After a short
time for consideration, you can enter a choice combination. The entry can be modied
and dierent constellations can be tried. After choosing two decisions, please enter the
payos which would result from this constellation. Your entry will then be veried. If
your entry is wrong, you will be notied and asked to correct it.
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Second Part — Decision Making
At the beginning of the second part you will be assigned to a role which remains con-
stant over the course of the experiment. It will be the role of either Participant A or
Participant B. Which role you are assigned to, will be clearly marked on your screen.
Please note that the assignment is random, both roles are equally likely. It will be as-
sured that half of the participants are assigned to the role of Participant A and the other
half to the role of Participant B.
Simultaneously to the assignment of roles, you are matched with a participant of a dif-
ferent role. This matching is also random. In the course of the remaining experiment
you will interact with this participant.
The second part of the experiment consists of four decisions settings. Exactly one de-
cision setting is payo relevant for you and the other participant matched with you.
Which decision setting that is, is determined by chance: Every decision setting has the
same chance of being chosen. Hence, please bear in mind that each of the following
decision settings can be payo-relevant.
All decision settings are presented similarly to those of the rst part. The dierence with
respect to the rst part is, that you can only make one decision, namely that for your
role. Thus, you do not know the decision of the participant matched with you.
Only after you have made a decision for each of the four settings, you will learn which
decision setting is relevant for your payo and the payo of the participant assigned
to you. In addition you will learn the decisions of the other participant in all decisions
settings.
After the resulting payos are displayed, the experiment ends. A short questionnaire
will appear on your screen while the experimenters prepare the payments. Please ll
out this questionnaire and wait at your seat until your number is called.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
Thank you for participating in this experiment!
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Appendix 4.D Supplementary material
4.D.1 The experiment reported on in Section 4.7
Table 4.1”: The game induced by f ′′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (2.68, 6.09) (2.68, 4.05)
θb (0.97, 6.09) (2.66, 4.86)
Table 4.2”: The game induced by f ′′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (2.68, 2.65) (2.68, 3.73)
θb (0.97,−5.79) (2.66, 3.73)
Table 4.3”: The game induced by f ′′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (3.41, 6.09) (3.24, 4.05)
θb (3.43, 6.09) (3.43, 4.86)
Table 4.4”: The game induced by f ′′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (3.41, 2.65) (3.24, 3.73)
θb (3.43,−5.79) (3.43, 3.73)
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4.D.2 Choice data T3
Table 4.8: Choice data T3
Buyer Seller
Game induced by θb θb θs θs
T3 f
′′ for (θb, θs) 63 0 62 1
locally externality-free f
′′ for (θb, θs) 63 0 0 63
mechanism f
′′ for (θb, θs) 1 62 63 0
f ′′ for (θb, θs) 7 56 0 63
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4.D.3 Normal form games which are induced by the Mirrleesian
mechanism
The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωl).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.26, 3.26) (3.26, 1.99)
ωh (1.99, 3.26) (1.99, 1.99)
The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.26, 3.70) (3.26, 3.72)
ωh (1.99, 3.70) (1.99, 3.72)
The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωh, ωl).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.70, 3.26) (3.70, 1.99)
ωh (3.72, 3.26) (3.72, 1.99)
The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωh, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.70, 3.70) (3.70, 3.72)
ωh (3.72, 3.70) (3.72, 3.72)
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4.D.4 Normal form games which are induced by the Piketty
mechanism
The game induced by the Piketty mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωl).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (2.32, 2.32) (3.98, 1.04)
ωh (1.04, 3.98) (2.94, 2.94)
The game induced by the Piketty mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (2.32, 3.06) (3.98, 3.08)
ωh (1.04, 4.38) (2.94, 4.40)
The game induced by the Piketty mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωh, ωl).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.06, 2.32) (4.38, 1.04)
ωh (3.08, 3.98) (4.40, 2.94)
The game induced by the Piketty mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωh, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.06, 3.06) (4.38, 3.08)
ωh (3.08, 4.38) (4.40, 4.40)
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4.D.5 Choice data T4 and T5
Table 4.9: Choice data T4 and T5
Individual 1 Individual 2
Game induced by ω1l ω
1
h ω
2
l ω
2
h
T4 (ωl, ωl) 62 1 62 1
Mirrleesian (ωl, ωh) 62 1 2 61
approach (ωh, ωl) 2 61 62 1
(ωh, ωh) 2 61 2 61
T5 (ωl, ωl) 57 6 55 8
Piketty’s (ωl, ωh) 60 3 14 49
approach (ωh, ωl) 7 56 61 2
(ωh, ωh) 2 61 9 54
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